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PATENTS ON METHODS OF DOING BUSINESS
DAVID T. DUTCHER
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the patentability of business methods has recently
increased in intensity. On July 23, 1998, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit ruled that there is no business method ex-
ception to the patent laws, and that business method claims must be
treated like other method claims.' Since that ruling, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office has experienced a surge in the number of
patent applications filed.2 The Federal Circuit ruling and the concomitant
effects at the United States Patent and Trademark Office have increased
the debate over the wisdom of allowing business methods to be patented.
This article explores the evolution of the law regarding business
method patents, considers the impact of the above-mentioned Federal
Circuit decision, defines what business methods patents are, explains
why they are important to companies, and discusses the arguments for
and against their patentability.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK BACKGROUND
One of the first hurdles an inventor seeking patent protection for his
or her invention encounters is ensuring that the invention is within the
subject matter defined as patentable by 35 U.S.C. §101. 3 Section 101
states, "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title.'" Thus, there are four statutory cate-
gories of patentable subject matter: processes, machines, articles of
manufacture, and compositions of matter.
Although Section 101 lists specific categories of patentable subject
matter, Congress stated that it "intended statutory subject matter to 'in-
clude anything under the sun that is made by man."' 5 The Supreme
Court, however, has imposed some limits. "Excluded from such patent
1. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
2. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, FY 2000 USPTO Annual Reports at
http://www.uspto.govlweb/offices/com/annual/2000/OOpatents.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2001).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
5. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952);
S. REp. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
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protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. 6
For example, one could not claim the law of gravity in a patent, even if
one had just discovered it.7 Courts have consistently enforced the Su-
preme Court's limits.8
Previously, many courts classified mathematical algorithms and
business methods as abstract ideas or laws of nature, thereby rendering
them unpatentable under the exceptions that the Supreme Court created.9
The development of these classifications is discussed below.
A. Mathematical Algorithm Exception
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether mathematical al-
gorithms were patentable subject matter under Section 101 in three cases
that involved computer programs.' ° In the first case, Gottschalk v. Ben-
son," Benson patented a method for converting binary-coded decimal
numerals into pure binary numerals using a general-purpose computer."
As a practical matter, the patent claimed a method of doing math prob-
lems. 3 The Supreme Court invalidated the patent as containing subject
matter not covered by the statute.'" In doing so, the Court noted that "ab-
stract intellectual concepts are not patentable" because they are the "ba-
sic tools of scien[ce]"' 5 and that "[t]he mathematical formula involved
here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a
digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed,
the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in prac-
tical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.'' 16 Gottschalk has
recently been read to mean that mathematical algorithms (e.g., computer
6. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)).
7. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
8. See generally Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 US 86
(1939).
9. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (mathematical algorithms); Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (mathematical algorithms); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)
(mathematical algorithms); Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547
(1st Cir. 1949) (business methods); Rand McNally & Co. v. Exch. Scrip-Book Co., 187 F. 984 (7th
Cir. 1911) (business methods); Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908)
(business methods).
10. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
11. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
12. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64.
13. See id at 65.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 67.
16. Id. at 71-72.
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programs) are not patentable unless they are claimed in connection with
a machine (i.e., computer).1
7
The second Supreme Court case is Parker v. Flook.'8 In Flook, the
Supreme Court relied on Gottschalk to hold that a method for updating
alarm set points during the process of catalytic conversion was unpatent-
able because the only "inventive" element of the patent was an unpatent-
able mathematical algorithm.' 9 The Court explained that the "notion that
post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself,
can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts
form over substance. 20
Finally, in Diamond v. Diehr,2" Diamond invented a process for
molding synthetic rubber.' The process combined molds, temperature
monitors, automated machinery, and a computer.23 In this case, the com-
puter constantly monitored the core temperature of the mold, recalculated
the cure time,2A and automatically opened the mold when the cure was
completed.25 In holding that the process was statutory subject matter the
Court stated:
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or
applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered
as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were de-
signed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a differ-
ent state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.21
17. See Wesley L. Austin, Sofiware Patents, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 225, 230 (1999)
(citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 72; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); Brian R. Yoshida, Claiming
Electronic and Software Technologies: The Effect of the Federal Circuit Decisions in Alappat,
Waterdam, and Lowry on the Claiming of Mathematical Algorithms and Data Structures, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 457,461,463 (1997)).
The Court's statement that "if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself' was an
unfortunate use of the term 'algorithm.' It was unfortunate because all software can properly be
referred to as different algorithms. Gottschalk should not be read as a rule that 'algorithms' are not
patentable. In light of recent case law, algorithms are patentable to the extent that they are not
abstract ideas.
Id. (citations omitted).
18. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
19. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593-94.
20. Id. at 590.
21. 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 178-79.
24. See id. at 177 n. 1. "A 'cure' is obtained by mixing curing agents into the uncured polymer
in advance of molding, and then applying heat over a period of time. If the synthetic rubber is cured
for the right length of time at the right temperature, it becomes a usable product." Id.
25. See id at 178-79.
26. Id. at 191-92.
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Significantly, the Court did not perceive the patent claims "as an attempt
to patent a mathematical formula, but rather ... an industrial process for
,,27the molding of rubber products....
In response to the Supreme Court's trilogy of cases, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") developed the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test to determine the patentability of patent claims incorporating
mathematical algorithms.28  Under the test, a court considers first,
"whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly cited."'2 9
Then, "if a mathematical algorithm is found, the claim is further ana-
lyzed to determine whether the algorithm is 'applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps,' and, if it is, it 'passes muster under §
101.'"3 Thus, under the test, if an algorithm is part of a patent claim, the
claim must recite either a physical transformation or an application to a
process in order to not be invalid under Section 101.
The Federal Circuit, however, in In re Alappat3 found patentable
subject matter in claims that recited a "means for" generating smooth
digital waves on a display screen.32 Because the "means" recited could be
accomplished by a general-purpose computer and because the invention
was truly the software, the decision effectively relaxed the physicality
requirement of the Supreme Court's trilogy.33
B. Business Method Exception
For much of the United States' patent history, the law regarding the
patentability of business methods has wavered. Early decisions of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and the lower
courts demonstrated the opinion that business methods were not patent-
able subject matter.34 For example, in Ex parte Abraham," the Commis-
sioner of Patents observed, "[ilt is contrary ... to the spirit of the law, as
construed by the office for many years, to grant patents for methods of
27. Id. at 192-93.
28. See generally State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-
74 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing the Freeman-Walter-Abele test); Cathy E. Cretsinger, Berkeley
Technology Law Journal Annual Review of Law And Technology L Intellectual Property B. Patent
AT & T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 165, 168-69 (2000)
(discussing the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test). The Freeman-Walter-Abele test was derived from
three C.C.P.A. decisions: In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
29. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In Re Walter, 618 F.2d at 767).
30. Id. at 915.
31. 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally Ex parte Abraham, 1869 Comm'r Decision 59, 59 (Comm'r Pat. 1869)
(holding that business methods were not patentable subject matter).
35. Id.
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book-keeping... ." 6However, in In re Tallmadge,37 a court suggested in
dictum that "[h]ad he really invented a method of simultaneous double
entry bookkeeping he would be entitled to the protection of that inven-
tion....""
The first appellate court to decide the issue of subject matter as ap-
plied to business method patents was the Second Circuit in Hotel Secu-
rity Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.39 ("Hotel Security"). Hotel Security is
frequently cited for giving rise to the business method exception. ' The
method claimed in Hotel Security was "designed to prevent fraud and
speculation by waiters and cashiers in hotels and restaurants.'' The
method involved: (1) assigning each waiter a number and placing the
number on order slips; (2) recording on a register in the kitchen the food
taken by each waiter under his or her number; and (3) comparing the
order slips, that the cashier kept when the customers paid, to the kitchen
register to detect dishonesty. 2 In invalidating the patent the court said,
"[t]he fundamental principle of the system is as old as the art of book-
keeping, i.e., charging the goods of the employer to the agent who takes
them."4'3
Therefore, the patent was invalidated for lack of novelty and inven-
tion and not because it claimed a business method. 4 The court confirmed
this explicitly stating, "[i]f at the time of [application for the patent],
there had been no system of bookkeeping of any kind in restaurants, we
would be confronted with the question whether a new and useful system
of cash-registering and account-checking is such an art as is patentable
under the statute." 5 Earlier in the opinion, however, in dictum the court
warned,
[a] system of transacting business disconnected from the means for
carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of
the term, an art. Advice is not patentable..."No mere abstraction, no
idea, however brilliant, can be the subject of a patent irrespective of
the means designed to give it effect."
36. Id.
37. 37 App. D.C. 590, 594 (1911).
38. Id.
39. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
40. Rinaldo Del Gallo, I1, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a
Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403,405 (1998).
41. Hotel Sec. Checking Co., 160 F. at 467.
42. See id. at 467-68.
43. Id. at 469.
44. See id. at 472.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 469 (quoting Fowler v. City of New York, 121 F. 747, 748 (2d Cir. 1903)).
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With this statement, in spite of the fact that it was dictum, and notwith-
standing the patent was invalidated for lack of novelty and invention, the
court gave birth to the business method exception.
Another decision frequently cited for the proposition that business
methods as a group are unpatentable is Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v.
Park-In Theatres, Inc.47 The patent claim at issue was a method for
parking cars in an open lot so that everyone could see the movie. 8 The
lower court found the patent to be valid, noting its novelty and success.49
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit cast aside these findings and
focused on what it determined to be the more important issue of
"whether, given the idea or conception of an open-air drive-in theatre, an
exercise of inventive faculty was required to devise the means for carry-
ing it out. ''w Thus, the court indicated that because there was no inven-
tion in the physical means, the claim must be invalidated; the fact that the
invention involved an ingenious, new idea did not save the claim.5' The
final holding was, "a system for the transaction of business, such, for
example, as the cafeteria system for transacting the restaurant busi-
ness... however novel, useful, or commercially successful is not patent-
able apart from the means for making the system practically useful, or
carrying it out."" Although this case applied a test requiring that the
physical means must be novel, and not an application of a rule that busi-
ness methods are unpatentable per se, the case is often cited for such a
proposition.53
When the physical means for implementing a business method have
been novel and inventive, patents have been upheld as within the range
of statutory subject matter. In Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange Scrip-
Book Co.,54 a passenger's coupon book that expressed units of travel in
terms of money as opposed to the usual mileage was held to be patent-
able subject matter." The court said,
47. 174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949).
48. See Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d at 550-51.
49. See id at 552.
50. Id. at 551.
51. See id. at 552.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1365 (D. Del. 1983) (explaining that Plaintiff used Loew's Drive-In
Theatres, Inc., to argue "that business methods and systems cannot form the subject matter of a valid
patent monopoly and that courts do not hesitate to invalidate patents on the grounds that they merely
describe business systems."); Leslie M. Hill, Prior User Defense: The Road to Hell is Paved with
Good and Bad Intentions, 10 FED. CIR. B.J., 2001 513, 539 n.136 (citing Loew's Drive-In Theatres,
Inc., as holding that "business methods did not fall within the boundaries of patentable subject
matter.").
54. 187 F. 985-86 (7th Cir. 1911).
55. Rand McNally, 187 F. at 986.
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[n]or do we think that this patented concept is nothing more than a
business method. Its use is a part of a business method. The ticket
patented is not a method at all, but a physical tangible facility, with-
out which the method would have been impracticable, and with which
it is practicable. And this is the status of thousands of like facilities
that, once designed and put to use, have become the first of a new
56business method; and patents on such facilities have been sustained.
The fact that the physical means was used in a business method was ir-
relevant once it was determined that the physical means was novel. 7
Many of the decisions cited above, support, only by dicta, the
proposition that the business method exception exists. 8 Furthermore,
after Hotel Security, neither the CCPA nor the Federal Circuit has ever
invoked the business method exception as the sole basis to invalidate a
patent for being directed to non-statutory subject matter.59
1. Criticism of the Business Method Exception
Recently, the business method exception to statutory subject matter
has received criticism from commentators and the judiciary.60 In In re
Schrader,6' Judge Newman wrote a vehement dissent that criticized the
business method exception. She stated that the exception is an "unwar-
ranted encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject matter in sec-
tion 101, my guidance is that it be discarded as error-prone, redundant,
and obsolete."'62 She continued by criticizing Hotel Security, and argued
that many of the cases reciting the business method exception were de-
cided on grounds other than the exception.63 She concluded her critique
of the exception by stating, "[platentability does not turn on whether the
claimed method does 'business' instead of something else, but on
whether the method, viewed as a whole, meets the requirements of pat-
entability as set forth in Sections 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act." 6
2. United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Business
Method Exception
Previously, the USPTO adopted the official position that business
methods were unpatentable subject matter.65 This position was codified in
Section 706.03 of the USPTO's Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Del Gallo, supra note 40, at 406.
59. See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
60. See Del Gallo, supra note 40, at 403-04.
61. 22 F.3d 290, 296 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
62. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 298.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Hotel Sec. Checking v. Lorraine County, 160 F. 467,469 (2d Cir. 1908).
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("MPEP"). 66 The provision stated, "[t]hough seemingly within the cate-
gory of process or method, a method of doing business can be rejected as
not being within the statutory classes. 67
As a result of the USPTO's position that business methods were
unpatentable subject matter, many applicants tried to disguise the true
nature of their claims as being directed to something besides a business
method.6' For example, in one case analyzing such a patent, the patentee
wrote the claims "in terms of apparatus, that is, 'means for' performing
certain tasks or steps, rather than in terms of the method steps them-
selves," 69 to disguise the business method.70
In 1996, the USPTO removed Section 706.03 from the MPEP.7' In
addition, the 1996 Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inven-
tions stated, "[o]ffice personnel have had difficulty in properly treating
claims directed to methods of doing business. Instead such claims should
be treated like any other process claims. 72
III. STATE STREETf
With criticism mounting against the business method exception and
the USPTO changing the MPEP, the Federal Circuit sought review of
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.74
State Street was the first appeal since In re Alappat75 in deciding whether
a claim directed to a computer "means" for performing business func-
tions constituted statutory subject matter under Section 101.76
66. See State St. Bank and Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
69. Paine, 564 F. Supp. at 1365.
70. Speaking of Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del 1983), a commentator has said:
Ultimately, the claim was upheld as statutory subject matter on the grounds that the
patentee claimed "a method of operation on a computer to effectuate business activity.".
. .This case was decided in 1983. Some commentators have noted that it marked the
beginning of the trend towards accepting business method claims as patentable subject
matter. Even though a business method was not literally claimed, it is clear that the
invention in question was nothing more than an application of a business method.
Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law Play, 4 VA. J.
L. & TECH. 9, 16 n. 35 (1999).
71. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1377.
72. Notice of final publication of the Examination Guidelines for Computer Related
Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996).
73. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
74. State St., 149 F.3d 1368.
75. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
76. State St., 149 F.3d at 1370.
2001] PATENTS ON METHODS OF DOING BUSINESS 181
A. Background
Initially, State Street Bank engaged in negotiations to license the
patented invention.77 When negotiations failed, State Street Bank brought
a declaratory judgment action and filed a motion for summary judgment
of patent invalidity for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.78
Signature's patent, entitled "Data Processing System for Hub and
Spoke Financial Services Configuration," discloses a data processing
system for implementing an investment structure by which mutual funds
pool their assets into an investment portfolio that is organized as a part-
nership. 79 The claimed system performs numerous complex calculations
that allocate the portfolio's daily income, expenses, and gain or loss
among the mutual funds.i° In addition, the system facilitates annual ac-
counting and tax assessment.8 '
The district court characterized the issue in the case to be whether
software that performed mathematical and accounting functions on a
computer was statutory subject matter.82 The court held that the invention
was both a method of doing business and a mathematical algorithm8 3
Because these were both nonstatutory subject matter, the patent was in-
valid. '4
B. Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the district
court erred in construing the claims as being directed to a process. 85 The
Federal Circuit concluded that the claims should have been construed as
claiming a machine because of their means-plus-function structure and
the supporting structure in the technical disclosure.8 The court noted,
however, that the characterization of a claim as being directed to a ma-
chine or process is of little relevance "as long as it falls within.. .one of
,,87the four enumerated categories of patentable subject matter....
The court next analyzed the statutory language of Section 101, at-
tempting to assess the statutory basis for the two "judicially-created ex-
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued Mar. 9, 1993).
80. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1371.
81. Id.
82. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 927 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D. Mass. 1996).
83. State St., 927 F. Supp. at 516.
84. Id.
85. State St., 149 F.3dat 1371.
86. See id. at 1371-72.
87. Id. at 1372.
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ceptions to statutory subject matter,"" relied on by the district court. Thecourt failed to find any basis for the exceptions in the statute:
The repetitive use of the expansive term 'any' in §101 shows Con-
gress's intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for
which a patent may be obtained beyond those specifically recited in §
101. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress in-
tended § 101 to extended to 'anything under the sun that is made by
man.'...Thus, it is improper to read limitations into § 101 on the
subject matter that may be patented where the legislative history indi-
cates that Congress clearly did not intend such limitations.89
Therefore, the court concluded that there was no support in the plain
language of the statute for the two judicially created exceptions, namely,
the business method exception and the mathematical algorithm excep-
tion.9o
After advocating an expansive reading of Section 101,91 the court
addressed the mathematical algorithm exception specifically. The court
explained that the Supreme Court has held that "mathematical algorithms
are not patentable subject matter to the extent they are merely abstract
ideas., 92 The court further stated that in order for a mathematical algo-
rithm to be patentable, it must be reduced to a practical application, such
that it produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result."'93 Unpatentable
mathematical algorithms, according to the Federal Circuit, are "identifi-
able by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied
concepts or truths that are not 'useful.' From a practical standpoint, this
means that to be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a 'useful'
way." 94 Therefore, claims reciting a series of mathematical calculations
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result are patentable. 95
While discussing the mathematical algorithm exception, the court
took occasion to rule that "the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if
any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject mat-
ter."96 The court noted that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test assists in
identifying a mathematical algorithm but does not assist in determining
the "usefulness" of the results. 9 The court concluded the mathematical
algorithm exception analysis holding that the claim produced a useful,
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1373, (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
90. State St., 149 F.3d at 1372.
91. Id. at 1373.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting In re Kuriappan P. Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
94. Id. at 1373.
95. See id. at 1375.
96. Id. at 1374.
97. See id.
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concrete, and tangible result, and therefore, was statutory subject
matter.98
After discussing the mathematical algorithm exception, the court
addressed the business method exception." The Federal Circuit specifi-
cally rejected the exception, noting that neither it nor the CCPA had ever
invoked the exception to declare an invention unpatentable. '°° The court
explained that the business method exception "represented the applica-
tion of some general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps
arising out of the 'requirement for invention'-which was eliminated by
§ 103. ' ' The court further stated that "[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, busi-
ness methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or
method."' ' In concluding its opinion, the court acknowledged the change
in the USPTO's MPEP and the issuance of the 1996 Examination
Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, discussed above.' 3
In summary, State Street stands for the proposition that business
methods constitute statutory subject matter if they produce a useful, con-
crete and tangible result. According to State Street, these methods should
be treated like other methods and analyzed under the standard criteria for
validity. '°4
IV. THE IMPACT OF STATE STREET
The impact of State Street can be viewed in a variety of ways. One
view is State Street will have little impact because, in spite of the
MPEP's Section 706.03 (which, as discussed above, has been removed),
the USPTO has been granting business method patents all along. 05 Sup-
porters of this opinion point out that before State Street, the USPTO is-
sued numerous business method patents, including the patent at issue in
the case.' 6 Furthermore, many of the cases discussing business method
patents were not suits against the USPTO by applicants who had appli-
cations rejected but, rather, were cases that involved parties who had
received patents and alleged infringers. 107





103. Id. at 1377.
104. Id. at 1375.
105. Craig J. Madson, "Anything Under the Sun Made by Man" is Patentable, Including
Methods of Doing Business 6 (Oct. 18, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
106. See id.
107. See supra Part l.B.
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Supporters of this view argue that the business method exception
was used only as an alternative reason for invalidating patents.'9 They
contend that the courts used the exception to bolster stronger reasons for
patent invalidity, such as obviousness or lack of novelty.' °9
Another view, taken by some commentators, is that State Street will
cause vast problems to the patent system and possibly the marketplace." °
They assert that the patent system is in danger because the State Street
decision opened the floodgates for filing patent applications."' This in-
crease in the number of applications filed causes additional strain on
USPTO resources, and consequently, jeopardizes the quality of patents
that ultimately issue."2 To illustrate this assertion, commentators point
out that the USPTO is presently granting business method patents with
little resources to examine the prior art. ' 3 As a result, patents that are
obvious, too broad or lacking novelty are being issued."
4
One such commentator, Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss of
New York University School of Law, believes that business method pat-
ents adversely affect the market and should be eliminated."' She claims
business method patents "will distort the market in the period between
their issuance and any court ruling that may find them invalid."
'" 6
Another view is that State Street will cause some initial problems,
but that these problems are typical of the growing pains the USPTO and
courts experience as they begin handling applications and patents in new
areas of technology.1 7 In the beginning, a few anomalous decisions may
be made which seem unfair but, within a few years, the USPTO and
courts will acquire the experience necessary to issue and uphold valid
business method patents."" Once the initial cases are decided, "the rule of
law becomes fairly well settled and businesses begin to operate" with an
understanding of the law.'9
Whether State Street will have little impact or will cause problems
is, at this point, difficult to predict. In the next couple of years, as the
numerous patent applications filed post-State Street begin to issue and be
litigated, the real impact of State Street will be seen.
108. Madson, supra note 105, at 7.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 7-8.
111. Id. at 8.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Madson, supra note 105, at 8.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Witnesses Testify on Diversion of Patent Fees and Business Method Patents, 59 PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 659, 660 (2000).
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V. FIRST INVENTOR DEFENSE
After State Street, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed,
the Patent Reform Act of 1999. The Act added a new section to the pat-
ent code, creating a defense to infringement of a business method patent
based upon a prior commercial use. The new Section of the patent code
states in part:
[i]t shall be a defense to an action for infringement under section 271
of this title with respect to any subject matter that would otherwise in-
fringe one or more claims for a [business] method in the patent being
asserted against a person, if such person had, acting in good faith,
actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least I year before
the effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the
subject matter before the effective filing date of such patent., 20
The general belief before State Street, that business methods were
not patentable subject matter justifies the new Section. Companies rea-
sonably believed that if they kept their business methods secret, they
would not be precluded from practicing them by another's patent. The
Section allows these companies, subject to the limitations described be-
low, to continue practicing their business methods even after another
entity patents the same method.
The Code limits use of the defense in several ways: (1) "a person
may not assert the defense under this section if the subject matter on
which the defense is based was derived from the patentee or persons in
privity with the patentee;"'' 2' (2) "the defense.., is not a general license
under all claims of the patent at issue," only the business method
claims;'22 (3) "a person who has abandoned commercial use of subject
matter may not rely on activities performed before the date of such aban-
donment in establishing a defense ... with respect to actions taken after
the date of such abandonment;"'' 23 (4) "the defense ... may be asserted
only by the person who performed the acts necessary to establish the
defense;""'2 (5) "except for any transfer to the patent owner, the right to
assert the defense [may] not be licensed or assigned or transferred to
another person" except with a transfer of the entire line of business to
which the defense relates;'25 and (6) the party asserting the defense must
prove it by "clear and convincing evidence.'
26
120. 35 U.S.C.S. § 273(b)(1)(2000).
121. 35 U.S.C.S. § 273(b)(3)(B).
122. Id. at § 273(b)(3)(C).
123. Id. at § 273(b)(5).
124. Id. at § 273(b)(6).
125. Id.
126. 35 U.S.C.S. § 273(b)(4).
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VI. WHAT ARE BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS?
A business method patent is a United States utility patent directed to
a method of doing business. "Business methods include the way a busi-
ness is structured, managed, organized and/or carried out." '' One scholar
has defined a business method patent as requiring two key components.'28
First, the end result of the process must be of commercial rather than
technological interest.' 29 Second, the inventive aspect of the claim must
lie in the process vis-A-vis the software or hardware elements. 30 In other
words, the software and hardware must be known and the claim cannot
derive any novelty from these elements. Instead, the novelty must arise
either from the process or from applying the process to a computer.
A. History
The first business method patent was "granted on March 19, 1799,
to Jacob Perkins of Massachusetts . . . [on] 'Detecting Counterfeit
Notes' ."" All the details of the invention were lost in the Patent Office
fire of 1836.32 The first business method patent for which any detailed
written description presently "exists ... was a printing method entitled 'A
Mode of Preventing Counterfeiting' granted to John Kneass on April 28,
1815.'
The first business method patents directed to automated methods of
processing business data were granted to Herman Hollerith on January 8,
1889." That day, he received three patents'35 for the "Art of Compiling
Statistics.""16 The protection of these patents allowed his Tabulating Ma-
chine Company to survive. 137 In 1924, Thomas J. Watson, Sr. changed
the company name to International Business Machine Corporation."
38
The manual punch cards that Hollerith invented (IBM punch cards) and
127. Michael E. Melton, The Business of Business Method Patents, 589 PLI/PAT. 97, 103
(2000).
128. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579 n.5 (1999).
129. Id.
130. id.
131. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, White Paper on Automated Financial or Management
Data Processing Methods (Business Methods) at http:/www.uspto.gov/web/menulbusmethp/
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his methods for processing business data were used until the birth of the
personal computer. 3 9
B. Recent Examples
Other examples of business method patents can be found dating
from Hollerith in 1889 to the present.'4° Recent business method patents
are more numerous and sophisticated than ever before.'4' Patents have
been granted for (1) date matching methods, 42 (2) interactive trading of
securities,'43 (3) selling expert advice online,'" (4) electronic-monetary
system,' 45 (5) estimating construction project costs and schedules,'" (6)
training janitors using picture displays,'4 7 (7) transmitting a digital video
or audio signal over a network,'" (8) displaying patent text and images
on a computer,'4 9 (9) placing a purchase order over a communication
network," (10) managing the amortization of a loan,' (11) structuring
and managing human communications,' (12) the training of golf putting
skills,' (13) detecting error in accounting for postal charges,'m (14) re-
verse auctioning online,' (15) tracking personal financial data, 6 (16)
surveying a music listener's opinion about songs,'57 (17) pre-authorizing
individual account transactions, (18) ranking of search results accord-
ing to computer relevance,' 59 and (19) collecting and archiving patient
records.'6 These examples illustrate that the USPTO has issued patents
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VII. PATENTABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
To obtain a business method patent, an invention must satisfy the
patentability requirements. 16' As Judge Rich wrote in State Street, busi-
ness methods are subject to the same requirements of patentability as any
other process.16 Accordingly, in order to be patentable, a business
method must satisfy the subject matter, utility, novelty and obviousness
requirements.' 63 Furthermore, the corresponding patent application must
meet the enablement and written description requirements.'"
A. Subject Matter
Like any other invention, a business method must fall within the
patentable subject matter.' 65 In State Street, the Federal Circuit delineated
the test for patentable subject matter, "the transformation of data... con-
stitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or
calculation, because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible
result."" 66 Most business methods and processes are analogous to
mathematical algorithms, formulas, and calculations. Therefore, if a
business method produces a useful, concrete and tangible result, it is
patentable subject matter,
B. Utility
In order to be patentable, an invention must have utility. Having
utility "means that an invention must perform some function of positive
,161benefit to society." The requirement exists to "assure that society ob-
tains a 'quid pro quo' in the form of a 'substantial utility' and 'specific
benefit in currently available form' before granting a monopoly to an
inventor."'" The utility requirement does not demand that the invention
be superior to existing products or processes. 69 The requirement does,
however, demand compliance with three tests: (1) the invention must
perform the intended function; (2) it must operate to achieve some mini-
mum human purpose; and (3) it must achieve a human purpose that is not
illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy. 1
70
In the business method context, the utility requirement precludes the
patenting of abstract ideas. To be patentable, the idea must be applied to
161. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
162. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
163. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103.
164. 35 U.S.C. § 112
165. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
166. State St., 149 F.3d at 1373.
167. CHISUM, DONALD S., CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2001).
168. Id. (quoting Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1996)).
169. See id
170. See id. at4-2.1.
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achieve some type of result. In this respect the requirement is similar to
the test articulated in State Street, specifically, requiring a method to
produce "a useful, concrete and tangible result.' 7' Accordingly, theoreti-
cal ideas of how to operate a business are not patentable.
C. Novelty
In addition to having utility, to receive a patent an applicant's in-
vention must be new or novel at the time of discovery. "The novelty re-
quirement lies at the heart of the patent system.' ' 2 Novelty requires that
a patent applicant contribute something new to the public in exchange for
receiving patent rights.7 ' The meaning of "new" or "novel" is defined by
three conditions listed in 35 U.S.C. §102. Subsection (a) bars an appli-
cant from patenting an invention that was "known or used by others in
this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent.' 74 Subsection (e) bars an applicant from patenting an invention
"described in ... a patent granted on an application for patent by another
filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for pat-
ent.' 75 Subsection (g) bars an applicant from patenting an invention that
"before [the applicant's] invention ... was made in this country by an-
other inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.'
76
When a patent application is filed at the USPTO, an examiner re-
views the prior art to determine whether the claimed invention is novel.'
77
The reviewed prior art is primarily comprised of issued patents and
printed publications.' 78 This prior art review presents an enormous prob-
lem for business method patent applications because the reviewed prior
art is unlikely to include the majority of prior art or public knowledge in
this area.79 This is because many companies were deterred from filing
patent applications and some companies maintained their business meth-
ods as trade secrets due to the perception that business methods were not
patentable. Consequently, the resources at the USPTO have been inade-
quate to determine the novelty of business method patent applications.
The inadequate USPTO resources cause problems for the patent owner
by undermining the presumption of validity in the minds of potential
licensees and potential infringers. This results in lost licensing revenues
and increased litigation costs to the patent owner.
171. State St., 149 F.3d at 1373.
172. CHISUM, supra note 167, at § 3.01.
173. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1984).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1999).
175. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
176. Id.
177. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 904, 7th ed., (July 1998).
178. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE at § 901.
179. Id. at § 901.06.
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The USPTO has taken steps to alleviate these problems. On March
29, 2000, the USPTO "announced a plan to improve the quality of the
examination process in technologies related to electronic commerce and
business methods."'8° The plan includes increased training for examiners
examining business method patent applications, a mandatory search of
non-patent literature databases, and a new required second-level review
of all allowed applications to ensure compliance with the search re-
quirements and to determine if the scope of the claims should be recon-
sidered.18'
D. Nonobviousness
Even if an invention is new or novel, it might not be patentable. The
invention must also be nonobvious to one of "ordinary skill in the art" at
the time of invention.1 2 The obviousness bar, like the novelty bar, re-
quires the patent applicant to contribute something to the knowledge in
the public domain in exchange for patent rights. The Supreme Court es-
tablished the test for obviousness in Graham v. John Deere Co. 83 The
Court laid out three factors to be considered in determining
obviousness.'8 First, "the scope and content of the prior art. '' 185 Second,
"the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue."' 86 Third,
"the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art."'8 7 The Court also recog-
nized that secondary considerations, such as commercial success, the
failure of others, long felt need within the industry, and copying, could
be considered.' 8
Business method patents may have difficulty meeting the nonobvi-
ousness requirement. Many business method patents are simply an old
idea applied on the Internet. For example, the Priceline.com patent, di-
rected to online reverse auctioning, claims a method that allows a buyer
to submit a bid to purchase goods or services and a seller to "bind a
buyer to a contract based on the buyer's purchase offer.' 8. 9 Clearly, the
only thing new about this idea is doing it online.
The motivation to combine requirement, however, has the possibil-
ity of saving some business method patents from a determination of ob-
viousness. In order for a patent to be invalidated for obviousness, prior
art must be gathered that discloses all of the limitations of the patent
180. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 131.
181. See id.
182. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. V 1999).
183. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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claims. If a patent is alleged to be obvious, and not lacking novelty, there
must be more than one piece of prior art.'90 In order to combine several
pieces of prior art together to render a claim obvious, there must be a
motivation to combine. The suggestion to combine the prior art refer-
ences together must come from either the prior art, the knowledge of one
of ordinary skill in the art, or the nature of the problem itself. Some busi-
ness method patents might be saved under this requirement because it is
not easy to prove a motivation to combine.
E. Enablement and Written Description
In addition to the fact that the invention must satisfy the above-
mentioned requirements, a patent application must enable one of ordi-
nary skill in the art to make and use the invention. 9' The purpose of the
enablement requirement is to force the inventor to disclose sufficient
information about the invention to the public in exchange for the right to
a patent. The sufficiency of the disclosure is judged by whether one of
ordinary skill in the art can make and use the invention without undue
experimentation. 92 A patent with few details in the disclosure forces the
patent owner or applicant to argue for a higher level of skill in the art, so
that the few disclosed details are all that are necessary to make and use
the invention. However, arguing for a higher level of skill in the art
makes a patent more vulnerable to invalidity attacks based on obvious-
ness, because if the level of skill in the art is high, the invention may
have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art.
A patent application must also satisfy the written description re-
quirement.'93 The written description requirement forces the applicant to
describe the invention to "clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the
art to recognize that [the applicant] invented what is claimed."'" The
reason for the requirement is to prevent an inventor from overreaching.
95
Courts might use the written description and enablement require-
ments to invalidate overly broad business method patents. Professor
William Lee, however, suggests that the written description and enable-
ment requirements have been used in the biotechnology field to strike
down overly broad patents because of the inherent unpredictability of
dealing with living things. 196 He argues that there is a degree of predict-
ability with business method patents, and therefore, no basis for impos-
190. If all the limitations of the patent claim can be found in one piece of prior art, the patent
would be anticipated and fail the novelty requirement.
191. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
192. See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1233 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
193. See35U.S.C.§ 112.
194. In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
195. See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981).
196. Professor William Lee, Remarks during Intellectual Property Litigation class at Harvard
Law School (Fall 1999) (on file with author).
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ing strict enablement and written description requirements on Internet
business method patents.197
VIII. WHY SHOULD BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS MATTER TO
COMPANIES?
Companies should be aware of the patent requirements of business
methods because these patents have the potential to greatly affect the
success of a company. These patents present a critical risk that a com-
pany might be precluded from using important business methods. Busi-
ness method patents, however, also present a tremendous opportunity to
increase the value of a company, raise capital and revenue, and assist in
marketing products.
The risk that business method patents present to a company is that
the company might be precluded from using a method it either presently
uses, or might use in the future. Such preclusion occurs because a busi-
ness method patent grants to its owner the right to exclude others from
practicing the invention. Preclusion from using a certain business method
does not present a significant problem if the particular method is not es-
sential to a company. In some cases, however, the business method is
essential. Ifi these cases the company is forced to attempt to negotiate a
license from the patent owner or use the business method and risk the
cost and consequences of a patent infringement suit.
In the present environment where technology is rapidly advancing,
it is difficult to determine if a particular novel business method (even if
the only novel aspect is doing the method on a computer) will become
the subject of another's patent. This is because patent applications are
prosecuted secretly. 98 Of course, a company can take steps to mitigate
these risks by patenting its own business methods.
Aside from the risks they present, business method patents can af-
ford tremendous opportunities to increase a company's value. Corporate
valuation, to a large extent, is determined by the value of the corpora-
tion's intellectual property, including patents. One commentator stated
that the "capital assets of Fortune 500 companies account for only 15%
of the company's value, whereas intellectual assets account for 85% of
the company's value."' 99 In many Internet companies, the ratio of the
value of the intellectual property to capital assets is even greater. For
example, Priceline.com is currently valued at nearly ten billion dollars; a
197. Id.
198. See American Inventors Protection Act, § 502, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (allowing for publication
of pending patent applications in certain circumstances).
199. Paul S. Hunter, Patenting Methods of Doing Business (Oct. 10, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript).
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significant portion of this valuation is based on the twenty business
method patents that it has recently received.'
Business method patents can offer other financial benefits to com-
panies. For example, the ability to exclude others from using a specific
method in e-commerce can provide a competitive advantage to a start-up
company or even an existing company expanding into e-commerce. A
patent is beneficial because it prevents other companies from practicing
one's idea or invention. On the other hand, if the company so desires, it
can raise revenue by licensing its patents to competitors. Moreover, a
company looking for capital will want to patent its ideas to help lure
venture capitalists. Venture capitalists are leery of investing in a com-
pany whose great ideas are not protected and can be exploited by others.
As previously noted, a company can use its patents offensively to
stop others from practicing its inventions. Patents can also be used defen-
sively. For example, if a company is charged with an infringement, in
some cases the company might assert its own patents in a counterclaim,
or use its patents in settlement discussions to negotiate cross-licenses.
Business method patents can also be used for marketing purposes.
As one commentator stated, "[i]f a company can describe its product in
promotional material and advertisements as 'patented,' that may convey
to consumers that the product is cutting edge, and perhaps more desirable
than a competitor's unpatented model." 2 ' To much of the public, the fact
that a product is "patented" connotes a sense that the product is important
or represents a large technological advance. This connotation, with
proper marketing, can work to a company's benefit.
In summary, while business method patents can pose a risk to a
company, they can also assist the company in obtaining a competitive
advantage over others in the field. Furthermore, business method patents
can increase a company's value and revenue and be an invaluable mar-
keting tool.
IX. LAWSUITS INVOLVING BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
As discussed above, companies constantly face the risk of being
sued for infringing a business method patent. Two recent high profile
cases illustrate this point.
200. See Larry J. Guffey, Business Method Patents: What They Are - Why Clients and Service
Providers Should Care, 33 MD. B. J. 25, 26 (July/Aug. 2000).
201. Sari Gabay, Note & Comment, The Patentability of Electronic Commerce Business
Systems in the Aftermath of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 8 J. L.
& POL'Y 179, 221 (1999).
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A. Priceline. com v. Microsoft2 °
In October 1999, Priceline.com sued Microsoft for infringing its
patent for reverse auctioning. °3 Specifically, Priceline.com alleged that
Microsoft's travel services website, expedia.com, infringed the patent
through its use of "Hotel Price Matcher" and "Flight Price Matcher." 2°
The patent at issue in the suit has received much criticism. Over a
year before Priceline.com filed its patent application, a patent attorney
and inventor, Thomas Woolston, applied for a patent, which he claims,
covered a process substantially similar to Priceline.com's patent.25 Due
to the delay of the USPTO, Priceline.com's patent was issued several
months before the Woolston patent.2  When Woolston first heard of
Priceline.com's patent, he contacted the company and proposed a joint
venture.27 After the company refused, Woolston filed patent interference
claims.28 As the litigation continues, Priceline.com may find itself in the
strange position of trying to invalidate a patent very much like the one it
holds.2
Moreover, a California company named Marketel claims that Price-
line.corn stole the reverse auction idea.10 Marketel claims the idea came
from its "TelAssist System," marketed in 1991. The "TelAssist System"
involved taking bids for airline tickets by phone and fax. 1 Marketel
folded seven months after it launched the idea because it could not raise
sufficient capital and the airlines were not particularly cooperative.'
As of the time of writing this article, it remains to be seen what will
happen to Priceline.com's patent and what will be the result of the in-
fringement suit.
B. Amazon.corn v. Barnesandnoble.com
On October 21, 1999, Amazon.corn filed suit against Barnesandno-
ble.com for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411.2' 3 The patent at
issue covers a "one-click" ordering system whereby a buyer can purchase
202. Priceline.com, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 399CV1991 (D. Conn. Oct 13, 1999).
203. See id. (discussing the infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,794,204).
204. See id.
205. See William Krause, Comment, Sweeping the E-Commerce Patent Minefield: The Need
for a Workable Business Method Exception, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 79, 98 (Summer 2000).
206. See id. at 98-99.
207. See id. at 99.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See Jeffrey A. Berkowitz, Business Method Patents: Everyone Wants to be a Millionaire,
609 PLI/PAT 7, 34 (June 2000).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (W.D.
Wash. 1999).
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goods online with one click of the mouse, provided that the seller already
has the necessary information about the buyer (e.g., credit card number,
address, name) in its computer system.2
The district court granted Amazon.com's motion for a preliminary
injunction on December 1, 1999, as the Christmas shopping season ap-
proached.23 The court found that the plaintiff had made a strong showing
of validity and infringement, and was likely to suffer irreparable harm if
no injunction was issued.2 6 The irreparable harm was most likely the
inability to distinguish itself from a competitor and the associated loss in
market share and sales.
On February 14, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
vacated the preliminary injunction.1 7 The court found that although
Amazon.com had made a showing that it was likely to succeed at trial on
its infringement claim, Barnesandnoble.com had mounted a serious
challenge to the validity of Amazon.com's patent.28 The court was quick
to add that "[a]ll we hold, in the meantime, is that [Barnesandnoble.com]
cast enough doubt on the validity of the '411 patent to avoid a prelimi-
nary injunction, and that the validity issue should be resolved finally at
trial.'"
21 9
X. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
Due in part to the recent litigation, debate over the patentability of
business method patents has increased. Numerous arguments have been
made against granting business method patents. The argument most fre-
quently mentioned is based on the perceived poor quality of the business
method patents that have been issued by the USPTO. The argument as-
serts that a much higher percentage of business method patents (vis-A-vis
other patents) issue from the USPTO that are invalid because they are
obvious or lack novelty. Two of the reasons cited for the higher percent-
age of invalid business method patents are the lack of non-patent related
prior art that is available to patent examiners and the examiners' unfa-
miliarity with the prior art that is available.
220David Bender has summarized this argument well. In areas of
technology that have been subject to patent protection for sometime,
there is a well-developed body of prior art representing the state of the
technology at any particular time.' Therefore, in areas of technology
214. See U.S. Pat. No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
215. See Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
216. See id. at 1246.
217. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
218. See id.
219. Id. at 1360.
220. David Bender, Recent Developments Regarding Business Method Patents, 616 PLI/PAT 9,
18-19 (2000).
221. See id.
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that have typically been patentable subject matter, the USPTO is able to
make a good determination of the novelty and non-obviousness of the
claimed invention. Bender's argument continues:
in the realm of business methods, no rich body of prior art exists and,
to the extent there are references at all to the state of the pertinent art,
they are not categorized and easily found, especially by persons
lacking a background in the industry to which the claimed invention
is directed (and, so goes the argument, the PTO has few if any per-
sons with appropriate backgrounds). As a result, the PTO is not in a
position to make an informed determination on novelty and non-
obviousness. And, the argument concludes, as a result many business
method patents will issue claiming methods used (often secretly) well
222before the patent application was filed.
In response to this argument, proponents of business method patents
point out that the USPTO has taken steps to alleviate these problems.
The USPTO has a plan which includes increased training for business
method patent application examiners, a mandatory search of non-patent
literature databases, and a new required second-level review of all al-
lowed applications to ensure compliance with the search requirements
and to determine if the scope of the claims require reconsideration.223
Furthermore, the first inventor defense 224 protects a prior user of a busi-
ness method from being precluded from continuing to use the business
method.
Moreover, one scholar, Rochelle Dreyfuss, has suggested that even
if the USPTO issues patents with claims that are overly broad, the courts
will construe the claims narrowly.22 Dreyfuss argues that Wang Labora-
tories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 226 demonstrates this view.
The question in Wang Laboratories was patent scope, and the court
took a very narrow view of what any particular business methodology
teaches. Thus, the court found patent-significant distinctions between
two "favorite places" or "bookmark" features, one using bit mapping
227protocols and the other using a character-based system.
Therefore, one might conclude that even if the USPTO issues pat-
ents with claims that are invalid or overly broad, what is the harm? The
courts will later strike down invalid claims and construe overly broad
claims very narrowly, and furthermore, the first inventor defense protects
many prior users.
222. Id.
223. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 131.
224. See supra Part V.
225. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Essay, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?,
16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 263, 269 (2000).
226. 197 F. 3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
227. See Dreyfuss, supra note 225, at 269.
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Rochelle Dreyfuss argues that invalid and overly broad issued pat-
ents cause great harm.28 The biggest problem is what she calls "sticki-
ness."2 9 "Stickiness" is a concept much like loyalty; once it takes hold,
the invalidation of the business method patent has no effect. 2 0 She illus-
trates the problem of "stickiness" with Amazon.com's one-click patent 
3 '
asserted against Barnesandnoble.com.
One click is very nice for shoppers because once they have inputted
various bits of shipping and billing information, they can check out
quickly on subsequent visits. Accordingly, if Amazon has the exclu-
sive right to one-click, we can expect that many customers will pa-
tronize its site. What happens if the patent is eventually invalidated -
will there then be effective competition? Probably not because once a
book buyer has entered information at Amazon, there is no reason to
go elsewhere .... Buyers who rely on such services will not care if
the patent is invalidated, and rival sites are permitted to utilize one-
click: once locked in to Amazon, shoppers will not likely visit a site
232that is less informative and requires more work.
In addition to the problem of "stickiness," Dreyfuss points out that inva-
lid patents deter investment in competing companies that cannot succeed
without first winning a lawsuit. 3'
The popular response to her argument is that these problems are
typical of the growing pains the USPTO and the courts experience as
they begin handling applications and patents in new areas of
technology.23 In the beginning, there are always a few anomalous deci-
sions, which seem unfair.235 Within a few years, however, the USPTO
and the courts acquire the experience necessary to issue and uphold valid
business method patents.236 With time, the USPTO will develop a com-
prehensive body of prior art in the area that will allow it to perform better
prior art searches.
Another argument against granting business method patents is that
the social costs outweigh the social benefits. The social costs imposed by
patents include the increased price of patented products and the de-
creased product quantity and quality from that typically found in a com-
petitive market.237 Critics also contend that the underlying policy of pat-
ents is to encourage otherwise unlikely investments in research and de-
228. See id. at 270-7 1.
229. Id. at 271.
230. See id.
231. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
232. Dreyfuss, supra note 225, at 271.
233. See id. at 270.
234. See Madson, supra note 105.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See Dreyfuss, supra note 225, at 275.
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velopment."8 Such critics argue that the incentive is not needed with
business method patents because new business methods do not require
large investments in research and development, and that new business
methods are likely to arise as a result of a competitive economy, without
the extra incentive of patent rights.239
Proponents of business methods patents respond that without patent
protection, many businesses would maintain their business methods as
trade secrets, and thus, the methods would not be publicly disclosed.
24°
These patent supporters argue that offering patent protection encourages
public disclosure.24' Proponents also "see the Internet as simply another
frontier of technology for which patents have played a useful role in fos-
tering innovation and protecting financial investments by
entrepreneurs.,242
As the flood of business method patent applications filed post-State
Street issue, the debate over the wisdom of allowing patent protection to
business methods will likely continue and become more intense.
XI. CONCLUSION
The life of the business method exception to patentable subject
matter, uncertain as it was in the past, now appears to be officially over.
243The State Street decision clarified the present state of the law. As more
and more business method patents are the subject of litigation, the courts
will shed more light on how these patents will be construed and en-
forced. In the meantime, as the effects of State Street continue to play
out, wise companies will plan accordingly and seek patent protection for
their business methods. 24
238. See Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical
Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 84 n.
358 (1999).
239. See id.






PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE FuTuRE: HOW THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT CAN REMOVE
BARRIERS IN CYBERSPACE
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON*
The United States' ability to remain strong and prosperous in the in-
creasingly technological, increasingly competitive global marketplace
will be determined ... by our success in harnessing the energy, crea-
tivity, and talent of all our citizens. A great many of those among the
estimated 43 million Americans who have disabilities are both eager
and able to help our country meet the challenges of our rapidly
changing world. Recognizing this rich source of human potential and
providing these individuals with greater opportunities to bring their
knowledge, ideas, and commitment to the workplace is, therefore, not
only a moral imperative, but also a crucial investment in our Nation's
future.
-- President George Bush, October 12, 1990'
INTRODUCTION
When President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") into law in 1990, the new law was highly controversial. The
law intends to present "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."2
The document also presents a finding that the nation as a whole has an
interest in "assur[ing] equality of opportunity, full participation, inde-
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals."3
Although few people disagree with the intended purpose of the law,4
many people worry about its expense and its potential lack of efficacy.'
While some business owners worry that they will be forced to undertake
massive expenditures for little gain, others remain unaware of the law's
*, B.A. 1993, University of Washington; M.P.Aff. 1998, LBJ School of Public Affairs, The
University of Texas;p J.D. candidate 2002, The University of Texas School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Elizabeth Ozmun for her guidance and assistance in producing this article. Of
course, the opinions expressed in this article - and any mistakes - are mine alone. I would also like
to thank the editorial staff of the Denver University Law Review for their diligent and thoughtful
editing. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Thorn, for his constant love and encouragement.
1. President's Proclamation for National Disability Employment Awareness Month, 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1582 (Oct. 12, 1990) [hereinafter "Presidential Proclamation"].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (2001).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
4. Bill Day, Businesses Find Disabilities Act Has Been a Plus, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-
NEWS, July 23, 2000, at 21A, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
5. Id.
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provisions until they are sued. In the intervening decade, however, great
progress has been made to improve access to public and commercial
buildings. While accessibility remains far from perfect in the physical
world, most commentators, even those critical of the law, agree that vast
strides have been made in the area of accessibility;6 however, the im-
provement in the physical world's accessibility has not been matched in
the virtual world.
The Internet plays a vital role in modem life, allowing people with
and without disabilities to shop for gifts and groceries, renew their pro-
fessional licenses, and take classes online. Millions of people use the
Internet every day, including many people with disabilities. Current es-
timates show that at least one out of every fourteen blind people in
America uses a computer, and the number is continuing to grow.7 How-
ever, only approximately 1 in 10 websites is accessible to screen readers
used by the blind, seriously limiting the ability of the visually impaired,
or otherwise disabled computer users, to access information on the Inter-
net.8
This paper examines how the disabled can use the ADA to achieve
access to services provided on the Internet and the World Wide Web. In
Part One, the paper analyzes the scope of the problem and looks at the
case history of a recent lawsuit brought by the National Federation of the
Blind against America Online ("AOL").9 Part Two looks at the statutory
language of the ADA and at court opinions interpreting the scope of the
act. It suggests four ways in which potential plaintiffs can bring a claim
against inaccessible websites under the ADA. These claims include ar-
guments that:
(1) Commercial websites constitute "places of public accommodation"
under Title III of the ADA;
(2) Even in circuits requiring places of public accommodation to main-
tain a physical facility, many commercial websites have a sufficient
"'nexus" to a place of public accommodation to be covered under the
public accommodation provision;
(3) State and local governmental websites are required to be accessible
under Title II in the same manner as any other governmental service; and
6. See, e.g., Bill Frezza, The ADA Stalks the Internet: Is Your Web Page Illegal?, INTERNET
WEEK ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2000 at http://www.intemetweek.com/columns00/frezz022800.htm (calling
the elimination of architectural barriers "commonsense accommodations ... enriching the lives of
many people previously living on the fringes of society" but nevertheless referring to the ADA as
"an act of charity that has become a swelling tithe, enriching class-action lawyers quick to feast on
vague legislation promoting poster-child plaintiffs.").
7. Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Net Rights for the Disabled? at http://204.245.133.32/bm/bm99/
bm991201.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2000).
8. Andrew Park, Disabled Find Many Barriers Online, AusTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Sept. 3, 2000, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
9. See infra pp. 6-9.
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(4) Educational and credentialing websites must be accessible under a
specific provision in Title II.
Part Two also examines two frequently invoked exceptions to the Act,
undue burden and fundamental alteration, and shows that these excep-
tions are unlikely to prevent the Act from requiring online access.' Fi-
nally, Part Three examines some of the policy implications of applying
the ADA to the Internet. Such policy concerns include fulfilling legisla-
tive intent, providing access to economic opportunity, minimizing the
economic and regulatory burden on a growing sector of the economy,
avoiding frivolous litigation, and correcting market failure."
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Website designer Yvonne Singer knows how much recent advances
in technology have done to create opportunities for the disabled. Cerebral
palsy has severely constrained her freedom of movement and made it
difficult for her to speak.' 2 Because she is able to type commands into her
keyboard through a pointer strapped to her forehead, she has conse-
quently been able to edit web pages for a pharmaceutical company and
pursue a master's degree online.'3 Kelly Ford, a webmaster from
Gresham, Oregon, has also found the Internet to be a useful tool in her
daily life. A Congressional research memorandum quoted her account of
the Internet's utility: "Sighted people don't know how difficult it is for a
blind person to use services that everyone else takes for granted, like
looking up a phone directory .... Now that a lot is on line, I feel so liber-
ated."'4
Singer and Ford also illustrate the need for accessible web design.
While accessibility in the physical world generally means providing ac-
cess to wheelchairs, access in the virtual world often means creating
keyboard controls in addition to the mouse, and providing text labels for
graphics. Singer's keyboard pointer would be useless on a site that re-
quired mouse manipulation. Similarly, without tags on graphics, Ford's
screen reader would not be able to make sense of the screen.'5 Most web-
10. See infra pp. 9-36.
i1. See infra at pp. 36-37.
12. Kevin Coughlin, Disabled Get Left Behind: For Some with Impaired Function, Internet is
Simply E-Frustration, THE PLAIN DEALER, August 10, 2000, at IC, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
13. Id.
14. Memorandum from Paul B. Taylor, Counsel, Subcommittee on the Constitution to
Congressman Charles Canady, House Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 16, 1999) at http://lists.w3.org/
Archives/Public/w3c-wai-ig/2000JanMar/01 14.html.
15. Screen reading devices generally use a voice synthesizer which then reads the text and
allows the visually impaired user to aurally surf the web. Other devices may make a Braille printout
of the information on the screen. One device even contains a shifting Braille display controlled by
magnets. Braille printers and displays have the added advantage that they can make the Internet
accessible to persons who may have both visual and hearing disabilities. See HardwarelSoftware
2001]
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sites present information visually, but for those that present information
aurally through the use of video broadcasts, or "streaming video," acces-
sibility guidelines, developed for the federal government, recommend
including a textual description or closed captioning, similar to the closed
captioning provided for television broadcasts.' 6 According to the Access
Board, an organization that developed web accessibility guidelines used
by the federal government, these measures are likely to be enough to
ensure accessibility.' 7 Other accessibility initiatives have recommended
similar measures."
Both Singer and Ford have jobs in the information technology sec-
tor. They are also part of the larger cyberspace market-a market that
may be more willing to buy online due to other barriers. After all, a non-
disabled customer may be able to drive herself to the store to make the
purchase, while a similar customer with a visual disability may have
greater difficulty in arranging efficient transportation. Presumably,
commercial Internet sites would be thrilled to add to their customer base,
and would be willing to make their sites accessible in order to increase
profits. However, the commercial sector has been surprisingly slow to
take advantage of this market. Gary Wunder, a blind computer program-
mer who works for the University of Missouri, explained the "Catch-22"
he has faced in arguing for accessibility: "When we go to a company
which is trying to develop a new product... we are told that we need to
wait and see whether the product will be accepted by the public. We're
told that ... our needs will be addressed as soon as the technology dem-
onstrates its viability."' 9 Once the product has proved its viability, how-
ever, Mr. Wunder notes that "[W]e're told that it is difficult and time
consuming to modify the existing product. It may not be the next release
or the one after that, but be assured that eventually our needs will be con-
sidered., 20 In the meantime, however, "the product is selling like hot
cakes and we're losing access to jobs and information. ,2 Wunder's de-
Eases the Burden, THE EDMONTON SUN, Mar. 10, 1999, at 57, available at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
16. Access Board, Propoed Access Standards for Electronic and Information Technology:
An Overview, at http://www.access-board.gov/sec508/overview.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2000).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Web Accessibility Initiative, Guidelines and Techniques at
http://www.w3.org/WAI (last visited Dec.4, 2000); Web Accessibility Initiative, Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines, W3C Recommendation at http://www.w3.orgfrRI1999/WAI-
WEBCONTENT-19990505 (last visited Dec. 4, 2000). See also CAST, Bobby 3.2 at
http://www.cast.org/bobby (offering a free, web-based application that allows website developers
and others to check the accessibility of a webpage simply by typing the website address into a form;
providing extensive analysis of potential accessibility problems and suggestions for how to ensure
the accessibility of individual websites).
19. Hearing on the ADA and Private Internet Sites: Testimony Before the House Judiciary
Comm., Subcomm. on the Const. (Feb. 9, 2000) (statement of Gary Wunder, Programmer-Analyst
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scription of the commercial sector's resistance to voluntary accessibility
policies is borne out by the lengthy difficulties the National Federation of
the Blind had in gaining accessibility to a popular Internet access service,
America Online ("AOL").
The Case of AOL
In the summer of 1996, an employee of America Online ("AOL")
posted a message to an Internet mailing list focused on promoting access
to the World Wide Web. The message read in part: "Through an inter-
esting series of coincidences it has become clear to me that our service is
not at all friendly to the visually impaired."22 The message further re-
quested assistance in preparing "a summary of the difficulties faced by
the visually impaired members of our service. 23 Curtis Chong, president
of the National Federation of the Blind ("NFB") in Computer Science,
issued a reply in which he explained that screen reading software used by
the blind was not compatible with AOL. Three examples that illustrate
this are first, even logging on to AOL required use of a mouse, rather
than keyboard controls; second, graphics were not labeled with text tags
that could be read by a screen reader; and third, menus and other pro-
gram functions did not operate through standard programming protocols
that could be understood by a screen reading system.24 In fact, the acces-
sibility problem with AOL's use of unlabeled graphics was fairly com-
mon knowledge at the time of the exchange, and had been documented in
the mainstream press.25 Nonetheless, this email exchange was the first
contact between AOL and the NFB, and Mr. Chong wrote in a followup
email that it "represent[ed] potentially a good beginning. 26
Accessibility was not quickly forthcoming, however. Several
months later, at the end of 1996, AOL released "AOL 3.0"-a new ver-
sion of the Internet access program. It was no more accessible than ver-
sion 2.0. By the end of 1997, AOL had reached ten million users-twice
as many as it had in 1996. It released another version of its software at
that time. Bob Pittman, the company's then-CEO and President, reported
that the new version-AOL 4.0-was the product of a complete exami-
nation of "the entire AOL interface from top to bottom" and that the new
22. Posting of Jeff Crowe, JKCrowe@AOL.com to GUISPEAK@LISTSERV.NODAK.EDU
(July 23, 1996, 09:44:10) available at http://www.nfbcal.org/nfb-rd/1096.html.
23. Id.
24. Email from Curtis Chong, President of the Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, to Jeff Crowe (July
23, 1996, 23:27:37 EDT) available at http://www.nfbcal.org/nfb-rd/1096.html.
25. See Mike George, Who Needs Braille When A Keyboard Can Do The Talking?, THE
INDEP. (LoNDON), June 10, 1996, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. (Stating that
Delphi's text-based service could be used by blind people, while AOL and Compuserve were less
accessible); See also Joseph J. Lazzaro, On-Line-Access Services Inconsistent for the Blind, BYTE,
Jan. 1995 (describing the technical issues behind AOL's incompatibility with screen readers).
26. Posting of Curtis Chong, Chong99@cris.com, to GUISPEAK@LISTSERV.NODAK.
EDU (July 23, 1996, 20:29:38 PDT) available at http://www.nfbcal.org/nfb-rd/1096.html.
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version was "more convenient, dynamic, and relevant."27 It was still not
accessible to screenreaders, however. In 1998 Curtis Chong sent a letter
to Rob Jennings, AOL's Vice President of Programming and Develop-
ment; the letter reiterated the accessibility problems with AOL and again
noted that "[tihe software does not provide enough access to its functions
via the keyboard, and it does not display information on the screen using
standard Windows controls. 28 Mr. Jennings replied to the letter with a
phone call, but AOL took no further action.29 Chong wrote again to AOL,
this time to the corporation's president, but received no reply.30 In No-
vember of 1999, AOL-having reached more than nineteen million us-
ers-launched version 5.0." Version 5.0 had the same compatibility
problems with screen readers. On November 4, 1999, the NFB sued AOL
under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), asking the court to
compel the company to make its services accessible to people with dis-
abilities. Ten months later, AOL agreed to make its next version fully
compatible with screen reader technology, though AOL continued to
deny that its services were subject to the ADA.32 The NFB dismissed its
suit, but left open the possibility of renewing the suit should AOL fail to
make its services accessible.33
II. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETIVE COURT DECISIONS
For four years, AOL delayed adding accessibility features to its
Internet-access software. After an ADA suit was filed against the com-
pany, however, company officials moved quickly to implement an acces-
sibility policy. Even though there has been no reported verdict against a
website operator, several settlements of ADA claims have resulted in
companies agreeing to make their web sites accessible. Several tax-
preparations software companies recently settled a claim brought by the
Connecticut Attorney General's Office and the National Federation of
the Blind.3' Additionally, several California banks have entered into a
27. AOL Networks to Introduce "The Next AOL" With Unveiling of New AOL Channel Line-
Up, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 6, 1997, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
28. Letter from Curtis Chong, Director of the Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind Tech. Dep't., to Rob
Jennings, Vice President of Programming and Dev., America Online, Inc. (Oct. 26, 1998) available
at http://204.245.133.32/bm/bm99/bm991201.htm.
29. Barbara Pierce, NFB Sues AOL (on file at the National Federation of the Blind's website
at http://204.245.133.32/bm/bm99/bm991201.htm)..
30. Id.
31. New AOL Search Service Grows More Than Seventy Percent Since Launch, Bus. WIRE,
Nov. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
32. National Federation of the Blind/America Online Accessibility Agreement (July 26, 2000)
(on file at http://204.245.133.32/Tech/accessibility.htm).
33. Cynthia D. Waddell, Will National Federation of the Blind Renew their ADA Web
Complaint Against AOL?, 18 DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL. 5, Aug. 25, 2000, available at LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
34. Cynthia D. Waddell and Mark D. Urban, An Overview Of Law & Policy For IT
Accessibility: A Resource for State and Local IT Policy Makers, (June 8, 2000), available at
http://www.icdri.org/SL508overview.html.
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settlement with the California Council of the Blind that requires the
banks to make their websites accessible to screenreaders."
Part Two of this paper examines the statutory framework of the
ADA as it relates to Internet accessibility, and examines ways in which
the statute can apply to commercial websites, governmental websites,
and educational and credentialing websites. Within each of these catego-
ries, the paper focuses on arguments that plaintiffs can use in developing
a claim. Part Two also looks at some of the arguments available to de-
fendants faced with an ADA claim, including the defenses of fundamen-
tal alteration and undue burden.
A. Commercial Websites
One of the major points of disagreement between the NFB and AOL
was whether AOL was a "public accommodation" as defined by the
ADA. Title III of the ADA requires places of public accommodation to
be accessible to persons with disabilities.36 The statute defines "public
accommodation" as an entity whose operations affect commerce and
whose function falls into one of the following twelve categories:
(a) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an es-
tablishment located within a building that contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor
of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
(b) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(c) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other
place of exhibition or entertainment;
(d) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering;
(e) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(f) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop,
travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of
an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional of-
fice of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(g) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
(h) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection;
35. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
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(i) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(j) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgradu-
ate private school, or other place of education;
(k) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment;
and
(1) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other
place of exercise or recreation."
Given the sheer dollar amount of shopping done on the Internet,
there is little doubt that commercial websites do, in fact, affect com-
merce. An argument can also be made that many commercial websites
also fit into at least one of the categories enumerated in the statute. Ama-
zon.com,5 for example, could fit into (E) as a "sales or rental establish-
ment;' 39 Concord University School of Law,40 a law school offering
classes exclusively over the Internet, could fit into (J) as a "postgraduate
private school."4' In their complaint against AOL, the NFB alleged that
the Internet content provider fell into a large number of these categories;
the complaint stated that AOL "is a place of exhibition and entertain-
ment, a place of public gathering, a sales and rental establishment, a
service establishment, a place of public display, a place of education, and
a place of recreation. 42
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has also interpreted the ADA to
mean that commercial websites fitting into any of the twelve categories
should be considered a place of public accommodation. 4  Although the
DOJ did not participate in the AOL case, it did file an amicus brief in
Hooks v. OKBridge, a case before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
alleging that a website providing on-line bridge games discriminated
against a disabled individual when it banned him from participating in
the site's games and other activities.M The District Court for the Western
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (while the examples listed are non-exclusive, the number of
categories are limited to those enumerated in the statute).
38. See Amazon.corn - Earth's Biggest Selection (visited Oct. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.amazon.com (Amazon.com is a commercial website that sells books and other products).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E).
40. See Concord University School of Law (visited Oct. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.concordlawschool.com. Concord University School of Law is a division of Kaplan, Inc.
Id. The school offers a Juris Doctorate (J.D.) degree to students who successfully complete its course
of study over the Internet, and bills itself as "[tihe nation's premier online law school." Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J).
42. Complaint for Plaintiffs at 19, Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., available
at http://www.education-rights.org/homenfbvaol.html (visited Dec. 2, 2000).
43. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Department of Justice, Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc.,
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District of Texas had found that the website was not a place of public
accommodation. 5 In its brief, the DOJ stated that OKBridge was a
"commercial business offering services for a fee to the general public
and easily falls within the ADA's definition of a public accommodation
as a 'private entity' that operates a 'service establishment,' place of 'en-
tertainment,' or place of 'recreation.' . . . It delivers those services...
through the internet to its customers." The DOJ added that OKBridge's
"computerized bridge tournaments are the 'services... of [that] place of
public accommodation.'"
B. Commercial Websites as Places of Public Accommodation
Not all courts have accepted the idea that a place of public accom-
modation can exist without a physical facility, however. The ADA does
not explicitly state that a physical structure is required; however, some
courts have found such an implied requirement based on the types of
entities enumerated in the statute.48 The circuits have split on the issue of
whether a physical structure is required; the Third and Sixth Circuits
have held that it is required,49 while the First Circuit has held that it is
not.m
Many of the public accommodation cases examining the issue of
physical presence arose in the context of insurance. In Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., for example, the issue before the Third Circuit was "the
purely legal question of whether a disparity between disability benefits
for mental and physical disabilities violates the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 (ADA)."5' In finding that such disparity did not violate
the ADA, the Third Circuit compared the ADA's public accommodation
45. Id. The facts of this case appear somewhat less sympathetic than the facts in the AOL
case. The District Court's opinion was not published and was not archived in either Lexis or
Westlaw. However, the DOJ's amicus brief noted that the District Court had dismissed Mr. Hook's
complaint on several alternate grounds, including some not addressed in the DOJ's brief. The brief
also noted that "OKBridge claimed that it terminated Hooks because of his persistent posting of
obscene and abusive messages on the site's discussion forum and because he cheated during a bridge
tournament.... Hooks claimed that these allegations were false and a pretext for terminating him
because he suffers from Bi-Polar disorder and other disabilities." Id. The Fifth Cricuit affirmed the
grant of summary judgment on August 21, 2000, without comment. See Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc.,
99-50891, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23035, at *1 (5th Cir., Aug. 21, 2000).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S.
1093 (1999) ("The litany of terms, including 'auditorium,' 'bakery,' 'laundromat,' 'museum,'
'park,' 'nursery,' 'food bank,' and 'gymnasium' refer to places with resources utilized by physical
access.... [W]e do not find the term 'public accommodation' or the terms in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)
to refer to non-physical access or even to be ambiguous as to their meaning.").
49. See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert.
denied 522 U.S. 1084 (1998); Ford, 145 F.3d at 614.
50. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc. 37 F.3d 12,
19 (1st Cir. 1994).
51. Ford, 145 F.3d at 603.
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provision with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which "proscribes
racial and religious discrimination in 'the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public ac-
commodation .. ,, " The court noted that the Civil Rights Act provision
had been previously determined to apply only to places of public ac-
commodation, and had not been extended to cover membership in an
organization or other organizational activities. 3 By analogy, the court
held that the ADA should also be limited to physical structures. 4
The Sixth Circuit ruled similarly in Stoutenborough v. National
Football League, Inc.55 In Stoutenborough, hearing-impaired plaintiffs
challenged a "blackout rule" prohibiting local televising of certain foot-
ball games, arguing that such a rule was illegally discriminatory under
the ADA. 56 The plaintiffs argued that non-hearing-impaired individuals
could follow the games through radio broadcasts, but that hearing-
impaired individuals could not follow the games without a television
broadcast.57 The appeals court upheld the district court's dismissal of the
case, stating "the 'service' that Stoutenborough and Self-Help for Hear-
ing Impaired Persons seek to obtain-the televised broadcast of
'blacked-out' home football games--does not involve a 'place of public
accommodation."'' 8 The court concluded that "[a]lthough a game is
played in a "place of public accommodation" and may be viewed on
television in another 'place of public accommodation,' that does not suf-
fice."5 9 The court relied upon the Justice Department's definition of
"public accommodation" from the Code of Federal Regulations, where a
place of public accommodation is limited to "all or any portion of build-
ings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other con-
veyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or per-
sonal property, including the site where the building, property, structure,
or equipment is located. ' 60
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to the need for a
physical location in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 6,
where it affirmed the district court's dismissal of a Title I claim based
on a difference in insurance benefits depending on whether the policy
52. Id. at 613 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994)).
53. Id. at 613 (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269-75 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied 510 U.S. 1012 (1993); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755-56 (9th Cir.
1994)).
54. Id.
55. Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
56. Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 582.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 583.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104). Interestingly, the definition contained in the Code of
Federal Regulations does not appear to be consistent with the DOJ's assertion that the OKBridge
website is a place of public accommodation. See supra text accompanying note 45.
61. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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holder develops a mental or physical disability. 6 The court noted that the
"plaintiff did not seek the goods and services of an insurance office,"
thus focusing on the physical structure of the accommodation and not on
the service offered.63
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. dissented, writing that the court
wrongly applied Stoutenborough to the case. He felt the true problem
with Stoutenborogh was that the defendants did not fall into one of the
twelve enumerated categories of places of public accommodation, rather
than the absence of a physical structure.64 In his dissent in Parker, Judge
Martin noted that the statute "specifically identifies" an insurance office
as a public accommodation; therefore, he argued, the court's reliance on
the need for a physical office space was misguided, and the "public ac-
commodation" analysis should have been affirmatively decided once it
was determined that the defendant fit into one of the enumerated catego-
ries.65 Judge Martin also criticized the policy implications of requiring a
physical structure, pointing out that "[a]n increasing array of products
and services are becoming available for purchase by telephone order,
through the mail, via the Internet, and other communications media," and
lamented the fact that the majority's decision could "operate to deprive
them of rights that Title III would otherwise guarantee." 66 Judge Merritt
also wrote a dissenting opinion, pointing out that "according to the ex-
press language of the Court's opinion, Parker is not covered because she
got her coverage from MetLife through the employer instead of walking
into a MetLife office and buying it."
67
The First Circuit, in contrast to the Third and Sixth Circuits, has
ruled that a place of public accommodation need not be a physical
place.68 The plaintiff in Car Parts Distribution Center claimed that an
insurance plan with a cap on benefits for persons with AIDS illegally
discriminated on the basis of disability.69 The district court dismissed the
claims and the appellate court remanded the case.70 The appeals court
disagreed with the district court's ruling that a place of public accommo-
dation is "limited to actual physical structures with definite physical
boundaries which a person physically enters for the purpose of utilizing
the facilities or obtaining services therein.",71 The appeals court noted that
Congress had not chosen to include an express limitation of physical
62. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.
63. Id. at 1010.
64. Id. at 1019.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1020.
67. Id.
68. Car Parts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12 (lst Cir. 1994).
69. Car Parts, 37 F.3d at 14.
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id. at 18 (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n, 826 F. Supp. 583,
586 (D.N.H. 1993)).
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facilities. 2 In the absence of such a limiting clause, the court looked for
other evidence of Congressional intent with regard to physical structures,
and found that "[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but per-
sons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are
not. Congress could not have intended such an absurd result. ' 73 The court
further considered other potential forms that a public accommodation
might take, and specifically noted that an Internet site could be a way of
accessing goods and services: "Many goods and services are sold over
the telephone or by mail with customers never physically entering the
premises of a commercial entity to purchase the goods or services. 74 The
court concluded that "exclud[ing] this broad category of businesses from
the reach of Title III ... would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and
would severely frustrate Congress's intent that individuals with disabili-
ties fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available
indiscriminately to other members of the general public. 75
A district court in California adopted the Car Parts rule and added
further that basic principles of statutory construction required the court to
apply the ADA beyond the physical facility.76 The court noted that the
ADA required businesses to make reasonable modifications to policies or
procedures when "such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to indi-
viduals with disabilities. 77 The court noted that "[i]t is axiomatic that
courts must interpret statutes so as to avoid rendering superfluous any
parts thereof... Finding that Title III applies only to physical barriers to
entry would render meaningless the provisions providing for equal ac-
cess to goods and services. 78
It is important to note that most of the cases examining the require-
ment for a physical structure occur in the insurance context. Several of
these cases look at the actual insurance product itself, and focus on
whether the benefits offered can differ based on disability alone. While a
number of courts have been reluctant to apply a Title III analysis to the
insurance product itself, cases arising in the Internet context might be
treated differently. Logging on to a website can be seen as analogous to
traveling to a store; browsing the pages is much like browsing the
shelves. In Ford, the court differentiated between an insurance office and
an insurance policy by analogy to "a bookstore [that] must be accessible
to the disabled but need not treat the disabled equally in terms of books
72. Id. at 20 ("Neither Title III nor its implementing regulations make any mention of
physical boundaries or physical entry.").
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id.
76. Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F.Supp. 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
77. Chabner, 994 F.Supp at 1190.
78. Id.
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the store stocks., 79 The issue with websites, unlike the issue with insur-
ance policies, is providing access to the bookstore itself - Amazon.com,
for instance - and not about changing the nature of the products offered.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that a
facility can in fact exist in cyberspace; in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha In-
surance Company, the court categorized websites alongside physical
facilities.80 Chief Judge Richard Posner wrote that "[tlhe core meaning of
this provision, plainly enough, is that the owner or operator of a store,
hotel, restaurant, dentist's office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or
other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space . . .) that is
open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons . . . ."" While Judge
Posner was willing to explicitly include websites in his definition of "fa-
cility," not every court has agreed. A federal district court in Texas re-
cently ruled that Title III does not apply to a company that "provides its
services over the internet rather than at a physical place, ' 2 even though
the Fifth Circuit has clear precedent that places of public accommodation
must make all goods and services available to the disabled. 83
C. Websites Created by Entities with a Physical Presence
If courts are unwilling to consider Internet sites as places of public
accommodation, such websites may still fall under Title III if they are
owned or operated by a "brick and mortar" company. In Parker, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that it had "expressed no
opinion as to whether a plaintiff must physically enter a public accom-
modation to bring suit under Title III as opposed to merely accessing, by
some other means, a service or good provided by a public accommoda-
tion."84 Using reasoning similar to the Fifth Circuit's decision in McNeil
v. Time Insurance Company,85 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
also stated in dicta that a public accommodation may need to make its
services accessible, regardless of whether those services are offered in
the facility or elsewhere. In Doe v. Board of Medical Examiners, a medi-
cal student alleged that the score reporting system for the medical board
violated the ADA by distinguishing the scores of students taking the test
79. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S.
1093 (1999).
80. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Carparts
Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)).
81. Doe, 179 F.3d at 559 (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of
New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)).
82. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Department of Justice, Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc.,
232 F.3d 208, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23035 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-50891).
83. McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 188 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the content of an
insurance policy was not covered by Title 1Il, but stating nonetheless that Title I1 "assures that the
disabled have access to all goods and services offered by the business.").
84. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006. 1011 n3. (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
85. See 205 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2000).
20011
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
with and without accommodation. 6 The Board argued that the relation-
ship between the score reporting system and the test facility was too at-
tenuated for the ADA to apply; the lawsuit did not allege that the facility
itself was inaccessible. 7 However, the court wrote that the "plain mean-
ing of Title III is that a public accommodation is a place, leading to the
conclusion that it is all of the services which the public accommodation
offers ... which fall within the scope of Title II.'''88 The court added that
the important question was whether there was a sufficient nexus between
the facility and the service offered, "We look for .. .some nexus be-
tween the services or privileges denied and the physical place of the...
public accommodation." 9 The court decided against the plaintiff on other
grounds, but found that there was a "forceful argument" for finding a
sufficient nexus in Doe, as "no one would take the exam except to obtain
a score."
9
Plaintiffs seeking to file an ADA claim against a commercial web-
site in the Third or Sixth Circuits may be able to rely on this type of
nexus argument. Many corporations and retail establishments utilizing
on-line selling on the Internet also operate stores that have a physical
presence and fall into one of the twelve enumerated categories. 9' Some
Internet sites allow users to order goods or services directly from a par-
ticular store; PapaJohns.com, for example, directs users to their nearest
Papa John's pizza restaurant and allows them to order online. Users may
have a strong nexus argument that "but for" the existence of the physical
facility (i.e., restaurant) they would have no reason to attempt to order
pizza from the website. Further bolstering such an argument, the De-
partment of Justice has issued an opinion that Internet communications
from entities already covered by Title III would need to be made in an
accessible format.92 The letter recommends methods for ensuring that
Internet content is compatible with screen-readers used by the blind.93
D. School and Educational Institution Websites
Private schools are specifically included as places of public accom-
modation under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(J). 94 However, there is an additional
provision in the ADA --§12189,9' which further specifies that all exami-
nations and courses offered for "licensing, certification, or credentialing"
86. Doe, 199 F.3d at 146.
87. Id. at 157.
88. Id. (quoting Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601,612-13 (3rd Cir. 1998)).
89. Id. (quoting Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem'l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 122 (3rd Cir.
1998)).
90. Id. at 157 n.4.
91. See, e.g., Gap.com, Toysrus.com, target.com and bankofamerica.com.
92. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Asst. Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Senator Harkin
(Sept. 9, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/cltr204.txt (Sept. 9, 1996).
93. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994).
95. 42 U.S.C. §12189.
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must be offered in an accessible format.96 The Department of Justice has
been especially active in enforcing educational accessibility; the DOJ
filed suits against various companies offering preparation courses for the
bar exam, the CPA exam, and college entrance exams.97 The DOJ
reached settlements with such companies only after they agreed to pro-
vide auxiliary aids such as qualified sign language interpreters, assistive
listening devices, and materials in Braille. 9
Section 12189 may be interpreted as requiring a heightened standard
of accessibility for educational providers, for it requires examinations
and courses to be offered "in a place and manner accessible to persons
with disabilities." 99 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is not just the physi-
cal location that must be made accessible, but also the educational serv-
ices themselves. The ADA prohibits a place of public accommodation
from "exclud[ing], den[ying] services, segregat[ing] or otherwise
treat[ing] differently" persons with disabilities "because of the absence
of auxiliary aids and services."'" The statutory definition of "auxiliary
aids and services" offers examples such as "qualified interpreters,"
"qualified readers," and "taped texts."'0 '
Today, many schools require students to take tests and/or courses
over the Internet. Farleigh Dickinson University, for example, adopted a
policy requiring students to take at least one online course. °e Credential-
ing bodies also offer license renewals online-in Texas; air conditioning
contractors can renew their licenses over the Internet. 0 3 Many other edu-
cational and credentialing organizations are offering online services to
participants in conjunction with more traditional programs; the Univer-
sity of Texas undergraduate program has launched "Web-based, pass-
word-protected class sites . . . associated with all academic courses" for
the spring semester 2001.' o' These websites will include activities such as
96. See ADA Title IH Technical Assistance Manual, § 111-4.6000 available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
97. See U.S. Department of Justice, Enforcing the ADA: Looking back at a Decade of
Progress (July 2000) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/pubs/l0thrpt.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2000).
98. Id.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12189.
100. Id. at § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
101. Id. at§ 12102 (1).
102. See Associated Press, University to Require Online Class (Oct. 15, 2000), available at
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20001014/us/onlinecourse.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2000). See
also Farleigh Dickinson University: FDU in the news, at http://www.fdu.edu/newspubs/
fduinthenews.html (describing Farleigh Dickinson as "the first traditional university to recognize the
global importance of the Internet by requiring every full-time undergraduate to take at least one
distance-learning course each year.").
103. The Texas Dep't of Licensing and Regulation: Air Conditioning and Refrigeration
Contractors On-line Renewal Application at http://www.license.state.tx.us/eProcessing/
ACRrenewlnit.asp (last visited Nov. 25, 2000).
104. Spring 2001 Course Schedule, The University of Texas at Austin at http://www.utexas.
edu/student/registrar/schedules/spring/fr-whnew.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2000).
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"exchanging e-mail, engaging in class discussions and chats, and ex-
changing files."'05
Under § 12189, educational courses and licensing requirements
need to be accessible to the disabled. The section does allow organiza-
tions providing such services to "offer alternative accessible arrange-
ments" in lieu of making the general program accessible.' °6 However,
alternative arrangements might be easier in some cases than others. Al-
lowing air conditioning repair technicians the chance to renew their ap-
plications by mail might preclude the necessity of making the renewal
web page accessible. For the universities, on the other hand, it might be
easiest to make sure that the class web sites are accessible. Since all un-
dergraduate classes at the University of Texas are expected to have a
web-based component, it would probably be more difficult to find a vi-
able alternative for disabled students than it would be to simply ensure
that the websites are capable of including all students. Likewise, since
Farleigh Dickinson University is choosing to require all students to take
a course through the Internet, it is difficult to imagine any viable option
other than developing accessible websites. The university could employ
assistants to click through inaccessible websites and read the text aloud
to any student who is visually impaired or physically unable to manipu-
late a mouse. However, this option would probably be so costly as to
appear ridiculous when compared to the option of simply adding text
tags and keyboard controls into the original programming code.
E. Government Websites
The ADA creates requirements for state and local governments that
are also stronger than the Title III requirements for commercial entities.
Section 12132 states "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.' ' 7 This standard is
broader than Title III, and its inclusion of "services, programs, or activi-
ties" does not tie the statute to any kind of physical facility. I' s
Unlike the bookstore in the analogy raised by the Ford court,'09
where the bookstore had to be physically accessible, but need not stock
Braille books, governmental entities have an affirmative responsibility to
make all "services, programs, and activities" accessible to the disabled."
This responsibility includes providing appropriate auxiliary aids such as
Braille materials, to ensure that the government provides equal commu-
105. Id.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (1994).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying note 79.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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nication to all of its citizens, regardless of disability."' While the De-
partment of Justice's published guidelines to state and local governments
have thus far focused on printed matter, it is no great leap of logic to say
that state governments have the same obligation to provide their elec-
tronic communications in an accessible format as they have with their
paper communications.
Federal government websites must also follow accessibility guide-
lines. However, while the ADA covers state and local entities, Section
508 of the Rehabilitation Act, passed in 1998, governs the accessibility
standards for federal government information systems, which includes
websites."2 This section contains quite rigorous standards. The Act re-
quires the federal government to ensure that persons with disabilities
have the same access to electronic information and data as persons with-
out disabilities."'3
The Rehabilitation Act charged the Access Board, an independent
federal agency, with developing standards to govern the implementation
of Section 508." 4 The law's enforcement provisions were originally
scheduled to become effective on August 7, 2000."1 However, in July of
2000 the president signed a law to delay implementation until six months
after the Access Board passed its final standards."
6
The proposed standards would affect website design in several basic
ways. First, the standards would require that all graphics be given a text
label.' "7 Second, animations would be required to flash at a rate of two
Hertz or less, to prevent seizures in people with epilepsy." 8 Third, color
could not be the only means of identifying visual elements."9 Finally,
web-based applications would be required to allow keyboard input, an
Ill. U.S. Department of Justice, The ADA and City Governments: Common Problems, (May 9,
2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/comprob.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2000).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2001).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 794d (a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) ("When developing, procuring, maintaining, or using
electronic and information technology, each Federal department or agency, including the United
States Postal Service, shall ensure, unless an undue burden would be imposed on the department or
agency, that the electronic and information technology allows, regardless of the type of medium of
the technology ... individuals with disabilities who are members of the public seeking information
or services from a Federal department or agency to have access to and use of information and data
that is comparable to the access to and use of the information and data by such members of the
public who are not individuals with disabilities."). See also ACCESs BOARD, QUESTIONS &
ANSWERS ABOUT SECTION 508 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1998, available at
http://216.218.205.189/sec508/brochure.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2000).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 794d (a)(2)(A)(iii).
115. Id. at § 794(d) (f)(I)(B) (amended 2000).
116. Pub. L. No. 106-246 Stat. 555 (signed by President Clinton on July 13, 2000). See also
Federal IT Accessibility Initiative, Bill to Change 508 Enforcement Date Signed by the President at
http://www.section508.gov/docs/updateinfo.htnd (last visited Nov. 5, 2000).
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issue important both to users with visual impairments and users with
certain mobility impairments. 2 O
The law as written would apply only to federal government agen-
cies.21 Unlike some other Rehabilitation Act provisions, it would not
apply generally to state or local agencies receiving federal funds."
Nonetheless, Section 508 could still apply to the states through a grant
distributed by the Department of Education. The Technology-Related
Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1998 ("Tech Act")
and the Assistive Technology Act of 1998 ("AT Act") both require agen-
cies receiving grant funds to comply with Section 508.23 Currently, all
fifty states receive funding under Section 101(e)(3) of the AT Act, and
will therefore be required to comply with Section 508.124 Therefore, while
the law itself does not require states to comply with Section 508, the ac-
ceptance of AT Act funds requires states to comply voluntarily or risk
losing federal funding for assistive technology.
States could choose to forgo the AT grants in order to avoid com-
plying with section 508.'2 However, as noted above, the ADA would still
apply to state services-including those services that are provided
through the Internet. Even if the Supreme Court were to rule that the
ADA cannot be applied against state governments 2 6 and the states chose
to forgo the AT grants, some states would still be required under state
law to make their websites accessible. In Texas, for example, the state
legislature passed a law requiring all state agencies to maintain a website
and to ensure the websites "conform[ ] to generally acceptable standards
for Internet accessibility for people with disabilities."'
27
120. Id.
121. U.S. Department of Education, Q&A: Title IV-Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998,
Section 508: Electronic and Information Technology at http:lwww.usdoj.gov/crtl508/archivel
deptofed.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2000).
122. Id.
123. id.
124. Carol Boyer, Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology Society of North
America, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT: LIBRARIES AND SECTION 508 OF THE REHABILITATION
ACT, at http://www.resna.org/taproject/policy/initiatives/508/boyer.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2000).
125. While all fifty states currently receive funding from the AT Act, the amount of funding is
relatively small compared to the size of most state budgets. Massachusetts, for example, receives
only $400,000 from this source, and New York receives only $500,000. The small size of the grant
relative to the entire state budget may "make[] the likelihood of state attention to - and compliance
with - Section 508 fairly remote." Carol Menton, Comments by the Massachusetts Assistive
Technology Partnership, available at http://www.access-board.gov/sec508/comments-nprnl61.htm
(last visited Nov. 11, 2000).
126. See Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11 th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000).
127. S.B. 801, 1999 Leg., 76th Sess. (Tx. 1999). Notably, the fiscal note attached to the bill
stated that the legislation would have "[n]o significant fiscal impact" on state agency resources.
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F. Exceptions to the ADA
Assuming that a website operator was subject to the ADA under one
of the above categories, what kind of changes to the website would the
law require? The ADA defines discrimination, in part, as:
(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or
otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the ab-
sence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate
that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the
good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being
offered or would result in an undue burden;'2 8
The ADA further defines "auxiliary aids or services" to include
"methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals
with hearing impairments" and "methods of making visually delivered
materials available to individuals with visual impairments.' ' 29 Most of
the programming techniques discussed above in Part One are designed to
accomplish exactly those objectives; adding textual tags can make visual
information accessible to screenreading equipment, for example, and
captioning video segments allow persons with hearing impairments to
make sense of aurally delivered information.
This prohibition on discrimination, however, contains two very im-
portant exceptions. First, exclusion of persons with disabilities is not
considered discriminatory if creating accessibility would "fundamentally
alter" the nature of the good or service.'" Secondly, accessibility is not
required if it would result in an "undue burden."'
3'
G. Fundamental Alteration
Critics of the ADA's application to the Internet have charged that
such application would fundamentally alter online services.'32 The statute
provides an exemption of accessibility standards that would require "a
modification that is so significant that it alters the essential nature of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
offered."'3 3 Courts have generally tried to determine the impact that such
alterations would have on the non-disabled; if creating an accessible
service would significantly impair others' enjoyment of the activity,
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2001).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(l).
130. Id. at § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
131. Id.
132. See The Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to Private Internet
Sites: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statements of Elizabeth K. Dorminey and Walter Olson).
133. U.S. Department of Justice, ADA Title il Technical Assistance Manual, § 111-4.3600 at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
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courts are less likely to require accessibility. For instance, a California
court did not require a karate studio to offer low-impact karate classes to
accommodate an HIV-positive karate student, as the court found that the
studio's "unique niche in the martial arts market was its adherence to
traditional, 'hard-style' Japanese karate" and that "contact between par-
ticipants, which causes the bloody injuries and creates the risk of HIV
transmission, was an integral aspect of such a program."'
1
4
Similarly, two circuit courts of appeal have reached different con-
clusions about whether allowing people with disabilities to participate in
golf tournaments with the aid of golf carts would fundamentally alter the
game. "5 Both courts looked to see whether non-disabled golfers' enjoy-
ment would be seriously impaired. However, the courts reached different
factual conclusions on the impact that such an accommodation would
have on the non-disabled players. In Olinger v. United States Golf Asso-
ciation, 36 the Seventh Circuit found that fatigue from walking was an
"integral part" of the competition. 37 The court took note of testimony
describing a man who won the U.S. Open in 1964 by walking in 100
degree heat while battling dehydration, and found "[this] testimony ...
by itself, supports [the requirement] that all players play all tournaments
under the same conditions and rules.' 38 In Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.,39
by contrast, the Ninth Circuit found the "fatigue factor" from walking
was insignificant, and noted that some golfers chose to walk the course
even in competitions where carts were allowed.'4 The Ninth Circuit also
noted that there was no handicap penalty attached to using a golf cart in
other competitions, thus suggesting that no actual advantage was gained
by using such a cart.'4 ' However, the result would have been different
had the trial court found the accommodation gave Martin an "unfair ad-
vantage" over other competitors, like using a "golf ball that carried far-
ther than others.' 42
Following the direction of these courts, it seems likely that website
accommodations would not be required if they would impair others' en-
joyment or use of the site. Some commentators have argued that accessi-
ble websites would limit their usefulness to the non-disabled population.
In her testimony before Congress, lawyer Elizabeth Dorminey warned
that applying the ADA to the Internet would mean that "[plictures and
134. Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 879 (4th Cir. 1999).
135. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000); but see Martin v.
PGA Tour, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000).
136. Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001.
137. Id.at 1006.
138. Id.
139. Martin, 204 F.3d 994.
140. Id. at 1000.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1001.
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graphics would be prohibited, and most games would be banned."' 43
Certainly, a complete prohibition on graphics would cause the Internet to
be less enjoyable for many people.' 4" A lack of games might cause a re-
volt among teenagers; one recent news article reported that "as many as
70 percent of the country's online teenagers utiliz[e] the internet to play
games.' 45
As noted above, however, guidelines for website accessibility do not
require eliminating graphics; rather, they simply require that a text tag be
attached to the graphic in the programming code, so that screen readers
can work around the graphics.'46 According to Dr. Steven Lucas, an
Internet professional who helped develop standardized programming
guidelines, "[aiccessibility techniques are not designed to limit the crea-
tivity of the designer."' 47 In fact, the pages will have the same look and
feel to the non-disabled user, complete with fancy graphics. Lucas ex-
plains, "[t]he artistic nature of the site will not be affected if the site is
created with text-only pages first. Once the text version is created and
tested for accessibility, the images and other artistic design features can
be added.''18 Even when the graphical site is created first, text tags can
still be added to the programming code at a later time. Therefore, it is
unlikely that ADA compliance would require removing any graphics
from the webpage.
Games are equally unlikely to be banned. Many video games test
the player's visual reflexes and manual dexterity. Assuming that most
courts would find such testing to be an "integral aspect" of the games,
the Montalvo court's analysis would apply, and the games--like the ka-
rate studio in Montalvo--would not be required to "abandon [their] es-
sential mission" in pursuit of accessibility.'4 9 While the games themselves
might not have to be accessible, however, their exemption does not mean
that a commercial website offering some games as part of the mix of
143. See Dorminey, supra note 132.
144. See Erik Sherman, Speeding up Internet Graphics, SMART COMPUTING, (Nov. 1998),
available at http://www.smartcomputing.com/editorial/article.asp?article=articles%2Farchive%
2Fworktheweb%2Fwtw3O%2Fwtw3O%2Easp (last visited Oct. 19, 2001) ("Web pages are as much
about graphics as text."). Id.
145. See Gainers News, New Adventure, Strategy Game Island Odyssey, (Dec. 19, 1999), at
http://www.seriousgamers.com/sgnewsl2-19-99.shtil (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
146. See supra text accompanying note 15. Additionally, persons with epilepsy or others who
may be bothered by flashing animations can simply turn the graphics option off; the text tags
attached to the graphics would still permit the user to navigate through the website without the use of
graphics. This function would be limited to the individual's workstation, so that other people who
may desire to see the graphics would be entirely unaffected.
147. The Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to Private Internet Sites:
Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on The Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, (2000)
(statement of Dr. Steven Lucas, Senior Vice President, Industry Government Relations & Chief
Executive Officer, PrivaSeek, Inc.)
148. Id.
149. Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 879 (4th Cir. 1999).
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products on its website should be exempt from the ADA. Similar to the
bookstore in the analogy developed by the Ford court,'50 the site itself
could be accessible even though it might offer some products that could
not be used by all persons.
H. Undue Burden
Accommodations that would create an undue burden are also not
required by the ADA. Federal regulation defines "undue burden" as
"significant difficulty or expense."' 5 ' The regulation lists several factors
to determine when an individual action would create an undue burden.
These factors include:
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part;
(2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in the
action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect on ex-
penses and resources;
(3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal re-
lationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or
entity;
(4) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corpo-
ration or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or entity
with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and
(5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent
corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and func-
tions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity.5 2
However, the "undue burden" defense is unlikely to provide a ref-
uge for very many website operators. First, cost estimates show that most
website operators will incur only a minimal cost to add accessibility
features.'53 Second, when a particular accommodation might result in a
high cost, there are usually lower-cost alternatives for providing access.
Some website operators are concerned, for example, that providing
150. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("a bookstore must be
accessible to the disabled but need not treat the disabled equally in terms of books the store
stocks.").
151. 28 CFR § 36.104 (1991).
152. 28 CFR § 36.104. These factors are substantially similar to the factors listed in Title 1,
used to determine when an employment accommodation would result in an undue hardship. 42
U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(B)(2001).
153. See United States Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board,
Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards Section 508 of the Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1998: Economic Assessment at http://www.section508.gov/docs/508-reg-
assess.html#ES.4 (last visited Dec. 5, 2000) (estimating that building accessible web sites will result
in "minimal incremental costs"); see also Boyer, supra note 124 (noting that creating accessible web
pages for Texas state agencies was estimated to have "[n]o significant fiscal impact.").
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closed-captioning for video broadcasts over the Internet could be quite
expensive." However, a transcript of the video might be easier to pro-
duce and still provide access to the hearing impaired. The Department of
Justice provides similar alternatives in the context of guided tours, noting
that while "[i]t may be an undue burden for a small private historic house
museum on a shoestring budget to provide a sign language interpreter for
a deaf individual wishing to participate in a tour... a written script of the
tour.. . would be an alternative that would be unlikely to result in an
undue burden."'55
Some commentators are skeptical that offering website accessibility
could really be a low-cost option. If such a requirement were truly not
burdensome, they argue, then surely more websites would be compliant.
Walter Olson, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, noted that
"[a]lthough we are often told that it is easy to design these features into a
website, it is worth remarking that even many of the websites that you
might visit in the course of educating yourself about disability rights are
themselves out of compliance." ' 6 However, the burden seems to lie in
simple attention to the issue, not in the implementation of programming
changes. For example, AOL was able to make changes quickly and eas-
ily once their management made the decision to make its next version
accessible. In fact, when a consultant hired by AOL to advise the com-
pany on accessibility issues was asked why AOL did not implement ac-
cessibility guidelines as soon as its technicians became aware of AOL's
deficiencies, he blamed internal communications problems and the size
of the company.' Furthermore, the media's attention to the AOL case
served to educate many website designers about the importance of acces-
sible design and, according to the report of one technology journal, has
"effectively raised awareness about making technology user-friendly to
disabled computer users across the technology community.' 58 Evidence
of this awareness can be seen through "Bobby", a popular tool for gaug-
154. See generally Cynthia D. Waddell, The Growing Digital Divide In Access For People
With Disabilities: Overcoming Barriers To Participation In The Digital Economy, paper presented at
U.S. Dep't of Commerce Conference "Understanding the Digital Economy: Data, Tools, and
Research," (May 25-26, 1999) available at http://www.icdri.org/the-digital-divide.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2001).
155. U.S. Department of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual, § 111-4.3600 at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
156. The ADA and It's Application to World Wide Web Sites: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2000) (statement of Senior
Fellow, Manhattan Institute, Walter Olson) (citing non-complying websites such as
http://www.whitehouse.gov and http://www.civil-rights.org, the website of the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights).
157. Lisa Vaas, Courts, Uncle Sam Begins To Clamp Down On Disabled-Unfriendly Web
Sites, PC WEEK, April 10, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
158. Jennifer Jones, Users With Disabilities Push High-Tech Limits, INFOWORLD, Sept. 4,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
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ing website accessibility, which as of November 2000, has examined
over three million websites each month.
59
III. POLICY CONCERNS
As noted above in Part Two, there are many cases in which a valid
ADA claim can be brought against an online content provider with a
reasonable probability of success'6 However, many commentators ad-
dress the issue of Internet accessibility and the ADA, often with very
strong, and sometimes diametrically opposing, points of view as to
whether the ADA should apply to the Internet. 6' Any future decision on
the role of the ADA in Internet regulation, whether it be legislative or
judicial, will have to take into account the inherent tensions between
various legal, regulatory, and public policy goals. This section will ex-
amine some of the most widely discussed issues, including: (A) discern-
ing (and following) legislative intent; (B) providing access to economic
opportunity; (C) minimizing the economic and regulatory burden on a
growing sector of the economy; (D) avoiding a flood of litigation; and
(E) correcting market failure.
A. Legislative Intent
The Internet itself is not listed as one of the twelve places of public
accommodation. Some commentators argue that this omission means that
websites should be categorically excluded from the public accommoda-
tion umbrella. "The principle of 'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius', the
inclusion of some assumes the intentional exclusion of others, supports
excluding the Internet from the definition of public accommodation."' 62
However, the Internet in its current form did not exist in 1990, so it can-
not be said that Congress meant to exclude it. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has held that the ADA covers areas that Congress might not have
envisioned, such as state prison programs and that such an extension of
the law demonstrates the Act's breadth, not ambiguity.
6 1
In fact, it makes logical sense that Congress intended more than
permitting the disabled access to the physical structure of a bank or a
grocery store. Rather, Congress was concerned about the ability of per-
sons with disabilities to meet basic needs, such as banking or grocery
159. See http://www.cast.org/bobby/What'sNew321.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2000).
160. See supra Part Two.
161. See, e.g., Frezza, supra note 6 (arguing that applying the ADA to the Internet would cause
a regulatory burden) and Waddell, supra note 154 (arguing that applying the ADA to the Internet
would improve commerce and employment opportunities).
162. See Dorminey, supra note 132.
163. Pa. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998) ("[i]n the context of an
unambiguous statutory text [whether or not Congress envisioned a specific application] is irrelevant.
As we have said before, the fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."') (citing Sedima, S. P. R. L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
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shopping. Today, banks and grocery stores have a complete range of
services available over the Internet and it makes little sense to assume
that Congress would have allowed such entities to discriminate against
the disabled simply because the online businesses subscribe to a different
business model. Even the most strict reading of the text would argue for
the inclusion of at least some online businesses. As mentioned above,
grocery stores are explicitly covered by the statute, and Grocery-
Works.Com is no less of a grocery store than Food Lion.
Furthermore, the question of legislative intent arises primarily when
determining whether commercial websites fit under the rubric of places
of public accommodation. In other areas, such as governmental programs
or educational services, the statute is written broadly enough that it is
difficult to argue that websites in these two categories would not be cov-
ered. The statute, after all, covers governmental "services", and this cate-
gory is broad enough under the statute's plain text to include all services
offered by the governmental entity, not just those services offered in
1990, when the ADA was enacted.
B. Economic Opportunity
President Bush described the ADA as a way to provide the disabled
"with greater opportunities to bring their knowledge, ideas, and com-
mitment to the workplace" and a "crucial investment in our Nation's
future."' ' Continuing to provide these opportunities means providing
access to the Internet, because many economic opportunities in today's
world are available only online. Use of the Internet has become impor-
tant, for example, in maintaining employment. Gary Wunder reports, "in
my job, electronic mail conducted via the Internet is the standard way we
communicate. Our meeting calendars are maintained electronically and
shared [on the Internet]. Even the list I use to telephone my colleague...
[is] accessible only by using the tools of the Internet."' 6
Critics have suggested that applying the ADA to the Internet might
actually result in decreased access to economic activity as website op-
erators may simply "learn to do no more than the rules force them to do,
avoiding changes that could improve their products or services." '66 This
argument would hold more weight, however, if companies were creating
accessible sites on their own. The four-year struggle to gain accessibility
from AOL, along with the dearth of accessible sites, demonstrates that a
164. President's Proclamation, supra note 1.
165. Hearing on the ADA and Private Internet Sites, Testimony Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Const., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gary Wunder, University
of Missouri).
166. Hearing on the ADA and Private Internet Sites, Testimony Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Const., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Elizabeth Dorminey,
Lawson, Steckel, Nelson & Schneider).
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company providing even minimum accessibility is still preferable to a
company providing no accessibility.
C. Minimizing the Regulatory Burden
Other people have argued that the Internet is a special case: a tech-
nology and an industry still in its infancy that could be irreparably
harmed through over-regulation. Critics have warned, for example, that
"regulations that prescribe burdensome formats for U.S.-based websites
could easily - and at little cost - drive site owners offshore, beyond the
reach of these regulations, making the U.S. less competitive in this dy-
namic sector of the economy.' 67 This argument has some merit. If regu-
lations are so burdensome that website operators choose to move off-
shore, then the economy would lose that business and people with dis-
abilities would still be left with inaccessible websites.
Since the ADA provides an exception for actions that would cause
"undue burden," the risk in this case is that the regulations provide
enough of a burden to entice a company off-shore, but not so much of a
burden as to exempt them from the ADA's requirements. This scenario is
unlikely to occur, however. First, the federal government's experience
has shown us that the cost of creating accessibility is likely to be very
low; the federal government did not experience any measurable cost to
bring its sites into compliance with strict federal standards.' 68 Other esti-
mates for private websites have shown the increase in cost to be about
one to two percent over what entities were currently spending on their
websites.169 Second, even small businesses with fewer resources than the
federal government have made their websites accessible. Instead of
making the sites more expensive, they have found that it has actually
increased their business. Finally, many corporations cannot simply move
their websites offshore to avoid complying with U.S. law. Websites run
by corporations headquartered in the U.S. still have an obligation to
comply generally with American laws.
D. Fear of a Flood of Litigation
Critics also warn that applying the ADA to the Internet will result in
a flood of litigation. Walter Olson warns that "if it is easy pickings to
walk down a town's main shopping street and find stores that you can hit
with an ADA suit over their physical facilities, then it is even easier to
browse the web and find websites that are arguably out of ADA compli-
167. Id.
168. See supra note 152.
169. But see Bill Day, Businesses Find Disabilities Act Has Been A Plus, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, July 23, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
[Vol. 79:2
PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE FUTURE
ance."'' " Congressional counsel Paul Taylor agrees that applying the
ADA to the Internet could "make most anyone who offers goods or
services over the Internet a potential defendant in an ADA lawsuit."'
7'
Many of these critics object to the ADA as it is currently written and
would prefer to see the elimination of recovery for attorney's fees and
the addition of a provision requiring plaintiffs to provide businesses with
some time to comply before a suit may be instituted.
7 2
Other people, however, worry that reducing people's ability to sue
for access will result in fewer companies taking action to create accessi-
bility. As one newspaper article reported, "the law is largely reactive. It
is driven by complaints and lawsuits rather than aggressive enforcement
through regular inspection."' 7 3 Furthermore, private individuals who
bring suit against an inaccessible public accommodation cannot recover
monetary damages, but can recover only injunctive relief and "reason-




Economic theory tells us that we should expect to see companies
rushing to fill pent-up consumer demand as new markets are identified.
One of the lessons learned over the last ten years is that companies can
actually improve profitability by making their services accessible to the
disabled. Greyhound Bus Lines, for example, told federal regulators
shortly after the passage of the ADA that complying with the act would
"bankrupt them and put them out of business."' 75 The company was or-
dered to comply with the law, however, and reported shortly thereafter
that overall ridership had increased as a result of the increase in disabled
176passengers.
Internet businesses that have made their websites accessible have
reported similar results. A recent PC World article described how one
small coffee business, owned by a husband and wife team by the name of
170. Hearing on the ADA and Private Internet Sites: Testimony Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Const., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Walter Olson, Manhattan
Institute).
171. Memorandum from Paul B. Taylor, Counsel, Subcomm. on the Constitution, to
Congressman Charles Canady, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 16, 1999) available at
http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/w3c-wai-ig/2000JanMar/01 14.html.
172. Janelle Carter, Eastwood Criticizes ADA Suits, AP NEWSWIRE, May 19, 2000, available
at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
173. Jennifer Lafleur and Lorraine Kee, Ten Years After Landmark Law, Gains are Made,
Barriers Remain, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
174. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(a), 12188(b)(4) (1994).
175. Day, supra note 4.
176. Id.
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Belssner, gained new customers after revising their website.177 The article
quoted Mr. Belssner as saying that "creating accessibility in a brick-and-
mortar environment is far more challenging than adding accessibility to
your Web site. '7T The couple saw their profitability increase after com-
municating with their customers and learning that simply labeling their
graphics would make their site accessible to a wider audience.'
79
The potential of an increased market share has not motivated many
companies to make their web sites accessible, however. PC World sur-
veyed "more than 30 major shopping, search, auction, news, and finan-
cial Web sites" and found that few had implemented accessibility guide-
lines.' 8° Companies' stated reasons for non-accessibility had more to do
with apathy than with perceived cost; one company stated that people
with disabilities were simply "not a market we've thought about pursu-
ing."'"' A spokesperson for the Gap clothing store stated that she was
aware of accessibility guidelines for websites, but commented that the
retailer "[had] no plans to implement them" citing simply "strategy.'
82
Such a lack of interest in pursuing profitability through an expan-
sion of the customer base is highly suggestive of market failure. Eco-
nomic literature reports that prejudice and discrimination can lead to
such market failure; in fact, discrimination-based market failure has been
cited as one of the motivating factors behind the enactment of the
ADA. 83 If such market failure is at work on the Internet, increased en-
forcement of the ADA online may have the dual effect of both increasing
accessibility and stimulating the economy through increased online sales.
IV. CONCLUSION
As it is written, the ADA can encompass Internet accessibility. The
language regarding governmental and educational websites is broad
enough to include Internet services in a plain text reading of the statute.
The language of Title III, dealing with places of public accommodation,
is slightly more ambiguous; some circuits have been reluctant to apply it
outside of physical facilities. However, even in these circuits some web-
sites may still be covered if they have a sufficient nexus to a physical
place of public accommodation, as in the case of a website run by a
brick-and-mortar store.
177. Judy Heim, Locking Out the Disabled, PC WORLD, Sept. 2000, available at






183. Susan Schwochau and Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled? 21 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L.
271, 275 (2000). ("In enacting the ADA, Congress focused on this explanation for the differentials in
employment and wages between disabled and nondisabled individuals.").
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Examining the possibility of increased enforcement of online acces-
sibility raises questions about the tension between increasing access for
the disabled and minimizing the burden placed on a newly emerging
sector of the economy. On balance, however, these policy concerns tilt
more towards increasing access than to protecting online businesses.
First, the past five years have not shown self-regulation of websites to be
very effective in promoting access. Second, cost estimates have shown
that mandating online accessibility is not expected to result in more than
minimal cost increases. Finally, it appears that the natural tendency to
increase market share is hindered by continuing discrimination-based
market failure. These factors lend support to the notion that increased
enforcement of the ADA in cyberspace could benefit the disabled at the
same time as it increases the commercial potential of the Internet.
The Internet plays a vital role in the world today, and will continue
to do so for the foreseeable future. When President Bush signed the ADA
into law in 1990, he spoke of the need to "[harness] the energy, creativ-
ity, and talent of all our citizens" in the "increasingly technological, in-
creasingly competitive global marketplace. '" '84 In the year 2000, achiev-
ing this goal requires that we provide effective, accessible access to the
Internet to all persons regardless of disability.
184. President's Proclamation, supra note 1.
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"The chief cause of business failures-after management error-is
lack of capital."' Because of the barriers facing small businesses in their
quest for gaining additional capital, in 1992 the Securities and Exchange
Commission (hereinafter called "the Commission") made numerous
changes to its regulatory scheme regarding the issuance and sale of secu-
rities.2 The most notable of these changes were the Commission's adop-
tion of an integrated disclosure system for small business issuers,3 its
revisions to Rule 504 of Regulation D (offerings by small businesses of
securities not in excess of $1 million), and its revision of Regulation A
offerings (offerings by businesses of securities not in excess of $5 mil-
lion).5
Simultaneous to the Commission's reforms, the Internet was be-
coming a ubiquitous medium of advertising, e-commerce, and informa-
tion promulgation. These two sets of events proved synergistic, for the
Internet's cost-effective means of distributing information improved the
ability of companies to directly and economically inform and interact
with large groups of possible investors. The process used by a company
directly offering its securities to the public is called a direct public of-
fering (hereinafter "DPO"). 6 "In a DPO, the issuer by-passes investment
banks and underwriters and offers shares directly to potential investors
via online resources, telephone or in-person marketing."7 By coupling the
available technology with the expanded opportunities for selling small
amounts of securities without the traditional regulatory burdens of a reg-
*. B.A., University of Oregon, J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon. The author wishes to
thank the following individuals without whose support this article would not have been possible:
Natasha Dawn Egge, Joseph Loew, Aaron Deas, Prof. Barbara Aldave, Prof. Andrea Coles-Bjerre,
Dean Lisa Kloppenberg, Prof. Nancy Shurtz, and Roy Dwyer. The author may be reached at:
jefferis@law.uoregon.edu.
1. Mario P. Borini, Give Small Businesses the Tax Break They Deserve, Bus. WK., June 18,
1984, at 11.
2. See Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,442
(Aug. 13, 1992).
3. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-228.702 (2000).
4. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2000).
5. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.262 (2000).
6. Joseph Kershenbaum, Securities Offerings Online by Small Nonpublic Businesses, 25 VT.
B. J. & L. DIG. 19 (1999).
7. Id.
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istered offering, the process of a company undertaking a DPO minimized
the offering's costs while maximizing the potential return.
Because there are significant benefits and cost savings to small
businesses that directly sell their securities, this paper addresses the pro-
cess by which a company may utilize Regulation A in the DPO context.8
II. INTRODUCTION To REGULATION A
The Spring Street Brewing Company (hereinafter "Spring Street")
offering is an example of how the Internet and the expanded opportuni-
ties for securities offerings were successfully combined to raise capital in
the small business context. 9 Spring Street was a small microbrewery in
New York that needed additional capital to expand its manufacturing
capacity, but it was unable to attract an underwriter for a registered of-
fering and was not willing to accept the terms of a venture capitalist.'
Therefore, Spring Street elected to undertake a DPO. Spring Street ap-
plied for a Regulation A exemption from the Commission, and it subse-
quently posted its offering circular on an Internet site and included
printed advertisements of the securities on its six-packs of beer." "Spring
Street completed the offering in March 1996, raising roughly $1.6 mil-
lion by selling approximately 900,000 shares to some 3,500 investors at
$1.85 per share."' 2
Regulation A was the best method for a company like Spring Street
to raise the additional capital it needed. Regulation A offerings are
unique in that they allow a prospective issuer to "test the waters" of the
market to determine if there is sufficient interest in the company's secu-
rities before the prospective issuer commits the time and resources to
filing an offering statement with the Commission.'3 In addition, the
Regulation proved effective for Spring Street in part because there are
virtually no restrictions on resale of securities and no special qualifica-
tions for initial investors to meet with respects to number or sophistica-
tion. Furthermore, DPOs offer the issuer tremendous cost savings. By
8. While the Commission permits an underwriter to participate in a Regulation A offering,
this paper shall not discuss that option due to the rarity of such collaborations. Therefore, this paper
shall focus only on the DPO process for Regulation A offerings.
9. See Daniel Everett Giddings, Comment: An Innovative Link Between the Internet, the
Capital Markets,. and the SEC: How the Internet Direct Public Offering Helps Small Companies
Looking to Raise Capital, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 785, 786 (1998).
10. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A
Sensible Alternative for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 531 (2001).
11. See id. at 532.
12. Id. at 532.
13. See Giddings, supra note 9, at 793.
14. See id. Some Regulation D offerings, which are also non-registered, require that the
number of purchasers be limited. For example, in a Rule 505 offering purchasers are limited to less
than 35 non-accredited investors and an unlimited number of accredited investors. See HOWARD S.
BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRmIEs LAW HANDBOOK § 9.05, at 475 (2001).
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cutting out the underwriter, accountants and printing and "roadshow"'5
costs, a company can "go public" at a cost of perhaps 6% of the total
value of the issue, as opposed to a 13% average for an underwritten,
registered offering. 16
The following section of this paper addresses a range of issues re-
garding Regulation A: the scope of the exemption, Commission compli-
ance obligations, state registration issues, broker-dealer regulations, ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such an offering, and strategy recommen-
dations.
A. Scope of The Regulation A Exemption
The Commission has promulgated 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251 through
230.263 (2000) to define the scope of the Regulation A exemption. The
rules address issues ranging from who may be an issuer to offering con-
ditions. The following are major issues regarding this exemption:
1. Who May Issue Securities Under Regulation A?
The Regulation A exemption assists small businesses in obtaining
capital from the sale of securities. 7 The major eligibility requirements
are:
* The issuer must be an entity organized and having its principal
place of business in the United States or Canada;'
8
* The total value of the securities being offered cannot exceed $5
million,' 9 "less the aggregate offering price for all securities"
sold by the issuer during the previous twelve months in reliance
on Regulation A27
* The issuer must not be subject to the reporting requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:21
* The issuer cannot be an investment company offering interests in
oil or gas rights; 2  and
15. A "roadshow" is the process by which a company's officers tour the country making
presentations to groups of investors regarding their business and the attractiveness of their securities.
16. See Kerry Hannon, Going Public to the Public: Small Businesses Can Bypass
Underwriters and Save Big Money, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 17, 1996, at 74.
17. See Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442,
36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 l(a)(1)(2000).
19. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, § 7.02, at 388.
A Regulation A offering by an issuer in the amount of $5 million.. .would make both
Rule 504 and 505 unavailable to an issuer for a period of 12 months. On the other hand, a
Rule 504 or 505 offering made immediately prior to the Regulation A offering would not
affect the amount that can be offered pursuant to Regulation A. Id.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b)(2001).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2)(2001).
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None of the issuer's officers or directors can be subject to a
pending investigation by the Commission or have been convicted
of any crime associated with the issuance or sale of securities
within the past five years."
Importantly, when issuing individual securities pursuant to the
Regulation A exemption individual securities have no price floor or
ceiling. "The Commission is persuaded that exclusion of legitimate small
business operating companies from the exemption because of the trading
price of their securities is not necessary for investor protection and would
foreclose significant financing options to small developing companies.,
2
1
2. Testing the Waters: Gauging the Market's Interest in an Issuer's
Securities
25
The Commission under Regulation A permits a prospective issuer of
securities to publish "to prospective purchasers a written document or
make scripted radio or television broadcasts to determine whether there
is any interest in a contemplated securities offering." 26 This provision is
unique to Regulation A; the Commission normally does not allow issuers
to disseminate advance information about prospective issues of securities
in connection with registered offerings. Before publishing or broadcast-
ing any advertisements in advance of a Regulation A offering, the pro-
spective issuer must deliver or publish to the Commission a copy of the
advertisement or script for a radio or television broadcast. 27 The written
script or broadcast is required to do no more than the following:
* State that money is not yet being solicited and will not be ac-
cepted;
* State that no sales of the security will be made or commitment to
purchase accepted until the investor is delivered an offering cir-
cular;
* Explain that an expression of interest by a prospective investor
will not commit that investor to purchase the securities;
* Briefly explain the business and its products;
22. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(5)(2001).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (2000).
24. Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,442,
36,444 (Aug. 13, 1992).
25. The Commission holds that if a prospective issuer uses the "test the waters" provision
permitted to Regulation A issuers, and then makes a good faith decision to have the securities issued
under another registration process, the prior use of the "test the waters" provision will not disqualify
the issuer from resorting to a registered offering. Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release
No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,442, 36,445 (Aug. 13, 1992).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a)(2000).
27. Id. "Failure to file such sales literature can be the grounds for entry of a suspension
order." BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, § 7.02, at 395.
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0 Identify the issuer's officers and directors. 8
The advertisements "may include a coupon, returnable to the issuer, indi-
cating interest in a potential offering revealing the name, address and
telephone number of the prospective investor."29
After the Commission obtains copies of the advertisements,' the
Commission permits a prospective issuer or its agents to communicate
orally with interested investors.3 ' However, once a prospective issuer has
filed an offering statement, the first step in qualifying for a Regulation A
exemption, the issuer can no longer promulgate further advertising. 2
Unfortunately, the movement toward uniformity regarding securities
regulation has removed cumulative blue-sky law regulatory require-
ments. A case on point is Colorado Rule 51-3.13(A) (2000) which places
the following requirements upon prospective issuers who use the Com-
mission's "testing the waters" provision:
* All solicitation of interest documents must be filed with the state
securities regulation administrator no later than the date of its
first publication;
" All solicitation of interest documents must include the following
statement: This information is distributed under SEC Regulation-
A and has been filed with the SEC and the Colorado Securities
Division. Neither the SEC nor the Securities Division has re-
viewed or approved its form or content.33
While the added burdens imposed by state blue-sky laws are minimal in
the Colorado context, the difficulty arises from multiplicity and diver-
gence of separate state regulations regarding pre-filing advertisements.
Therefore, a prospective issuer who plans on using the "testing the wa-
ters" provision should research the law of each state where it plans on
advertising its prospective issuance so as to ensure compliance with state
law.
3. How To Apply for a Regulation A Exemption
The Commission requires that all prospective issuers seeking to
issue securities under the Regulation A exemption file seven copies of a
28. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(2)(iv)(2000).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(c)(2001).
30. Once the solicitation documents have been filed with the Commission, they need be re-
filed only if the advertisement is changed in a materially significant manner. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.254(b)( 1 )(2000).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a)(2001).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(3)(2000).
33. 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 51-3.13(A)(2001). See also http://www.dora.state.co.us
/securities/ttwoff.htm (explaining Colorado Rule 51-3.13(A) as it applies to the Federal "Testing the
Waters" provision).
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Form 1-A Offering Statement 34 in "the Commission's main office in
Washington, D.C., 35 The offering statement must be signed by the is-
suer's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, a majority of the
members of the issuer's Board of Directors, and any individual who is
selling his or her privately held securities through the Regulation A proc-
36ess.
Form 1-A allows a prospective issuer to supply the Commission
with the required information in either of two formats: the traditional
registration format, or the question and-answer format.
37
Minor errors in an offering statement or the issuer's failure to com-
ply with a particular term of Regulation A will not automatically destroy
the issue's exemption if the issuer demonstrates to the Commission three
points: that the error was not prejudicial to prospective purchasers of the
security, that the error was insignificant, and that the issuer made a good
faith effort to comply with the Commission's requirements. 3  Further-
more, the "Commission's safe harbor provisions relating to forward
looking information have been specifically made applicable to Regula-
tion A."39
It is common for the Commission's staff to send the prospective
issuer a "comment letter" asking the issuer to clarify, correct, or supple-
ment the information that it has provided. Unless the issuer seeks to have
its offering statement's qualification delayed,4° the offering statement
will be designated as qualified, and sales of the securities may commence
on the twentieth calendar day after the Commission deems the form
completed and filed .
34. Some state jurisdictions, in accordance with the Commission's cooperation, allow
prospective issuers to use Form U-7 to be submitted to both the Commission and respective state
securities regulators for registration / qualification purposes. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1152.
Use of Form U-7 is associated with an issuer seeking a SCOR state registration exemption, yet such
an exemption is not advisable due to its limitations and conflicts with Regulation A. See discussion
infra Part II(C).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(e)(2000).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(d)(2000).
37. See Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,442,
36,443-44 (Aug. 13, 1992).
38. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.260(a)(2001).
39. See Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,442,
36,444 (Aug. 13, 1992).
40. In some instances a prospective issuer may wish to delay the qualification date of its
offering statement in order to promote the sale of the securities for more than the 20 days provided
by the Commission. In those instances, the issuer needs to amend its preliminary offering circular to
comply with Section 230.252(g). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(g)(2001).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(g)(2000).
[Vol. 79:2
2001] DIRECT PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND THE INTERNET 235
4. Does the Prospective Issuer Need to Supply Audited Financial
Statements?
A significant advantage for prospective issuers who utilize Regula-
tion A is that they are not required to supply the Commission with
audited financial statements, unless the issuer has audited financial• 42
statements otherwise available. However, a number of states require
certified financial statements; therefore, it is advisable for a prospective
issuer to research the state law requirements for the jurisdictions where
they plan on offering and selling their securities so as to ensure compli-
ance.
5. Treatment of Confidential Information
Sometimes an issuer may desire to have some of the information
contained in its Form 1-A application treated as confidential. Such in-
formation can range from trade secrets to projections of earnings. A pro-
spective issuer can request that the Commission treat selected parts of itsS41
offering statement as confidential. Once the Commission has received
the offering statement, the Commission's staff will review its content to
ensure that the information supplied complies with the requirements of
Regulation A. If the material that the issuer seeks to withhold can be
deleted from the offering statement without compromising its value to an
investor, then the Commission should approve the issuer's petition.
6. What is an Offering Circular?
An offering circular is a document that the Commission requires to
be delivered to all parties upon request, all prospective purchasers of a
security, and all purchasers of a security issued under Regulation A."
There are two types of offering circulars: a Preliminary Offering
Circular4 5 and a Final Offering Circular.46
The Preliminary Offering Circular is required to bear on the outside
front cover the caption "Preliminary Offering Circular," the date of issu-
42. Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,442,
36,491-92 (Aug. 13, 1992). See UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Form 1-
A, Part F/S, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/formsnl-a.htm.
43. The Commission has two standards for whether information submitted in a registration
statement will be treated as confidential. Information that is required to be in the offering statement
will be reviewed per Section 230.406. See 17 C.F.R. § 234.406 (2001). Information not required to
be in the offering statement will be considered per section 200.83. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.83 (2001).
44. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2001) (providing rules regarding the
limitations upon offers, confirmations, and sales of securities and the documentation required to be
delivered to a purchaser or prospective purchaser during each respective period).
45. "Preliminary Offering Circular: The offering circular described in § 230.255(a)." 17
C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2000). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a).
46. "Final Offering Circular: The current offering circular contained in a qualified offering
statement." 17 C.F.R. § 230.261(a).
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ance of the circular, and a statement required by the Commission.47 In
addition, "[t]he Preliminary Offering Circular contains substantially the
information required in an offering circular by Form 1-A, except that
information with respect to offering price, underwriting discounts or
commissions, discounts or commissions to dealers, amount of proceeds,
conversion rates, call prices, or other matters dependent upon the offer-
ing price may be omitted. ''"
A Final Offering Circular must include the narrative and financial
information required by Form 1-A, the offering price of the security, the
number of shares offered, the projected total amount of proceeds, and
any dealer or underwriter discounts or commissions. 9 In addition, the
Final Offering Circular must include a cover-page legend informing a
prospective purchaser of the security that the Commission does not af-
frmn the merits of the offering or the accuracy of the offering circular.'
7. When May an Issuer Offer to Sell Securities Under Regulation
A?
No offer may be made to sell the securities to be issued under
Regulation A until a Form 1-A offering statement has been filed with the
Commission.5' There is no waiting period between the time when an ap-
plicant files the Form 1-A, and the time when it may make oral and
written offers, or even publish printed advertisements regarding the offer.
47. The required statement must read:
An offering statement pursuant to Regulation A relating to these securities has been filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Information contained in this Preliminary
Offering Circular is subject to completion or amendment. These securities may not be
sold nor may offers to buy be accepted prior to the time an offering circular which is not
designated as a Preliminary Offering Circular is delivered and the offering statement filed
with the Commission becomes qualified. This Preliminary Offering Circular shall not
constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy nor shall there by any sales
of these securities in any state in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful
prior to registration or qualification under the laws of any such state.
17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a)(1)(2000).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a)(2)(2000).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 230.253(a)(2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2000).
50. The Commission requires that the following language be printed on the cover page of
every final offering circular subject to Regulation A:
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DOES NOT
PASS UPON THE MERITS OF OR GIVE ITS APPROVAL TO ANY SECURITIES
OFFERED OR THE TERMS OF THE OFFERING, NOR DOES IT PASS UPON THE
ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF ANY OFFERING CIRCULAR OR OTHER
SELLING LITERATURE. THESE SECURITIES ARE OFFERED PURSUANT TO AN
EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION WITH THE COMMISSION; HOWEVER,
THE COMMISSION HAS NOT MADE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION
THAT THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREUNDER ARE EXEMPT FROM
REGISTRATION.
17 C.F.R. § 230.253(d)(2000).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i)(2000).
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However, no sales of the securities can take place until the Commission
has qualified the Form 1-A."
8. Making Offers During the Waiting Period
There are three types of offers that can be made prior to the Com-
mission qualifying a prospective issuer's offering statement: oral offers,
written offers, and advertisements. All three of these types of offers are
subject to one overriding limitation: An issuer or its agent cannot enter
into a contract to sell any security before the Commission has qualified
the issuer's offering statement.
53
a. Oral Offers
An issuer or its agent may extend an oral offer to sell its securities
to a prospective investor prior to the Commission's qualifying the offer-
ing statement provided that no binding transaction is entered into before
the offerings statement's effective date. 4
b. Written Offers
Written offers must comply with the restrictions articulated in 17
C.F.R. § 230.255. "Once an offering statement is filed, a written offer
can be made only through the use of a preliminary or final offering cir-
cular."" The preliminary offering circular is required to bear on its cover
page the caption "Preliminary Offering Circular," the date of its issue,
and an explanatory statement concerning the nature of the offering. 6 The
Preliminary Offering Circular must contain "substantially the informa-
tion required in an offering circular by Form I-A," except that it is not
required to state the offering price, underwriter and dealer discounts,
amount of proceeds, and other matters dependent upon the securities
offering price; but it is required to give an estimate of the initial offering
price for the security and the number of shares to be issued.57 If informa-
tion in the preliminary offering circular is later found to be inaccurate in
any material58 respect, a revised copy of either the preliminary offering
circular or a final offering circular must be furnished to the investor at
52. 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 l(d)(2)(i)(A)(2000).
53. See discussion infra Part ll(A)(8)(a-c). Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. §
77e (2001) (prohibiting the sale of any security before its associated registration statement becomes
effective).
54. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(d)(1)(ii)(A), (d)(2)(i)(A).
55. See Small Business Initiatives, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,442,
36,445 (Aug. 13, 1992).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a)(1)(2002).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a)(2)(2000).
58. The term "material," used in reference to information subject to SEC regulations, is a
term of art. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that a fact
is "material" if there is "a substantial likelihood that the.., fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available.").
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least 48 hours prior to the mailing of any confirmation of sale to him or
her. 9
c. Print, Radio, and Television Advertisements
A prospective issuer may disseminate offers to the general public
regarding a pending Regulation A offering if they state from whom the
investor can acquire a preliminary or final offering circular, and contain
no more than the following information: "(1) the name of the issuer of
the security; (2) the title of the security, the amount being offered and the
per unit offering price to the public; (3) the general type of the issuer's
business; and (4) a brief statement as to the general character and loca-
tion of its property.'6°
9. Does the Issuer Need to File Copies of its Sales Materials with
the Commission?
The Commission requires that an issuer provide it with copies of all
materials used in advertising its securities. "While not a condition to an
exemption pursuant to this provision [Regulation A], seven copies of any
advertisement or written communication, or the script of any radio or
television broadcast, shall be filed with the main office of the Commis-
sion in Washington, D.C.",61 In addition, the issuer must provide the
Commission with contact information for an individual who can respond
to the Commission's questions about the advertising materials. 6 It is
advisable for an issuer to comply with these rules, because a close
working relationship with the Commission and its staff will facilitate
amicable relations with the Commission's staff if questions or issues
should arise with the current or a subsequent issuance. Such an amicable
relationship will be helpful to the issuer that seeks the Commission's
permission to advance the date on which its offering statement will be
qualified, or at some later time seeks acceleration of the effective date of
a registration statement.'
10. Selling Securities Once the Offering Statement is Qualified
The Commission prohibits the sale of securities until the Form 1-A
offering statement has been qualified.64 If a sale of the securities is made
by either the issuer or a dealer, a preliminary offering circular or final
59. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(b)(2000).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(C)(2000).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2000).
62. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442,
36,445 (Aug. 13, 1992).
63. While securing an advancement of the qualification date of a Regulation A offering
ordinarily is not critical, the success of a subsequent underwritten offering may depend on the
Commission's willingness to accelerate the effective date of a registration statement.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(d)(2)(i)(A)(2000).
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offering circular must be furnished to the purchaser at least 48 hours
prior to the issuer's or its agent's mailing of the confirmation of sale.6
Furthermore, a final offering circular "must be delivered to the purchaser
with the confirmation of sale, unless it has been delivered to that person
at an earlier time."
11. How Long May an Issuer Sell the Securities?
Implicit in Regulation A is the premise that the issuer, once its of-
fering statement is qualified, can continuously issue securities until either
the issuer deems the offering closed or reaches the regulatory cap of $5
million. However, the issuer must update its sales materials and offering
circular67 at a minimum of every twelve months after the offering state-
ment is qualified." In addition, the issuer must submit any updated of-
fering circular as an amendment to its offering statement.69
12. Reporting Sales to the Commission
Any issuer of securities under Regulation A is required periodically
to file seven copies of Form 2-A at the Commission's main office in
Washington, D.C.70 This form reports to the Commission the total
amount of funds raised by the offering and how the proceeds have been
applied.7 ' The Commission should be provided with this information
every six months until "substantially all the proceeds have been applied,"
and "within 30 calendar days after the termination, completion, or final
sale of securities in the offering, or the application of the proceeds from
the offering, whichever is the latest event.
' 72
13. Closing the Issuance of the Securities
In order to close a DPO, if the issuer is using a web page to facili-
tate its sales, the electronic version of the company's offering statement
should include a link to a subscription agreement containing blanks for
the prospective investor to designate the number of shares and total dol-
lar amount of the purchase.73 The investor then completes the form, en-
closes their payment, and mails the documents to the issuer's escrow
65. 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(d)(2)(i)(B)(2000).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C)(2000).
67. "An offering circular for a continuous offering shall be updated to include, among other
things, updated financial statements, 12 months after the date the offering statement was qualified."
17 C.F.R. § 230.253(e)(2)(2000).
68. The offering circular must be updated "whenever the information it contains has become
false or misleading in light of existing circumstances, material developments have occurred, or there
has been a fundamental change in the information initially presented." 17 C.F.R. 230.253(e)(1).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.253(e)(3)(2000).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (2000).
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.91 (2000).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(a)-(b)(2000).
73. See Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 561.
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74
agent. If the issuer is not using an Internet interface, it should mail a
confirmation and final offering circular to the investor upon receipt of
the investor's order. The investor signs the confirmation slip, encloses
his/her payment and mails it to the issuer's escrow agent. Once the es-
crow agent receives the electronic or hard-copy forms, in addition to
receiving and depositing "checks aggregating the minimum amount re-
quired to close on the offering, ... a closing will be held. 75 "The funds
will be released to the company and sale confirmations will be sent to the
registered investors. 76
14. Can the Securities be Resold?
"Shares issued in reliance on Regulation A can generally be resold
freely by investors unaffiliated with the company."77
15. How Can the Internet Help in Selling the Issuer's Securities?
There are five ways that the Internet can assist in the sale of securi-
ties issued under Regulation A.
a. Advertising
The "testing the waters" provision allows for the same types of ad-
vertisements to be made on a web page as are allowed in print media or
on television or radio.78 The "testing" provision is significant. Any other
prospective issuer relying upon a different exemption to issue its securi-
ties is in violation of federal law by advertising an issuance unless the
issuer is previously registered with the Commission.79 VillageFax adver-
tised its prospective issuance of securities on the internet to promote the
sale of its securities, and its promotion sparked sufficient interest to raise
$2.3 million in capital.80
b. Electronic Document Delivery
An issuer or its agent may gain telephonic consent from an investor
to receive copies of the preliminary offering circular, final offering cir-
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id. "Under federal law, both confirmations and stock certificates for Regulation A and
federally registered DEPs must be accompanied or preceded by a final offering circular/prospectus."
Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(d)(2)(i)(2000); 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2)(2000).
77. Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 543.
78. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442,
36,444 (Aug. 13, 1992).
79. See Giddings, supra note 9, at 793. See also James E. Grand & Gary Lloyd, Internet
IPOs: A Potential Oasis for Small Companies, UPSIDE , July 01 1996, at 92 (highlighting the
benefits of the 'test the waters' provisions for small issuers).
80. See Juan Hovey, Working the Web for New Capital, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at C6.
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cular, or confirmation of sale8' via e-mail.82 This allows distribution of
the information to the prospective purchaser in a cost-effective and expe-
dient manner.
A final offering circular can be delivered electronically, provided
three requirements are met: notice, access and evidence of delivery. The
SEC has established these requirements to ensure that information dis-
tributed through electronic means [will] result in investors receiving sub-
stantially equivalent information as they would have received had the
information been delivered to them in paper form... An easy way for a
DPO company to comply with the.., offering circular/prospectus deliv-
ery requirements is to include a provision in the subscription agreement
to the effect that by signing the subscription agreement the investor
agrees to accept delivery of documents via e-mail or the company's web-
site.83
c. Posting Sales Literature On-Line
Supplemental sales literature may be posted on the issuer's web site
once the Commission has qualified the issuer's offering statement.
8 4
"Under the 'envelope theory,' supplementary selling literature posted on
a web site [will] be considered as accompanied by a final prospectus if a
hyperlink to the sales literature is in close proximity to a hyperlink to the
final prospectus on the same web site menu or the sales literature con-
tains a hyperlink to the final prospectus" or offering circular.85
d. Accepting Conditional Offers Electronically
Conditional offers to buy securities may be accepted via e-mail
from prospective purchasers. 86 A prospective issuer can post on the Inter-
net the preliminary or final offering circular, supplemental sales litera-
ture, and an electronic form for investors to fill out to express interest in
81. The e-mailed confirmation of sale would be merely for the purchaser's informational
benefit. It is strongly advised that the issuer have a confirmation of sale sent by the broker's clearing
firm, if it has one, in order to comply with Rule lOb-10. The confirmation of sale should be sent via
U.S. mail. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [Transfer Binder 19991 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,577 at 79,907 (July 14, 1999).
82. See Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 33-7856, 57 Fed. Reg. 25,843,
25,845-46 (May 4, 2000). "An issuer or market intermediary may obtain an informed consent
telephonically, as long as record of that consent is retained." Id.
83. Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 562-3.
84. See Use of Electronic Media, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,843, 25,850 (May 4, 2000) (encouraging
issuers to ensure compliance with Section 5 of the Securities Act in communicating over the Internet
during a registration). See generally Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date
of a Registration Statement, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3844, (Oct. 8, 1957),
22 Fed. Reg. 8359 (1957) (providing conditions under which company information can be
published).
85. Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 557.
86. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [Transfer Binder 1999] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,577 at 78,907 (July 14, 1999).
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the security. The conditional offers may be accepted after the Commis-
sion has qualified the offering statement and an offering price has been
established for the security." An important point to remember is that if a
conditional offer to purchase securities was made prior to the security's
price having been set, then the issuer must contact the prospective pur-
chaser, inform him or her of the price, and await a re-confirmation of
intent to purchase by the investor before the conditional offer can be ac-
cepted by the issuer.8
e. Electronic "Roadshows"
An issuer's web site may also include a "virtual roadshow." 9 Most
companies that are making underwritten offerings of securities conduct
tours of major American cities where the companies' executives make
presentations to potential institutional investors. Such tours are very ex-
pensive in lost-opportunity and travel costs for the issuers' executives.
The Internet allows a company to produce a "virtual roadshow," in which
company executives and marketing staff present in video form informa-
tion about the company's assets, business plan, and anticipated growth.
The video presentation may be viewed by potential investors at any time,
and can be updated to reflect changes in the issuer's outlook.90
f. State Blue-Sky Laws and Cyberspace Issues
While the Internet provides a substantial cost savings over other
media, and increases the exposure a prospective issuer may have re-
garding its offering of securities, the non-uniformity of state blue-sky
laws regarding electronic offerings warrants a cautionary note. To date,
thirty two states have adopted the North American Securities Adminis-
trator Association (NASAA) Internet Resolution.9' The resolution pro-
vides that a state securities administrator will not take action against a
company offering securities via the internet if: (1) the website clearly
states that the securities are not being offered to residents of that state,
and (2) the offer is not specifically directed at any individual in a state.92
An alternative exemption is also provided by the NASAA resolution
whereby a prospective issuer using the "testing the waters" provision can
offer their securities as long as "no sales are made until registration and
87. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [Transfer Binder 1999] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)1 77,577 at 78,910 (July 14, 1999).
88. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [Transfer Binder 1999] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 177,577 at 78,911 (July 14, 1999).
89. See Hovey, supra note 80.
90. An example of a successful use of a "virtual roadshow" is VillageFax, which issued
securities pursuant to Regulation A, placed advertisements for the stocks on the Yahoo, Bloomberg,
and Microsoft web sites, and raised $2.3 million from 350 investors. See Hovey, supra note 80.
91. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, § 24.11, at 1175.
92. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, § 24.11, at 1175.
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prospectus delivery have been effected., 93 In order to minimize potential
regulatory intrusion by any of the eighteen states that have not formally
adopted the NASAA Internet Resolution, it is recommended that a pro-
spective issuer contact the respective state securities administrators out-
lining the proposed offering and request a "no-action" letter. ' Hopefully,
the move toward uniformity regarding state blue-sky laws will reduce the
number of non-conforming states from eighteen to zero over the next
several years.
16. Can the Commission Suspend the Sale of the Securities Once
the Offering Statement is Effective?
The Commission may enter an order temporarily suspending a
Regulation A exemption if it has reason to believe that: (1) the require-
ments of the exemption have not been complied with, (2) the offering
statement or sales material is materially misleading, (3) the offer is
fraudulent,95 (4) one of the officers or directors of the issuer has been
subject to a stop order or indictment related to the sale of securities, or
(5) the issuer or its agents refuse to cooperate with the Commission's
staff in an investigation of the offering.96 If the Commission issues a stop
order, the issuer may request a hearing within 30 days of the order's is-
sue to review the validity of the order.97 If the applicant fails to request a
hearing, then the sale of the securities subject to the stop order becomes
permanent on the thirtieth calendar day after its entry.98
17. Can the Issuer Withdraw its Offering Statement?
An issuer is not bound to continue with the offering once it has
submitted the offering statement to the Commission. If none of the secu-
rities subject to the offering statement have been sold, an agent of the
issuer merely needs to petition the Commission to have the offering
statement withdrawn.99 An example of the withdrawal of an offering
statement can be found in the experience of Directonal Robotics. After
doing extensive work to complete an Internet-based offering, Directional
93. Id.
94. The term "no-action letter" is jargon of the securities industry whereby either the
Commission or a state securities administrator produces a letter asserting that under the conditions
described by the issuer that the agency will not recommend an enforcement action.
95. The definition of "fraud" in reference to the sale of securities is a term of art. For a
starting point regarding what constitutes fraud according to the Commission, refer to § 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2001).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 230.258(a).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.258(b)(2).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.258(c).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 230.259(a).
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Robotics raised merely $200,000 of its $5 million target, and ultimately
abandoned the DPO for an alternative method of raising capital."e
Another process for the withdrawal of an application is initiated by
the staff of the Commission. When an application has been filed for nine
months but has not been amended or become qualified, the Commission
can, after notice to the applicant, sua sponte deem the offering statement
abandoned and thereby withdrawn. '°'
B. Conclusions Regarding Regulation A
Regulation A's benefits, most notably its expanded marketing op-
portunities and diminished filing requirements, make it a useful tool for a
small business seeking to raise additional capital. One concern regarding
the DPO process is the effect of "disintermediation." In the context of an
underwritten registered offering, the underwriter's prominence and col-
lateral liability enhance the confidence investors have in the security. In
the DPO context, however, there is no third party to use its contacts and
reputation to market the security; therefore, the issuer faces the prospect
of selling securities in a skeptical market environment without the ad-
vantages of an associated underwriter. The issuer can overcome this li-
ability by aggressively marketing its securities, ensuring that its offering
statement is accurate and persuasive, and marketing to its customer base
and to individuals within its own community.
In addition to the Commission's requirements, the issuer must also
take into consideration two other regulatory issues: state securities laws,
also known as "blue-sky laws," and broker-dealer registration require-
ments. These issues are addressed in the two sections below.
III. COMPLIANCE WITH STATE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS' 4
In addition to complying with the Commission's federal mandates,
an issuer must register its offering in each state in which it plans to offer
or sell its securities. '°3 While many large public offerings are exemptfrom state blue-sky laws 4 , Regulation A offerings do not qualify for a
100. See Michelle V. Rafter, The Cutting Edge: Online IPO's Falling Short of Expectations,
L.A. Times, May 26, 1997, at Dl.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 230.259(b).
102. This paper will not address Coordinate Review Programs which are not available for
Regulation A offerings. See NASAA Coordinated Equity Review Program § 5, NASAA Rep. (CCH)
110,001, at 10,011 (giving an overview of such programs).
103. While all fifty states have their own securities laws, the following are notable examples of
state statutory registration requirements: CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (Deering 2001); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 11-51-301 (West 2000); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-7 (Vernon 2000).
104. Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 was amended by the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 to provide that no state law, rule, regulation or order "requiring, or with
respect to, registration or qualification of securities, or registration or qualification of securities
transactions, shall directly or indirectly apply to a security that is a covered security or will be a
covered security upon completion of the transaction." National Securities Markets Improvement Act
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blanket exemption from state blue-sky requirements. 5 Therefore, a pro-
spective issuer has two choices. It could register its Regulation A offer-
ing in each state in which it intends to market the security, or it could
structure the offering so as to qualify for an exemption in each state in
which it intends to offer and sell its securities.'" Both options have bene-
fits and drawbacks.
Structuring an offering to qualify for an exemption in every state
would be preferable to registering that offering in each state, because the
prospective issuer would be able to "avoid the time and expense of pre-
paring and filing the necessary state registration documents."' 7 Yet it is
not practical for a company planning a Regulation A offering to structure
it to fall within an exemption in every state." Exemptions from blue-sky
laws are generally available only two contexts: (1) offerings to a limited
number of sophisticated investors, or (2) for offerings below a certain
dollar amount.'09 Therefore, "it is likely that a company engaging in a
Regulation A offering will have to register its DPO in each state in which
it intends to make offers or sales.""
A. Registration by Notification
Registration by notification is an exemption from the traditional
state registration process that dramatically lowers the regulatory burden
of a prospective issuer, yet the process varies significantly from state to
state. Two archetypal examples of registration by notification are Utah
and Colorado's procedures.
Utah's registration by notification is available for any issuer, re-
gardless if the issuer is also eligible for registration by coordination,"'
who meets the following criteria:
* Continuous operation for at least five years;
* The issuer has not defaulted for the previous three years on any
payment of principal, interest, or dividends on any security it has
previously issued; and
of 1996, 15 U.S.C. s 77r (a)()(A)-(B) (2001). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2001) (defining a
"covered security" as a security listed or approved for listing on the New York Stock Exchange, or
the American Stock Exchange, or admitted or approved for admission and trading on NASDAQ).
105. See Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 544-45.
106. Id. at 545.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. See also UNIF. SEC. Acr § 402(12) (amended 1998) (providing an important
exemption for an issuer in a state if that issuer offers to sell, or sells, to no more than ten entities
within that state. This exemption is apt for a Regulation A offering in which an investor in a state in
which the issuer has not marketed the security expresses interest in purchasing that security).
110. Id. at 545-6.
11I. See infra, Part IH(B) (discussing Coordinated Equity Review).
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* Issuer had net earnings over the past three years equaling at least
5% of the value of the outstanding securities (or if the issuer has
not previously issued securities, then the net earnings for the past
three years must equal at least 5% of the value of the issues to be
issued).' 
2
The exception is also available for an issuer who has previously used
registration by notification for a prior distribution.' 
3
Colorado's exemption for registration by notification exemplifies a
less rigorous registration by notification process. Pursuant to Colorado
statute 11-51-308(l)(p) (2000), a prospective Regulation An issuer must
submit to the Colorado State Treasurer a minimal filing fee,' "4 a copy of
all the documents the issuer provided to the Commission, and a cover
letter specifying a contact person for the issuer."5 The offering usually
will be qualified in the state simultaneous with the Commission's quali-
fication of the offering statement.1
6
B. Coordinated Equity Review (CER)
Section 303 of the Uniform Securities Act provides another means
of complying with state blue-sky laws by allowing registration with
states via a process called "Coordinated Equity Review" (hereinafter
"CER") or "Registration by Coordination."" 7 To qualify for CER, a pro-
spective issuer must provide the state administrator with three forms: (1)
Form U-1, the Uniform Application to Register Securities, (2) Form U-2,
the Uniform Consent to Service of Process, and (3) Form U-2A, the Uni-
form Form of Corporate Resolution authorizing the filing of a registra-
tion statement. Form U-I requests the following information from a pro-
spective issuer:
* The issuer's registration/offering statement and offering circular
(including any revised copies that are subsequently issued);
* The amount of the securities offered in the state, a listing of all
other states were the security will be offered, and any adverse
orders or decrees entered regarding the offering; and
112. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-8 (2001).
113. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-8(b)(2001).
114. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308. See also, Colorado Department of Regulatory
Agencies, Divisions of Securities, http://www.dora.state.co.us/securities/ttwoff.html (laying out the
filing requirements for obtaining an exemption from Registration for public offerings which are
relying on Regulation-A at the Federal (SEC) level. As of December 4, 2001, the filing fee is $75).
115. See Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, Divisions of Securities,
http://www.dora.state.co.us/securities/ttwoff.html.
116. Id.
117. Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 547.
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0 Should the state administrator require, a copy of the issuer's arti-
cles of incorporation, bylaws, underwriter agreement, specimen
of the security, and any other information filed with the Com-
mission."
CER permits individual states to impose merit requirements upon
offerings proposed for distribution within their jurisdiction. "9 While
merit standards vary from state to state, the Uniform Securities Act Sec-
tion 306 defines four primary standards for denying an application due to
merit concerns:
* Does the offering tend to work a fraud upon the investor?
* Are the underwriting and selling expenses unreasonable?
* Are the promoter's profits or participation unreasonable?
* Are there unreasonable options as to amount or their terms?'2"
In order to ensure that a prospective issuer complies with a state's merit
requirements, the corporation's counsel should research the merit stan-
dards for each jurisdiction in which the issuer seeks to offer and sell its
securities.
This process is available for Regulation A offerings in just nine
states: Alaska, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennes-
see, Utah and Washington.'2 ' The state registration statement will become
effective simultaneous with or subsequent to the Commission's qualifi-
cation of the offering if the Commission has not issued a stop order and
if the registration statement has been on file with the state administrator
for at least ten days.
22
C. Small Company Offering Registration (SCOR)
The Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR) process was
adopted by the North American Securities Administrators Association in
order to simplify state registration requirements, promote uniformity
118. Uniform Application to Register Securities (Form U-I), I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
5115 at 1013 (1997); available at http://www.nasaa.org/nasaalibrary/uniform-forms.asp. See also,
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303(b) (amended 1998) (setting out the basic requirements for registration by
coordination).
119. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, § 24.01, at 1126.
120. UNWF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(E)-(F)(amended 1998).
121. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.090 (Michie 2000); IDAHO CODE § 30-1420 (Michie 2000); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.360 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-204 (2000); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.091 (West 2000); PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 70 § 1-205 (West 2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-2-105 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-9 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.180
(2001).
122. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303(c) (amended 1998).
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among states, and reduce registration costs.'23 The SCOR application,
Form U-7 which is a simplified registration statement in a question-and-
answer format, "is designed to be used by Companies, the attorneys and
accountants for which are not necessarily specialists in securities regula-
tion."'24 While the simplified application process is appealing, there are
four limitations upon registered offerings that use the SCOR process.
First, while SCOR is available for Regulation A offerings, the total value
of securities that can be sold via a SCOR registration is limited to $1
million.'5 Second, the offering price of the securities must be $5 or
more. 2 6 Third, there can be no pre-effective date selling efforts and all
"free writing '' 21 must be filed and cleared with the state securities regu-
lation administrator prior to use. 28 Finally, the SCOR application process
generally requires that independent certified accountants audit financial
statements for the preceding year. 9 These four requirements curtail the
main advantages of the Commission's $5 million cap, no per-unit re-
strictions, the Commission's "testing the waters" provision, and the
waiver of audited financial statements. Therefore, the SCOR process is
not recommended for Regulation A offerings.
If an issuer wishes to pursue a SCOR state registration, the prospec-
tive issuer must complete Form U-7, consent to service of process within
each state where it plans to sell its securities, and then submit its applica-
tion materials to one of four regional review programs. 3 The registration
application is reviewed by the region's Program Administrator state, in
addition to each state where the offering will be made available, for
compliance with the SCOR program's disclosure requirements and any
123. See G. Michael Stakis & Jean E. Harris, Simplifying Registration of Small Corporate
Offerings: Form U-7 "SCORs," INSIGHTS, July 1992, at 13; Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 551.
124. Instructions for filing for SCOR, Instruction I, available at
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/corpfin/SCOR.doc.
125. See e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113(b)(2)(B) (West 2000); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-065-0225
(2000); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460-17A-030(2)(e) (2000). See also Bloomenthal, supra note 14, §
24.07, at 1152.
126. Instructions for filing for SCOR, Instruction 1-C, available at
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/corpfin/SCOR.doc.
127. Informal trade term referring to supplemental sales literature. See J. Dormer Stephen III,
Gustafson: One Small Step (backward) for Private Plaintiffs, One Giant Leap (backwards) for The
Securities Bar, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 425, 453-54 (1996) (defining "free writing" as "selling
literature.. .allowed to be sent to prospective purchasers, as long as [it] has been preceded or
accompanied by a section 10(a) statutory prospectus.").
128. Instructions for filing for SCOR, Instruction 111-J, available at
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/corpfin/SCOR.doc.
129. Instructions for filing for SCOR, Instruction IV-K, available at
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/corpfin/SCOR.doc.
130. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, § 24.07, at 1153-54. The Western Regional Review
Program (whose territory includes Alaska, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, New
Mexico, Oregon, Wyoming and Washington) also reviews Regulation A offerings. Id.
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merit review standards a given state may have. 3' All entities offered the
opportunity to purchase the securities must be provided a copy of the
final version of the Form U-7'32 effective in that state.'33
D. Registration by Qualification
If an issuer is not eligible for registration by notification, SCOR, or
CER, then it must file a full registration with each state in which it plans
to offer or sell securities.' The full registration process is generally
called "registration by qualification."'35 To register by qualification, an
issuer must file a registration statement that substantively mirrors the
company's Regulation A filings with each state. 36 The Uniform Securi-
ties Act also requires that the state administrator be informed of the
amount of securities being offered within the state, other states where a
registration statement has been filed, and any judgments or injunctions
against the issuer regarding the issuance or sale of securities. 3 7 The Act
also requires the submission of a form documenting that the issuer agrees
to specify an entity for service of process within that state. 38 In all states
but New York, the state administrator then reviews the filing to ensure
that it is complete in all material respects, and meets the state's disclo-
sure requirements, merit standards, and anti-fraud provisions. 39 Section
306 of the Uniform Securities Act provides that a state administrator may
131. See http://www.dfi.wa.gov/sd/registration.htm (offering an illustrative overview of the
registration, licensing and examination standards for registering securities in the state of
Washington).
132. Every prospective investor who receives a copy of the issuer's U-7 form will see on its
cover page the following legend in boldface type: "Investment in a small business is often risky. You
should not invest any funds in this offering unless you can afford to lose your entire investment. See
Item I for a discussion of the risk factors that management believes present the most substantial risks
to you." Small Corporate Offering Registration Form (Form U-7), I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 5124
at 1049-21 (1997).
133. Instructions for filing for SCOR, Instruction Ill-G, available at
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaalcorpfin/SCOR.doc.
134. See Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 548.
135. Id.
136. The information required to be submitted includes: (1) the name of the company making
the issuance and a listing of all its subsidiaries, (2) its directors and officers and their respective
remuneration, (3) listing of any stockholders owning in excess of 10% of the company's outstanding
shares, (4) prospective promoters of the securities, (5) agents selling the security who are not
employed by the issuer, (6) the company's capitalization structure, (7) specifying the securities
offered, their price, and any underwriting information, (8) proposed use of proceeds from the
issuance, (9) available options to investors, (10) significant contracts, (11) pending litigation, (12)
sales literature used by the issuer, (13) examples of the security, (14) the issuer's articles of
incorporation, (15) its bylaws, (16) opinion of counsel that the issuance is legal, (17) consent of
experts, (18) financial statements (need not be audited) and (19) additional information required by
each respective state. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304 (amended 1998). A state administrator may waive
any of these requirements. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 305(e)(amended 1998).
137. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 305(c)(amended 1998).
138. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304(b)(amended 1998).
139. See Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 548.
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deny effectiveness to a registration statement if the administrator finds
that denying the registration's effectiveness would be in the public inter-
est and:
* The registration statement is incomplete in a material respect;
" Any rule or condition imposed by the act is willfully violated by
a person associated with the issuer;
" If the prospective issuance is subject to an injunction by a court
or administrative agency;
* The prospective issuer's business includes illegal activities; or if
* The offering would constitute a fraud upon investors, includes
unreasonable underwriter or dealer discounts, or is "being made
on terms that are unfair, unjust, or inequitable9
After a state administrator's review of the registration materials, he
or she typically sends a comment letter to the issuer to request additions,
clarifications, or deletions from the materials.' 4' The issuer then re-
submits the registration materials with the requested modifications, and
the state either accepts the materials or requests further changes. 4 2 If the
issuer fails to make the specified adjustments to its registration state-
ment, the state will not allow sales of the securities within its jurisdiction.
E. Conclusions Regarding Blue Sky Law Registration Procedures
A simple way for an issuer to comply with a state's blue-sky laws is
to use the SCOR process. Unfortunately, SCOR exposes a number of
limitations upon the issuance which limit the unique strengths of a
Regulation A offering. Most issuers will not be able to use Registration
by Coordination because few states permit its use. Registration by Noti-
fication is an attractive alternative; however, because sixteen states do
not offer this process, it is unlikely to be available in all the states in
which an issuer hopes to market its securities. Therefore, in a multi-state
offering many companies will have to resort to the Registration by Quali-
fication, in conjunction with Registration by Notification where avail-
able, in order to comply with blue-sky law requirements. In light of this
fact, corporate counsel should consult with the company's board and
officers to select the states in which to market the securities so as to
minimize the issuer's regulatory burden.
140. UNIF. SEC. AcT § 306(a)(A)-(F) (amended 1998).
141. See Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 550.
142. See id.
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IV. FEDERAL AND STATE BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS
An additional regulatory issue that will arise in a Regulation A of-
fering is whether the party selling the securities on behalf of the issuer
will be considered as a "broker" under federal or state law.
A. Federal Law Regarding Broker-Dealer Registration in the DPO
Context
In the context of Regulation A issues, or other types of DPOs, the
Commission has created a non-exclusive "safe harbor" wherein "associ-
ated persons" that participate in the sale of an issuer's securities will not
be considered a broker/dealer under federal law. 4 3 To meet the "safe
harbor" requirements, the associated person must meet the following six
conditions:
* The party cannot have been barred from the sales of securities;
* The person can not be a partner, member or employee of a bro-
ker or dealer;
* The party cannot be paid commission based on sales of the secu-
rity;
* The party must perform substantial duties for the issuer aside
from selling securities;
* The party cannot have been a broker-dealer within the past
twelve months, and
* The party cannot have participated in sales of the company's se-
curities within the past twelve months.'"
The "safe harbor" provision is limited and the final condition may cause
problems for companies that have sold other types of securities within
the previous year. If the issuer is unable to meet the requirements of the
"safe-harbor" provision, it can hire a broker-dealer to market the securi-
ties, or it can form a subsidiary that is a registered broker dealer. 
45
B. State Law Regarding Broker-Dealer Registration in the DPO Context
There is also a "safe harbor" provision for Regulation A and other
DPO issuers under state law. Per the Uniform Securities Act, neither a
DPO company nor its agents are required to register as broker-dealers.
'46
143. See Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 564; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 3a4-1
(2002).
144. See, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.3a4-1(a), 3a4-1(c)(1); see also Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 564.
145. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, § 19.02, at 893.
146. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 202 (amended 1998).
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However, some states specifically include a company or its agent selling
securities in a DPO within their definition of "broker-dealer"; therefore,
counsel for a prospective DPO issuer should research the laws of the
specific states in which the securities will be marketed in order to deter-
mine whether the issuer's agent needs to be registered.'4 7
V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ISSUING SECURITIES PER
REGULATION A
There are many advantages and disadvantages of going public either
through a traditional registered offering or through the Regulation A ex-
emption. It is important for the legal counsel of any prospective issuer of
securities to discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages and to
triangulate what option is the most advantageous for the particular issuer.
A. Advantages of Going Public
There are three primary advantages to having a company "go pub-
lic" by selling its securities: raising capital, liquidity, and credibility.
1. Lower Cost for Capital
The essential reason for a company to sell securities is to raise addi-
tional capital. A company's ability to issue securities in exchange for
cash provides vital liquid assets for the company at a much lower price
than would a traditional bank loan or investment by a venture
capitalist.'9 The influx of capital empowers the company to expand pro-
duction, hire more staff, increase research and development funding, and
acquire new assets. In addition, the sale of securities in the form of
stocks allows current management to retain control of the strategic and
day-to-day operations of the company, thanks to the traditional legal
division between ownership and management in American corporate
law. Furthermore, a successful DPOs benefits to the company's financial
situation will make the company's subsequent attempts to gain either
private or public equity financing, or access to loans, easier. 149 Yet it is
important to remember that companies can only raise a maximum of $5
million in funds when issuing securities pursuant to Regulation A, so that
means of going public probably will not meet most businesses' long-term
capital needs." 0
147. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE. § 25004 (2001) (requiring registration of a broker-dealer in
the DPO context) with, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-201(14) (1990) (giving broker-dealers in the
DPO context a registration exemption).
148. See Ann Moceyunas and John C. Yates, Counseling Internet Start-Ups: One Year After
the Bubble Burst, 637 PRACTICING LAW INST. 655, 793-4 (2000).
149. See id. at 794.
150. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(b)(2000) (setting the aggregate offering price for a Regulation A
offering at $5,000,000).
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2. Liquidity for Shareholders
Liquidity in the context of securities "refers to the ease with which
the shares can be bought or sold."' 5 ' It is possible for an owner to "liqui-
date" some part of his or her share of a company by selling it to a third
party, but the issuance of stocks facilitates the sales process and reduces
its legal complexity. Liquidity allows for founders and/or initial investors
to sell all or part of their interest in the company and secure those assets
in other investment opportunities. 52 In addition, the issuance of stock
may act as an employee recruitment tool 53 and provide some tax advan-
tages.1"4 On the other hand, it is important to recognize that ordinarily
there is a very limited market for securities issued under Regulation A.
The limited secondary market is due to the small number of shares avail-
able and the limited value of the issuance as a whole. Compounding the
problem is the fact that there are only a handful of sites on the Internet
that facilitate the sale of these small-issue securities. Therefore, the li-
quidity advantages associated with going public are not generally present
in the DPO context.
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3. Enhancing the Issuer's Credibility
The process of going public may attract attention from analysts, the
business press, and other investors; this attention may assist in promoting
the issuer's product sales, ability to gain additional capital, and enhance
the company's reputation.' 6 This increased visibility may also enhance
the bargaining power that the company has with customers and
suppliers. 5 7 Yet, Regulation A offerings are unlikely to attract a great
amount of publicity due to their small size, and the increasing frequency
of the exemption's use. Therefore, this general advantage to the process
of "going public" is only marginally realized in the DPO context.
B. Disadvantages of Going Public
There are three disadvantages to going public: expense, increased
exposure to civil liability, and lost opportunities for alternative methods
of raising capital.
151. Sjostrom, supra note 10, at 573.
152. See Moceyunas & Yates, supra note 148, at 793.
153. See Kristopher D. Brown, Emerging Growth Companies: Financing and Strategic
Alliance Transactions, 1244 PRACTICING LAW INST. 9,48 (2001).
154. See Sjostrom, supra note I Oat 574.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 575.
157. See Moceyunas & Yates, supra note 148, at 793.
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1. Expense
The process of going public is very expensive. In a traditional reg-
istered offering, the underwriter's commission can be as much as 13%;
and "legal, accounting and filing" fees can range from $300,000 to
$500,000.1s In the Regulation A DPO context, the issuer saves money by
avoiding the commission and audit costs and reducing legal fees.5 9 On
the other hand, the company will still bear the burden of the Commis-
sion's fees, state registration fees, and broker fees."se Even if the com-
pany decides to abandon its effort after "testing the waters," the time that
the company's executive, legal, and marketing staffs have put into the
project will represent thousands of dollars and indeterminate opportunity
costs.'
6 '
2. Exposure to Civil Liability
The exposure of the company and its directors and officers to po-
tential liability is less in the case of a Regulation A DPO than in the case
of a registered offering. In the case of a Regulation A offering, the com-
pany may be held liable for false or misleading statements in the offering
documents.' 62 However, in the Regulation A context, "the company's
directors and executive officers are not expressly exposed under federal
law unless they participate in the offering."' 6 State blue-sky laws may
also expose the company to liability through their antifraud provisions.
Furthermore, under the Uniform Securities Act, officers and directors are
equally liable with the company for any errors or omissions that make
any aspect of the offering statement or circular materially misleading.'
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3. Loss of Collateral Monitoring
While venture capitalists, business angels, and some financial insti-
tutions extract a significant price for their investment of capital,' 6 they
also offer benefits that are not present in the public-offering context.
158. See Sjostrom, supra note 10 at 575-6.
159. See id. at 576.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 577.
162. See id. at 578.
163. Id. Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act does not apply to unregistered offerings, such as
Regulation A offerings. Id at 577-78.
164. See UNIF. SEC. AcT § 101 (amended 1988) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection
with any offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly ...to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."). See
also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b)(amended 1998) (dictating the use of joint and several liability for
"[e]very person who directly or indirectly controls a [liable] seller").
165. Examples of conditions placed upon contributions of capital include: representation on the
board of directors, oversight of strategic planning, oversight of day-to-day operations, or numerous
types of financial constraints.
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Most venture capitalists and business angels contribute business exper-
tise, market analysis, and management experience; these types of contri-
butions can be the difference between success and failure for a small
business. Furthermore, once a company has gone public, it may prove
difficult to attract these types of investors due to financial and manage-
ment constraints.
4. Loss of Control
Public ownership of a company diminishes the exclusive decision
making powers enjoyed by private equity holders.'6 Furthermore, share-
holders and analysts may subject management to pressure to increase the
value of the stock regardless, of what the original business plan that the
founders of the company might have developed.61 Furthermore, de-
pending upon the amount of shares sold and their representative value in
relation to ownership of the company, a majority shareholder may wrest
control of the company's board of directors from the company's original
management. ,68
VI. STRATEGY ISSUES FOR A REGULATION A DPO
The key to a successful effort by a private entity to raise capital is to
balance the benefits and liabilities of its possible choices, and then to
craft an offering scheme that maximizes the opportunities while mini-
mizing the opportunity costs.
The analysis of benefits and liabilities requires a prospective issuer
to engage in a comprehensive review of its options. The small business
must weigh the costs and benefits associated with going public against
the advantages and liabilities of private equity financing, business angels,
or bank loans. If the small business determines that going public is the
most favorable option, then it must determine whether it is eligible for
underwriting or should pursue a DPO. If the decision tree leads the pro-
spective issuer to opt for a DPO, then it should review what its capital
needs are and determine if one of the Commission's exemptions to reg-
istration is available. If the capital needs of the small business are less
than $5 million, and if it meets the Regulation's other qualifying criteria,
then Regulation A is an attractive path for a small issuer to take. In de-
signing a plan to issue securities under Regulation A, the issuer should
consider the recommendations below.
First, it is imperative for the issuer to use Regulation A's "testing
the waters" provision. This tool provides two key opportunities: It allows
an issuer to gauge the market's interest in the contemplated offering and
it can enhance the market's response to a prospective issue by sparking
166. See Moceyunas & Yates, supra note 148, at 796.
167. See Brown, supra note 153, at 48.
168. See Moceyunas & Yates, supra note 148, at 796.
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interest in the enterprise. The key to using the "testing the waters" provi-
sion is to focus upon those segments of the investment community that
would be interested in the issuer's business and strategy. If the first at-
tempt at marketing the prospective issue does not succeed, then the issuer
should reevaluate its chances of making a successful offering. Further-
more, it should reexamine who are the members of its likely investment
community and refine its marketing efforts to reach them. By using the
"testing" provision to its maximum effectiveness, the issuer may find
that there is enough interest in its securities to warrant an underwritten,
registered offering. Thus, a good-faith initial exploration of a Regulation
A offering can provide invaluable insight into the market without pre-
cluding the prospective issuer from pursuing alternative paths if they
prove more attractive.
Second, before filing the company's offering statement, a prospec-
tive issuer must analyze the responses gained from "testing the waters"
to determine the geographic locations of the company's likely investors.
If there are merely a handful of potential investors in a given state, the
issuer may be able to seek their investments without registering in that
state.' 69 In any event, the issuer can lighten its regulatory burden by reg-
istering in a handful of states instead of all fifty.
Third, upon devising a registration strategy, the prospective issuer
should invest adequate executive and legal resources to ensure the pro-
duction of a materially complete and factually accurate offering state-
ment and circular. The sophistication, accuracy, and persuasiveness of
these documents are essential to generating the interest in the investment
community and minimizing the company's potential liability.
Fourth, the issuer's directors and officers need to ensure the com-
pany's compliance with the Commission's requirements. The issuer
should conduct monthly meetings with key officers, managers, and legal
counsel to monitor the company's progress in its sale of the securities
and to ensure adequate training of the issuer's staff regarding the Com-
mission's mandates.
Finally, the company's board and officers must have predetermined
goals for the offering and set dates by which to achieve them. If those
goals are not met, then the company's management must reexamine its
objectives and be prepared to stop the offering and pursue an alternative
path. Not all Regulation A offerings are successful, and management
needs to anticipate problems and react to them quickly and appropriately.
VII. CONCLUSION
Regulation A can be a powerful and cost-effective tool for a small
business attempting to raise capital via a DPO. The key to success in an
169. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9)(amended 1998).
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offering of this type is to ensure compliance with the Commission's re-
quirements, state registration requirements, and broker-dealer require-
ments. It is critically important for an issuer to retain counsel with suffi-
cient expertise to ensure that the issuer can make intelligent choices re-
garding what exemptions to pursue and in what states to sell the securi-
ties. Finally, effective use of the marketing tools allowed by the Com-
mission can make the difference between success and failure in the com-
pany's capital-raising effort. By combining an effective offering state-
ment, strategic state registration, and aggressive marketing, a small busi-
ness can use Regulation A to raise sizable sums of money without the
costs associated with using an underwriter or the burdens associated with
private equity financing.

A&M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.:
A CASE COMMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Ask anyone with a computer and a quick Internet connection what
was the coolest thing about going on-line and more than likely the re-
sponse will be, "Free music on Napster!" But, the Napster case does not
just concern the simple notion of bootlegging music. Nor is it about con-
sumer justification since record companies are charging exorbitant fees
for a CD, when they can produce the same CD for pennies on the dollar.
More than a quick, easy, and free way to share music with fellow music
buffs using the innovations of Internet technology, the Napster contro-
versy is about the value of intellectual property ("IP") in today's new
world of Cyberspace. Beyond the notion of "fair use,"' this comment will
discuss how the Napster outcome should shape current copyright law to
deal with the exchange of information through peer-to-peer file sharing
on the World Wide Web.
Napster exploded onto the Internet. Since its founding in May
1999,2 Napster estimated that it would expand its network to reach be-
yond seventy million users by the end of 2000.' The creator of Napster,
Shawn Fanning, was a 20-year-old computer programming student at
Northeastern University when he decided to develop an easier way to
share music with his college roommate. From a small user base to one of
the most popular sites on the Internet in less than one year, this "brain-
child of a college student"5 has brought the court's attention to copyright
infringement at an exponential rate. The ultimate holding will be critical
toward defining boundaries for Internet services, and just how far the
notion of "fair use" can be stretched.6 Beyond whether or not one Internet
service is liable for the bootlegging of CDs among its user community,
this case presents the court with a new technology known as peer-to-peer
("P2P") file sharing, which can facilitate copyright infringement in a
matter of seconds between millions of different and anonymous users.
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
2. See http://www.napster.com/company (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
3. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (referring
to defendant's internal documents that suggest there will be seventy-five million Napster users by
the end of 2000).
4. See http://www.napster.com/company (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
5. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
7. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
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II. FACTS
A collection of eighteen powerful record and publishing companies
sued Napster, Inc. (hereinafter, "Napster"), an Internet company, for al-
leged contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.8 The plaintiff
companies brought suit on December 6, 1999 and moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent Napster from allowing its users to make copies
of copyrighted music without permission of the owners of the rights.9
The alleged copyright infringement was accomplished through the use of
MP3 files and Napster's MusicShare software, which could be down-
loaded for free from Napster's Internet site.'0 MP3 or MPEG3 stands for
Motion Picture Experts Group, level 3." MP3 files are capable of com-
pressing digital audio files to 1/12 of their original size without destroy-
ing the sound quality. 2 Once users had the software and were registered
on the Napster system, they were able to make their user directory con-
taining their own MP3 files available to other users while on-line, and
could perform searches for MP3 files on other user directories to make
copies for their own personal use. 3 The contents of the music files did
not reside on and never even passed through the Napster servers; only the
names of the files and users were stored and indexed. 4 Therefore, the
plaintiff record companies alleged that Napster users were the direct in-
fringers and Napster was contributorily and vicariously liable through
facilitation of the infringing behavior.'5
On July 26, 2000, the Northern District Court of California granted
the plaintiff record companies' motion for a preliminary injunction and
enjoined Napster "from engaging in, or facilitating others in copying,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copy-
righted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either
8. Id. at 896-900 (listing plaintiffs as A&M Records, Inc., Geffen Records, Inc., Interscope
Records, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., MCA Records, Atlantic Recording Corporation, Island
Records, Inc.. Motown Record Company L.P., Capitol Records, Inc., La Face Records, BMG Music
d/b/a the RCA Records Label, Universal Records Inc., Elektra Entertainment Group Inc., Arista
Records, Inc., Sire Records Group Inc., Polygram Records, Inc., Virgin Records America Inc., and
Warner Bros. Records, Inc.).
9. Id. at 900.
10. See id. at 901; see also http://www.napster.com/download (providing a method to
download the software needed to trade MP3s) (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
11. See http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci212600,00.html (providing a
technical definition of "MP3") (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
12. See id.; see also Recording Indus. Ass'n. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180
F.3d 1002, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining MP3).
13. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 901-902.
14. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing how
the transfer or copy of an MP3 file is made from one user's computer to another, otherwise known as
"peer-to-peer").
15. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 911.
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federal or state law, without express permission of the right's owner."'6
Napster appealed.
7
On July 28, 2000, pending the appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel of
judges stayed the injunction. 8 But on appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the district court that a preliminary injunction was
"not only warranted but required."' 9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
pealsfound that the Plaintiff record companies would likely succeed in
establishing that Napster was contributorily and vicariously liable for
copyright infringement.'
In district court, Napster asserted the affirmative defenses of fair use
and substantial non-infringing uses, as well as a First Amendment chal-
lenge, copyright misuse and waiver. 2' The lower court rejected all de-
fenses raised by Napster.2 Both sides presented expert witnesses and
moved to exclude certain expert reports and findings.2 ' The district court
denied all of Napster's motions to exclude the plaintiff record compa-
nies' reports because they were useful in showing irreparable injury. 4 In
addition, the court granted the plaintiff record companies' motions to
exclude or not rely on certain defense reports due to inadmissible conclu-
sions and dubious credibility. 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the conclu-
sions made by the district court on the expert opinions and determined
the report rulings were not an abuse of discretion and were valid.2 The
court also revisited Napster's fair use defense and the new defenses it
raised under the Audio Home Recording Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. 27 Concluding that "having digital downloads available for
free on the Napster system necessarily harms the copyright holders' at-
tempts to charge for the same downloads," the court of appeals stated
that Napster has had a "deleterious effect on the present and future digital
download market." 29
Therefore, on February 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Northern District Court of California's decision and ruled
16. See id. at 927.
17. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004.
18. Id. at 1011.
19. Id. at 1027.
20. See id at 1022-24.
21. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 912-25.
22. Id.
23. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C9905183MHP, 2000 WL 1170106 at *I (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
24. Napster, 2000 WL 1170106, at *7-8.
25. Id. at *8.
26. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2000).
27. Id. at 1014-26.
28. Id. at 1017.
29. Id.
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for a preliminary injunction, but reversed and remanded to the lower
court to clarify the scope of the original injunction because it was over-
broad.3" The district court modified the injunction on March 5, 2001 to:
(1) require notice by the record companies of copyrighted works they
wish removed from the Napster system; and (2) require Napster itself to
police the system, ensuring that copyrighted works of which it has re-
ceived notice are not copied, downloaded, uploaded, transmitted, or dis-
tributed.3' In the event the injunction was wrongfully issued, according to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 (c), the district court required the
plaintiffs to set bond for damages incurred in the amount of five million
dollars.32
III. BACKGROUND
Federal copyright law has roots in the Constitution, where exclusive
rights are granted to creators of original works to encourage "the prog-
ress of science and useful arts."'" Rather than an "inevitable, divine, or
natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their crea-
tions," copyright law is intended to "stimulate activity and progress.., for
the intellectual enrichment of the public." 34 In other words, copyright law
has a dual purpose; it protects the author of the original work and allows
for certain uses by others that provide societal benefits. The Copyright
Law of 1976 gives copyright owners a cause of action if someone in-
fringes on their original work. 5 Unfortunately, the 1976 Act was limited
in the area of copyright law as it pertains to the internet and especially
silent in its specific applicability to the peer-to-peer copying of digital
music files.36
In 1992, the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") amended the
existing Copyright Act to allow the use of digital audio recording devices
to copy digital music recordings for personal, noncommercial use.3 7 This
statute arose as part of the legislature's attempt to keep up with technol-
ogy. s Nevertheless, it is evident that, at the time the AHRA was passed,
the legislators did not anticipate that home computers would be used as
audio recording and listening devices just a few years later. Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the AHRA does not
30. Id. at 1027-28.
31. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3-
7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
32. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Napster,
239 F.3d at 1011; FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
36. See id.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1992).
38. Kristine J. Hoffman, Comment, Fair Use or Fair Game? The Internet, MP3 and
Copyright Law, 11 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 153, 166 (2000).
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protect persons who copy MP3 files from a computer hard drive because
"computers are not digital audio recording devices" as defined by the
statute.39
In another attempt to update the existing copyright law with ad-
vancements in technology, Congress passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") in 1998.40 The DMCA provides Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") a safe harbor from copyright infringement
suits. 4' To qualify for the safe harbor, ISPs cannot initiate the transfer,
modify the illegal material, or keep a copy of the work. 2 If applicable,
the DMCA shields an ISP from any contributory copyright liability
where the users of the service are sharing illegal files.
A. Copyright Infringement
Generally, in order to be successful in establishing a claim for direct
copyright infringement, a plaintiff must satisfy the following require-
ments: (1) proof of ownership of the material in question, and (2) dem-
onstration of a violation of one of the exclusive rights of the copyright
holder.4 '3 Furthermore, in order to establish secondary copyright liability,
the secondary infringer must know or have reason to know of the direct
infringement, and induce, cause, or materially contribute to the infringing
behavior."
A recent case of contributory infringement on the Internet involving
Netcom, a popular ISP, determined that the requisite knowledge required
for secondary liability cannot be imputed to a system operator merely
through the defendant's conduct.45 Instead, contributory infringement
must be demonstrated through actual awareness of specific acts of in-
fringement.46 In Netcom, the ISP and the operator were accused of con-
tributory copyright infringement because they allowed the posting of
infringing material, taken from copyrighted works of L. Ron Hubbard,
on one of the bulletin boards by one of Netcom's many users.4 ' The court
refused to conclude that the ISP or the operator were liable simply be-
cause the structure of the system allowed for copyrighted material to be
39. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1002,
1078 (9th Cir. 1999).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998) (effective Oct. 28, 1998).
41. Id. § 512(a).
42. Id.
43. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954
(1987).
44. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp.
1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
45. Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1372-73.
46. Id. at 1374.
47. Id. at 1365-66.
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posted. 8 In addition, both Netcom and the operator lacked the requisite
knowledge that one of its users infringed upon the copyrighted work.49
Beyond direct and contributory copyright liability in copyright law,
a final way to impose fault is through vicarious liability. Vicarious copy-
right infringement occurs when a defendant "has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in
such activities. ' Simply stated, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that there are two aspects of vicarious liability: financial benefit and
supervision.' Financial benefit can be shown through conclusive evi-
dence of a party's direct financial interest in activities "where infringing
performances enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential cus-
tomers."5 2 Furthermore, the right and ability to supervise can arise either
from an existing employer-employee relationship or in the absence of
any formal supervisory power, so long as the party is in a position to
police the behavior of the direct infringers."
The supervision aspect of vicarious liability is exemplified in the
Fonovisa case, which held auction operators vicariously liable for the
direct copyright infringement of booth operators.- The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that because the auction operators, whose goal
was to maximize profits, had the ability to block the access of copyright
infringers to the swap meet, and did nothing, they played a secondary
role in the infringement.5 In sum, any evidence of a direct financial in-
terest coupled with the ability to supervise the infringing behavior gives
rise to liability through vicarious copyright infringement.
B. Affirmative Defenses
One defense in copyright infringement cases is known as the fair
516use defense. It is an affirmative defense that, when raised, can bar a
defendant's direct copyright infringement liability by applying four fac-
tors and an "equitable rule of reason" to the specific facts of each indi-
vidual case.57 Furthermore, if someone is accused of direct copyright
infringement and is later found to be a fair user, then the logical conclu-
48. Id. at 1372-73.
49. Id. at 1374.
50. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
51. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259 at 262.
52. Id. at 263.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 261-64.
55. Id. at 263-65.
56. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984); 17
U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (2001).
57. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976)).
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sion follows that there can be no basis for secondary infringement." The
fair use defense is derived from Section 17 U.S.C. § 107 and reads in
part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.5 9
There are other ways to limit secondary liability beyond proving
that the use is a fair use. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
manufacturers of home video tape recorders, whose product is purchased
by the general public to copy television programs for private viewing,
did not infringe on copyright holders who had their works broadcast on
free television because it in effect expanded the viewing audience. 60 The
Sony court focused on the fair use activities of the consumer of the home
video tape recorder, and found that there were substantial non-infringing
activities, such as taping public domain material. 6' Because the U.S. Su-
preme Court applied an "equitable rule of reason" when weighing out all
the factors of a fair use analysis, they held that the manufacturers could
not be secondary infringers since the balance tipped in their favor.62
Thus, the Court reasoned the sale of the Betamax device did not amount
to secondary infringement because: (1) the intended use was for non-
commercial purposes, (2) the space-shifting entitled exposure of the
copyrighted material for private home use, and (3) substantial, non-
58. See generally Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. 417,454-56 (holding that Sony is not liable for
contributory copyright infringement because time-shifting is a fair use).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 107(l)-(4).
60. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 421, 443.
61. Id. at 424, 444 (emphasizing sports, religious, and educational programming); see also id.
at 433 (explaining that a copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to reproductions of
public domain material).
62. Id. at 454-55.
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infringing uses of the product or service existed, such as access to free
television programming.63
C. Recent Cases Involving Digital Music Files
In cases of copying digital music files on the Internet, the fair use
defense, when specifically applied to space- or time-shifting, has seen
both a success and a failure. In June 1999, the fair use defense was
stretched to include the distribution of MP3 files via a portable device.
6
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the space-shifting of copy-
righted music from a user's computer hard drive to the user's portable
MP3 player (the "Rio") is a noncommercial personal use, and therefore a
fair use.65 The court said that this did not involve distribution of the copy-
righted material to the general public, and was merely allowing an indi-
vidual user to make a copy of his own file to render it portable.6
On May 4, 2000, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York analyzed a similar case but rejected the fair use defense and held
that the reproduction of unauthorized copies of audio CDs into MP3 files
for space-shifting purposes on the website My.MP3.com did not signifi-
cantly transform the work.67 In its fair use analysis, the court pointed out
that even though My.MP3.com's use of the copyrighted works seemed to
have a positive impact on one market, the impact did not tip the scale
toward a finding of fair use where copyright infringement has occurred,
nor did it give an unauthorized user the right to enter into a valid copy-
right holder's future market."
IV. A&M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC. 69
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower
court's finding that the record company plaintiffs could successfully pre-
sent "a prima facie case of direct infringement" against Napster users.
7
0
In other words, since the court held that Napster users directly infringed
the copyrighted works, Napster could potentially be liable for contribu-
tory and/or vicarious copyright infringement. 7' The direct infringement
63. Id. at 442, 446.
64. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1002,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the Rio's function as being for personal use and consistent with the
Copyright Act's main purpose).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (considering the first factor of a
fair use analysis, "the purpose and character of the use," and whether the new use transforms the
work by infusing it with new meaning or new understanding).
68. See UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
69. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
70. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
71. See id. at 1019-20.
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claim achieved success through demonstration of ownership of the copy-
righted files and proof that Napster users violated the reproduction and
the distribution rights of the copyright owners." On appeal, Napster did
not dispute that direct infringement occurred through its users, but rather
asserted the affirmative defenses of fair use and substantial non-
infringing uses, as well as defenses under the Audio Home Recording
Act and the safe harbor of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the
defenses of waiver, implied license, and copyright misuse.73 The court of
appeals rejected all of Napster's defenses.
A. Are Napster users 'fair users?"
If Napster is unable prove its users were fair users, then Napster
itself may be liable for contributory or vicarious copyright
infringement.75 In considering the preliminary injunction, the court of
appeals applied the four statutory factors of the fair use doctrine listed in
the Copyright Act of 1976 to determine that Napster users were not fair
76users.
The first factor in a fair use analysis, "the purpose and character of
the use, ' 77 focuses on how transformative the work is as related to the
original copyrighted work.78 The court of appeals held that the down-
loading of MP3 files is merely a transmission of the copyrighted work in
a different medium and, therefore, is not transformative.79 In addition, the
court of appeals looked at whether the uses had commercial or noncom-
mercial purposes.8° Because Napster users anonymously requested files
and, by copying the MP3 files, the users obtained music for free that they
otherwise would have had to buy, the court found that Napster users
qualified as commercial users.8'
The second factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work, ' 82 did not
require much analysis by the court of appeals, as musical compositions
83are generally considered creative in nature. Since creative works are
72. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("as
much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted, and more than
seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs"), affd in part, rev 'd in part, 239 F.3d
1004. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2000) (setting forth the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner).
73. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014, 1024-26.
74. See id. at 1019, 1024-26.
75. See idi at 1019-20.
76. See id. at 1014-19.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1999).
78. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
79. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
80. See id.
81. See id
82. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
83. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
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"closer to the core of intended copyright protection"" than other fact-
based works, the scale is tipped in the copyright owner's favor and
against a finding of fair use.85
The third factor of a fair use analysis, "the amount and substantiality
of the portion used,"86 rests on a qualitative and quantitative analysis. 7
No absolute rules govern the determination as to how much of a copy-
righted work may be copied and still qualify as a fair use. 8 The court of
appeals based its decision on Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia
Church of God, Inc.,s9 which held that "[w]hile 'wholesale copying does
not preclude fair use per se,' copying an entire work 'militates against a
finding of fair use.'''9 Therefore, because Napster users copied the entire
work, the court found strong, but not conclusive, evidence of infringing
behavior.9'
The Supreme Court has described the fourth factor, "the effect of
the use upon the potential market," ' as the "single most important ele-
ment of fair use."93 The court of appeals reviewed the expert reports pre-
sented by both parties and agreed with the district court that Napster had
a "deleterious effect on the present and future digital download
market.
, 94
Using all four factors in an "'equitable rule of reason' analysis,"95
the court held that Napster users were not fair users and that they directly
infringed on the exclusive rights of copyright owners.96
84. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,586 (1994)).
85. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
87. 'See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
88. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986)
(affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment for defendant author because the verbatim
copying of published interviews amounted to only 4.3% of the words in the copyrighted work); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (holding that copying a
television program in its entirety, for the purpose of home time-shifting, is a fair use); Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985) (finding the use of an
insubstantial amount of quoted words from a manuscript to be infringement because the quoted
words were essentially the book's focal point).
89. 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000).
90. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
91. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1999).
93. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
94. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017.
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (stating the
four factors "enable a Court to apply an 'equitable rule of reason' analysis to particular claims of
infringement") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976)).
96. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-17.
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B. Substantial Non-infringing Uses
Napster also attempted to show its system was capable of a substan-
tial number of non-infringing uses,97 which outweighed any of the poten-
tial infringing uses. 9 However, the court of appeals did not agree with
Napster that sampling, space-shifting, or permissive reproduction con-
stituted substantial non-infringing uses.' First, the court determined that
sampling is, in fact, a commercial use, and even if sampling boosted
compact disc sales, it was still unauthorized.' °° Next, the court of appeals
rejected the space-shifting defense because rather than exposing the
copyrighted material solely to the original user, Napster's method of
space-shifting made the material available to the general public.'0 ' Lastly,
the court said Napster could not assert permissive reproduction as a de-
fense because the plaintiff record companies had not challenged the
noninfringing uses of Napster, which included Napster's "New Artist
Program," message boards, and chat rooms, '°w as well as music down-
loads from copyright owners who consented to their music being avail-
able through Napster.
C. Audio Home Recording Actd o3
Napster asserted the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
("AHRA") as a defense to the charges of copyright infringement based
on secondary liability.'' The AHRA protects the manufacturers, import-
ers, and distributors of digital audio recording devices by allowing "in-
home noncommercial recording of copyrighted works.' 0 5 However, the
court of appeals rejected Napster's AHRA defense, concluding "the
Audio Home Recording Act does not cover the downloading of MP3
files to computer hard drives" because "computers ... are not digital
audio recording devices," as that term is defined in the AHRA.'16
97. See id. at 1017-19.
98. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 ("[Tlhe sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.").
99. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1018-19. Sampling occurs when a user downloads a music file to
consider whether to buy the recording. See id. at 1018. Space-shifting occurs when a user downloads
a music file from Napster that the user already possesses on an audio compact disc. See id. at 1019.
100. See id. at 1018-19.
101. See idL at 1019.
102. See id.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1999).
104. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
105. Kevin Davis, Comment, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 129, 159 (1999).
106. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024 (quoting Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999)). The court also noted that the plaintiff
record companies did not assert claims under the AHRA. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
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D. Digital Millennium Copyright Act'°7
Napster also asserted a defense under the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act ("DMCA"), which, Napster argued, limited its liability as a
secondary infringer."°a Section (d) of the DMCA reads:
(d) Information location tools.--A service provider shall not be liable
for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for in-
junctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by
reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location
containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using infor-
mation location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer,
or hypertext link, if the service provider--
(1)(A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or ac-
tivity is infringing;
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is appar-
ent; or
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expedi-
tiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider
has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of
this paragraph, the information described in subsection
(c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be identification of the reference or link, to
material or activity claimed to be infringing, that is to be re-
moved or access to which is to be disabled, and information rea-
sonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that
reference or link."°
Based on its DMCA analysis, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's finding."0 The district court had rejected Napster's DMCA
defense and held that § 512(d) of the DMCA does not protect secondary
infringers."' The court of appeals disagreed with this blanket conclusion
made by the district court because it felt that circumstances might exist in
which the DMCA could protect a party from contributory and vicarious
107. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1999).
108. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
110. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
111. See A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
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liability."' Although the plaintiffs had shown that Napster would proba-
bly be unable to obtain protection under the safe harbor of the DMCA,
the court felt that questions raised by this defense, such as whether Nap-
ster qualifies as an ISP, would be better resolved at trial."3 Therefore, in
considering the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court determined
the DMCA defense was not strong enough to protect Napster.'"4 How-
ever, the court noted the DMCA defense may prove useful during trial. "'
E. Other Defenses
The court rejected Napster's defenses of waiver, implied license,
and copyright misuse. ' 16 First, the court noted that "[w]aiver is the inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence
and the intent to relinquish it.""' Napster asserted that the "plaintiffs
knowingly provided consumers with technology designed to copy and
distribute MP3 files over the Internet and, thus, waived any legal author-
ity to exercise exclusive control over creation and distribution of MP3
files."" 8 However, the court refused to hold the record companies re-
sponsible for creating the tools that enable the illegal reproduction of
music files." 9
Next, Napster claimed that the record companies granted Napster an
implied license to distribute MP3 files on the Internet. 2° Courts have
been reluctant to find implied licenses except where one party has cre-
ated a work by request and provided the work to the requestor, with the
intention that the requestor would copy and distribute the work.'2 ' Thus,
this defense succeeds in very few circumstances.' 2  Therefore, the court
felt that the existence of some online advertising that promoted permis-
sive downloads of specified music files did not equate to the record com-
panies granting to Napster an implied license that made countless copy-
righted works available for distribution.'
23
Finally, Napster claimed copyright misuse and alleged that online
distribution of music files "is not within the copyright monopoly.' 24 The
court rejected this defense simply because the rights to reproduce and




116. See id. at 1026-27.
117. Id. at 1026 (quoting United States v. King Features Entm't, Inc., 843 F.2d 394, 399 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
118. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1026.
119. See iL
120. See id.
121. See id (citing SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc.,
211 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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distribute a copyrighted work are the copyright owner's exclusive
rights.'2
In rejecting all of Napster's defenses, the court of appeals upheld
the preliminary injunction against Napster to stop its participation in
copyright infringement.'2 The court of appeals affinrned in part, and re-
versed in part, the lower court's decision. 27 The court then remanded the
case to the District Court for the Northern District of California to mod-
ify the scope of the injunction. 2 8 The court of appeals ordered modifica-
tion to limit Napster's burden of ensuring protection of all copyrighted
works on its system. 129 The court held that although Napster must still
police its system for infringing MP3 files, the plaintiff record companies
must supply Napster with notice of the copyrighted works they wish to
protect. "'
F. Damages
If the district court finds Napster liable for contributory and vicari-
ous copyright infringement, the question of damages naturally arises.
Napster may prove that it did not cause any actual monetary damage to
the record companies. In fact, by making an artist's songs available on
the Internet, Napster may have sparked listeners' interests in purchasing
the entire compact disc."' Thus, it is possible that Napster's shareware
music programs help sales, rather than hinder them.32 Furthermore, Nap-
ster never technically made money. 33 Napster was simply an extremely
popular site with potential to make future acquisitions or to be acquired
themselves.'3 Damages, however, can be considerable in copyright in-
fringement cases. For example, when a court found MP3.com guilty of
willful copyright infringement through its site, My.MP3.com, the court
assessed MP3.com with statutory damages of $53,400,000. 35 The Nap-
ster case will be the first in which a court will assess damages, if any, for
125. See id at 1026-27.
126. See id. at 1029.
127. See id.
128. See id., remanded to No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. 2001).
129. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027, 1029; Napster, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3-*9.
130. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027; Napster, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3-*7.
131. See Joel Selvin, Editorial, Did Napster Help Boost Record Sales?, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5,
2001, at 54, available at 2001 WL 3410699.
132. See id.
133. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (explaining that Napster does not
collect revenues and does not charge its users any fees), affid in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
134. See A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (measuring Napster's value partially by the
number of Napster users and concluding that Napster was worth between sixty and eighty million
dollars).
135. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0472 (JSR), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17907 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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contributory and vicarious copyright liability on the Internet for music
piracy. The district court will have to decide if it wants to send a message
to other current or potential pirate sites by imposing a large damages
award against Napster.
V. ANALYSIS
The aftermath of the injunction, in essence, disabled Napster and
forced its user community to turn elsewhere for pirated music.' 36 Today,
Napster must police itself for infringing users and files. 3 7 Consequently,
music fans, although still claiming devout loyalty to Napster, have turned
their attention temporarily to other piracy tools such as Gnutella, Mor-
phius, Aimster, Freenet, iMesh, and others. 38 These services have
tweaked the Napster idea to limit their central involvement and, for now,
decrease their liability.'39 In other words, while Napster takes the wrath of
the record companies, the infringing behavior has simply shifted to other
sites and systems that continue to do the forbidden file sharing; these
other systems just share files in a different manner.140
A court would likely absolve a peer-to-peer ("P2P") software dis-
tributor of any direct infringement liability since the distributor plays no
actual part in the infringing behavior. However, as the court of appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held in granting a preliminary injunction against
Napster, creators and operators of P2P systems can be liable for con-
tributory and vicarious copyright infringement.' l4 The court analyzed the
secondary infringement issue as follows: (1) a party can be liable for
contributory copyright infringement if it has knowledge of and materi-
ally contributes to another party's infringing activity, and (2) a party can
be liable for vicarious infringement if it receives financial benefit from
and controls another party's infringing activity.'42 Additionally, the court
found that once a party receives information regarding specific acts of
infringing behavior, the party must do something to prevent the
behavior.'
4 3
136. See Opinion, New Labels, Same Act, PALM BEACH POST, July 28, 2001, at 12A, available
at 2001 WL 24556444.
137. See Napster, No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *5-*6. (N.D. Cal.
2001).
138. See Opinion, supra note 136; Gnutella at http://www.gnutella.co.uk (last visited Oct. 21,
2001); Morphius at http://www.morphius.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2001); Aimster at
http://www.aimster.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2001); The Free Network Project at
http://frecnet.sourceforge.net (last visited Oct. 21, 2001); iMesh at http://www.imesh.com (last
visited Oct. 21, 2001).
139. See Lee Gomes, Entertainment Industry Sues to Curtail Web Music-Sharing System
Morpheus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2001, at B9, available at Westlaw, 2001 WL-WSJ 2877494.
140. See id
141. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001),
remanded to 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186.
142. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019, 1022.
143. See id at 1021.
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However, a question arises regarding those systems with architec-
ture making it impossible to monitor, block, or otherwise prevent in-
fringing behavior." With the system at issue in the Napster case, Napster
could supervise its users and block certain users if it chose to do so, and
the court weighed this factor while considering the allegations of secon-
dary liability.' 45 The new and improved alternatives to Napster are true
P2P systems, and because of this distinction, may be able to escape li-
ability. ' 6 A true P2P system requires no central unit.'47 The transfer of
information occurs between two end users who work directly with one
another.' 48 Today, by employing one of the new technologies such as
Gnutella, a user simply logs on to the Internet and instantly begins
searching and sharing files directly with other Gnutella users. 149 The user
never has to communicate with a central server to facilitate the process."5
Regardless of the ability of file-sharing web sites to control users or
block the sharing of certain files, the court must consider those systems
that cannot police their users. Software, and particularly Internet soft-
ware, has the capability of undergoing rapid transformations to alter a
particular feature or change the system architecture. In light of this tech-
nology and in the interest of judicial economy, the Napster court should
consider adopting a broadly tailored decision to capture many of the cur-
rent and future P2P systems that are popular with copyright infringers,
rather than limiting its holding to systems with policing capabilities.
As discussed in detail above, the district court held that Napster
could not rely on the "Betamax" defense because Napster did not have
substantial non-infringing uses."'' The court of appeals, while recogniz-
ing the possibility that a P2P file sharing system could have a substantial
number of non-infringing uses, chose not rule on this issue during the
preliminary injunction phase.5 2 For example, a file sharing system not
promoting infringing activity still has the potential of facilitating unau-
thorized copying.'53 If a P2P system's main purpose is more generic than
the facilitation of music piracy, the system could potentially escape li-
ability under the court of appeals's holding. The court of appeals found
Sony and the defense of substantial non-infringing uses inapplicable
144. See Gomes, supra note 139.
145. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
146. See Gomes, supra note 139.
147. See Dave Wilby, Top of the Swaps (Six Music-Sharing Web Sites), INTERNET MAG., Sept.
1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27915442.
148. See id.
149. See Hane C. Lee, The Next Napster? Nowhere in Sight, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Feb. 19,
2001, available at 2001 WL 7800832; Gnutella at http://www.gnutella.co.uk (last visited Oct. 21,
2001).
150. See Lee, supra note 149.
151. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004.
152. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
153. See id. at 1020-21.
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since Napster had "both actual and constructive knowledge that its users
exchanged copyrighted music," and therefore could be liable for secon-
dary infringement based on knowledge alone.14
At this point, whether centralized or non-centralized P2P systems on
the Internet can escape liability by raising the "Betamax" defense for
substantial non-infringing uses remains unclear. However, an important
distinction must be drawn between a video recorder that allows a person
to make a single, in-home copy of a broadcast television program and a
software tool that makes available, to thousands of anonymous computer
users, a free copy of a copyrighted work that is sold in the market. For
example, if Sony Corporation created a VCR with the primary purpose of
allowing people to first copy pay-per-view television shows and then
simultaneously make the shows available to thousands of anonymous
viewers via cable, the Sony court may have come to a different conclu-
sion on secondary liability.'55 In fact, the Sony court specified that video
recorders expanded "public access to freely broadcast television pro-
grams.' 56 Still, some people argue that the "Betamax" defense should be
broadly interpreted to hold that "the sale or distribution of a device that
enables others to engage in copyright infringement should not, on its
own, constitute a 'material contribution' to that infringement."'
57
Unfortunately, one cannot assume the holding in Napster governs
systems without policing capabilities, nor can one assume the holding
controls over systems with substantial non-infringing uses. Because the
court of appeals has ruled, and the district court on remand will have to
rule, based on the facts of the Napster case, the holding may be too nar-
row to apply to potential infringers using other similar systems. How-
ever, are these other non-centralized systems with substantial non-
infringing uses really a threat to copyright holders?
Although non-centralized P2P systems may currently escape liabil-
ity, the fact remains that unless a service has a centralized repository for
users to access, the service will not be as widely accessible or as widely
embraced as Napster. Napster is a safe, simple tool that was easy for
music fans to use.55 Napster feels easy and secure because it gives the
individual users control over which directories and MP3 files they want
to share. 59 Many of the other P2P systems, such as Gnutella, require us-
ers to be more technologically savvy than Napster users, and to under-
154. Id. at 1020.
155. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
(discussing failure to show nonminimal harm to market).
156. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
157. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 827 (2001).
158. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901-02 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004.
159. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-12.
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stand concepts such as firewalls and file server systems.' 6 These other
P2P systems may be slower, more complex, and have many bugs that
need to be worked out, including how much of one's system is exposed
to other anonymous Internet users.' 6' Despite the potential loopholes, the
Napster holding indicates it is wrong to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works on the Internet. Internet users will hopefully be more
apt to enroll in monthly fee sites in order to share copyrighted music and
movies on the Internet rather than risk revealing their personal computer
files and information to unknown people.
With its Napster decision, whichever court ends up with the "final
say" will become a pioneer in shaping the future of Internet copyright
law. Given the tremendous advancements in technology today and in
preparation for the advancements of tomorrow, the Napster opinion most
likely will not provide a complete solution for controlling copyright in-
fringement on the Internet. Regardless, by holding that A&M Records
"substantially and primarily prevailed on appeal," the court put develop-
ers and users of P2P systems on notice that liability for copyright in-
fringement on the Internet is real and violators will be prosecuted.
62
Without this critical starting point in policing copyrights on the Internet,
the unlimited reign of file sharing would have continued without set
boundaries on what kind of files users could copy for free, which affects
even the latest craze of DVD swapping.
The Supreme Court said, "[s]ound policy, as well as history, sup-
ports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological
innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.' 63 Because the
Napster holding will not altogether eliminate copyright infringement on
the Internet, the legislature must devise an amendment to the Copyright
Act. The amendment should hold the creators and distributors of P2P
programs liable if they facilitate mainstream distribution of software with
infringing capabilities, and have the knowledge and intent that a major
function of the program is to share copyrighted material without the con-
sent of the copyyright owner. A P2P system really cannot become main-
stream without a central website, knowledge base, or team of developers
that distribute new versions to the user community. Consequently, copy-
right owners will not face an impossible task when tracking down the
individuals responsible for facilitating the mainstream illegal activity.
160. See generally Gnutella, at http://www.gnutellanews.cominformation/what-is-gnutella.
shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (providing information on how Gnutella works);
http://gnutellanews.com/information/ firewalls.shtml (last modified May 21, 2000) (providing
information on how to establish a connection across a firewall).
161. See, e.g., Mia Garlick, The Ups and Downs of the Napster Revolution, at
http://www.gtlaw.com.au/templates/publications/default.jsp?pubid=42 (Dec. 9, 2000) (explaining
that Gnutella users must know a Gnutella server's numeric Internet protocol address to use the
program since Gnutella servers change several times daily).
162. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1029.
163. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
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Although the Recording Industry Association of America would
probably like to ban altogether the use of MP3 files except where copy-
right owners retain exclusive control of the reproduction and distribution
of the works, a better solution is to find a balance between technology
and copyright law.' 64 Currently, as the lawmakers focus on expanding
existing copyright law to allow greater protection to copyright owners on
the Internet, record companies and other members of the music industry
are joining forces to improve security measures.' 65 The Secure Digital
Music Initiative ("SDMI") is one step the music industry has taken to
improve security.'" In particular, the SDMI is preparing to release its
"black box" technology, which will "work in conjunction with 'water-
marks' to help filter out pirated music. ' 67 In essence, the SDMI water-
marking technology distorts the sound of a particular song if a pirate
attempts to copy the watermarked song.'6" Even though this "black box"
technology seems like a simple solution for preventing future digital mu-
sic piracy, the technology still has glitches that developers will have to
eliminate. Also, watermarking technology does not solve the existing
piracy problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technology is advancing at a rapid speed. Internet users have the
ability to transfer information all over the world with the click of a single
button. In a matter of seconds, data within one file is broken up into
pieces and transmitted over cable or phone lines to be rapidly reassem-
bled into a copy of the original file. Even more astounding is the fact that
these data transfers can be done anonymously between two personal
computers without leaving a trace behind. While legislators try to shape
the laws to keep up with new technology, such amendments become out-
dated before the lawmakers etch them on paper. While huge record com-
panies spend millions of dollars on lawsuits to recoup the pennies they
lose each time a song is shared among a community of music fans, a new
Internet service or device is developed to take the place of the previous
one.
The Napster case is an indication that history is repeating itself.
With the advent of radio in the 1930s, entertainers perceived radio as a
threat to their earnings through live performance. 69 Only gradually did
164. The Recording Industry Association of America is one of the biggest opponents of
Napster and other similar systems on the Internet. See Napster Lawsuit Q&A at
http://www.riaa.com/Napster.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
165. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 38, at 179 (explaining that the Secure Digital Music
Initiative is an industry security initiative).
166. See id
167. Id. at 171.
168. See id
169. See Robert A. Gorman, The Recording Musician and Union Power: A Case Study of the
American Federation of Musicians, 37 Sw. L.J. 697, 702 (1983).
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entertainers fully appreciate the lucrative effect radio could have on their
music sales through mass communication. Today, many entertainers and
record companies view the Internet as a threat to compact disc sales.
However, like the tremendously positive effect radio had on performers'
popularity and potential earnings, the Internet possesses the same possi-
bilities, if used appropriately and within the guidelines of the law. Un-
doubtedly, Napster and other P2P systems provide a novel and innova-
tive means of sharing information. On the other hand, despite the poten-
tial of P2P systems becoming a lucrative new avenue to promote artists
and their music, copyright owners have every right to prevent the distri-
bution of unauthorized copies of their work to millions of Internet users
without their consent.
Jennifer Gokenbach
A &M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.: COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ON THE INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution vests in Congress the power to pro-
tect the creative works of authors and inventors.' In order to facilitate
technological advancement, Congress has utilized its express constitu-
tional authority by making necessary changes to federal copyright law.2
The Federal Copyright Act is an example of modernization of Congres-
sional copyright law.3 At present, United States copyright law protects an
artist's work from the moment the work is completed, regardless of
whether the artist has notified the public of the work's authorship.4
Alternatively, innovative technology has also demanded that Con-
gress provide the general public with exceptions and defenses to an al-
leged violation of copyright law.' Consumers have the ability to repro-
duce copyrighted works with the aid of advanced technologies through
the use of photographic cameras, video recorders, and dual cassette
decks. The Audio Home Recording Act is one example of Congressional
efforts to minimize consumer liability when using these products.6 The
Act insulates individuals from liability for the manufacture or distribu-
tion of devices that digitally record audio mediums, or for employing
these mechanisms in a noncommercial fashion.7 Another example is the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which shields Internet service pro-
viders from liability based on use of the network by subscribers.8
Despite Congressional efforts, legislative responses to ever-
changing computer technology are often outdated upon introduction.9
The courts' propensity to defer to Congress regarding copyright law
compounds this problem.'0 Traditionally, courts have "refused to unilat-
erally broaden protections in response to technological change."" In re-
sponse to technological advancement, however, courts are being called
I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See April M. Major, Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another Challenge: The Electronic
Frontier of the Worldwide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 75, 76 (1998).
3. Id. at 86.
4. Id.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2001).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
7. Id.
8. See idL at. § 512.
9. Kevin Davis, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34 U.S.F.
L.REV. 129, 162 (1999).
10. Id. at 132.
11. Id.
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upon to move away from their deferential stance and enjoin the harmful
treatment of copyrighted works.'2
II. FACTS
A California student created Napster, Inc. to assist his college
roommate's efforts to exchange music with others. 3 Napster software
provides a forum in which users may distribute, trade, or download mu-
sic files free over the Internet. 4 A subscriber can use Napster to share a
collection of music with others by first copying compact discs to a com-
puter hard drive and then uploading those files onto the Napster
network." While the contents of those files remain on the uploading
user's hard drive, Napster lists the files in an on-line "collective direc-
tory."' 6 All Napster subscribers may then access this library via the Inter-
net.'"
Napster's system grew out of recent technology that uncovered a
new digital file format which can be used to store audio recordings,
commonly referred to as MP3 files.'" By compressing audio recordings
onto a computer's hard drive from a compact disc, this digital format
allows a person to transmit these files to another computer very quickly
by the use of an electronic mail account.' 9 Napster, through a process
referred to as 'peer-to-peer file sharing,' essentially "facilitates the
transmission of MP3 files between and among users."20
While Napster is currently a free service, the company was not de-
signed to be a non-profit organization.2' With an estimated 75 million
current users, over 100 people try to gain access to Napster every
second . Napster "plans to delay the maximization of revenues while it
attracts a large user base," and the "value of the system grows as the
quantity and quality of available music increases., 23 The company
planned to eventually 'monetize' its system through the use of advertis-
ing, marketing products and paybacks for providing links to other related
sites.2
12. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 64 U.S. 417, 457 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
13. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D.Cal. 2000).
14. Id. at 901.
15. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).





21. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D.Cal. 2000).
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Nearly all of the files that are uploaded or downloaded through
Napster's system are copyrighted.2 "Napster, Inc. has never obtained
licenses to distribute or download, or to facilitate others in distributing or
downloading, the music" copyrighted to others.26 Nevertheless, Napster
has continued to grow in size and popularity as a source for people to
increase their musical collections without having to pay what they would
ordinarily be required to pay by the copyright holder. 7
III. BACKGROUND
In 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the issue
of time-shifting, which involves the copying of a copyrighted work for
the convenience of watching or listening to it at a different time.: Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. brought an action alleging that the consumers of
video tape recorders (VTRs), manufactured by Sony Corporation of
America, were infringing on Universal's copyrights by recording copy-
righted works broadcast on television for later viewing. Universal
sought an injunction against the manufacture of the video tape recorders,
in addition to monetary damages. ° In denying relief to Universal, the
district court applied 'fair use' case law to determine whether the use of
VTRs was infringing, instrumentally affecting modem copyright law.3 '
As codified in Title 17 of the United States Code, a court may iden-
tify and weigh several factors in deciding whether the use of copyrighted
material constitutes fair use.32 Those factors include the character and
purpose of the material, the nature of the work, the amount copied, and
the market effects caused by the alleged infringement. 33 After considering
the facts in light of these factors, the district court concluded that "non-
commercial home-use" of VTRs was a fair use and ruled for Sony on all
claims.'
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding Sony liable for
contributory infringement.35 On review, the Supreme Court overturned
the Ninth Circuit's decision, ruling that Sony had prevailed in regard to
contributory infringement because the company had shown that most of
the copyright holders, particularly those involved with "sports, religious,
educational and other programming," approved of time-shifting. 6 The
25, Id. at 902-03.
26. Id. at 903.
27. Id. at 914.
28. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,421 (1984).
29. Id. at 420.
30. Id.
31. See Davis, supra note 9, at 136.
32. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-48.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
34. See Davis, supra note 9, at 136.
35. Id.
36. Sonyv, 464 U.S. at 443-44.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court stated that "a finding of contributory infringement would
inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of
their audience that is available only through time-shifting."3 Further-
more, the Court reasoned, Universal had failed to identify any possible
significant harm to potential markets for the copyrighted work." The
Court relied heavily on the fact that once a program had been recorded
onto a hard copy, that tape was not normally used in any illegal or pro-
hibited way.39
In 1994, the Court again used the fair use doctrine to rule in favor of
an alleged infringer of copyrighted works in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music.4° The case involved the leader of the musical group 2 Live Crew,
Luther Campbell, who was sued for infringing upon the copyrights of
Acuff-Rose Music. 4' The alleged infringement occurred when 2 Live
Crew recorded and distributed a commercial parody of Roy Orbison's
"Pretty Woman."42 Significantly, the Court protected Campbell under the
doctrine of fair use even though the reproduced work was commercial in
nature as opposed to the private use of recorded television programs in
Sony.43 The Court applied the factors of fair use listed in 17 U.S.C. §107,
and found that the original work had been transformed into a new work,
in this case a parody, and neither the commercial nature nor the fact that
the work had been copied in its entirety undercut Campbell's fair use of
the song."4
In 1995 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California heard a landmark case involving an allegation of copyright
infringement.4 5 Religious Technology Center sued Netcom, an on-line
system operator, for contributory copyright infringement. 46 Netcom had
been maintaining a 'computer bulletin board' on which both infringing
and non-infringing material was found posted.47 The significance of this
case rests with the court's insistence that the operator of a computer sys-
tem must have actual knowledge of infringing acts to be liable for con-
tributory copyright infringement.48 The Religious Technology court de-
termined that a service provider such as Netcom can be found liable for
contributory copyright infringement when it fails to remove material
37. Id. at 446.
38. Id.
39. Davis, supra note 9, at 137.
40. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
41. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
42. Davis, supra note 9, at 141.
43. Id. at 143.
44. Id. at 142.
45. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
46. See Religious Tech, 907 F.Supp. at 1361.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 1374.
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subsequent to being notified by the copyright holder of the material's
infringing nature.4 9 The Court further confirmed that secondary liability
in regard to copyright infringement relies on a finding of direct infringe-
ment by a third party. 50
Two recent decisions, Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia
Church of God"' and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,5 have
both given today's courts added guidance when confronted with copy-
right infringement claims. The Worldwide court noted that commercial
use does not depend on the sale of the reproduced material. 53 Rather, the
proper inquiry of whether a reproduced copyrighted work is used for
profit is "whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price. '" The UMG court
determined that the compression of an audio compact disk onto an MP-3
does not transform the work. ' Unlike Luther Campbell's transformation
of "Pretty Woman" into a parody, the use of MP3s does not make the
necessary transformation to be determined a fair use in light of the fac-
tors listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107.56
IV. A&M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.
In August of 2000, plaintiffs A&M Records, et. al., sought and re-
ceived a preliminary injunction from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.57 That injunction enjoined Napster
from "engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, up-
loading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state
law, without express permission of the rights owner." 8 The district court
based the injunction on its finding that the plaintiffs own the copyrights
for around seventy percent of the files downloaded from the Napster site
and that Napster materially contributes to the downloading of those
works.59
On review in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Beezer addressed the issues
of whether the district court had employed appropriate legal standards
governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction and also whether the
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1371.
51. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1486 (2001).
52. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
53. Worldwide, 227 F.3d at 1117.
54. Id. (citing Harper & Rowe, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
55. UMG, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
56. Id.
57. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affid, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
58. Napster, 114 F. Supp 2d at 927.
59. See id.
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district court correctly apprehended the law with respect to the underly-
ing issues of the case.60 Holding preliminary injunctive relief available
only when a party "demonstrates either: (1) a combination of probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that
serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips in its fa-
vor, '' 1 the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
62manded the case for decision in compliance with its ruling.
The appellate court first affirmed the district court's findings that
the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of direct infringement by
Napster users.63 Such a showing requires that a plaintiff demonstrate (1)
ownership of material allegedly infringed, and (2) that at least one right
given copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. §106 has been violated.64 Find-
ing that the record supported a conclusion of copyright ownership over
the material allegedly infringed, the Ninth Circuit noted that two exclu-
sive rights under 17 U.S.C. §106 had been violated: the right of repro-
duction,65 evidenced by the downloading of files from Napster's site, and
the right of distribution,' as evidenced by the uploading of files onto
67Napster's site.
The appellate court went on to affirm that Napster's users are not
fair users under the factors of 17 U.S.C. §107.6 Napster had unsuccess-
fully argued that people who use Napster's site are merely involved in
sampling, space-shifting, and permissive distribution.69 The Ninth Circuit
generally affirmed the district court's findings, relying on the holding in
UMG Recordings that no transformation occurs when music is com-
pressed to compact disc, which means that the purpose and character of
the work remains unchanged. 70 Also relevant to the first factor under
§ 107 is whether the reproduction is commercial rather than personal. The
court deferred to the precedent of Worldwide Church of God that
"[d]irect economic benefit is not required to demonstrate commercial
use. Rather, repeated and exploitive copying of copyrighted works, even
if copies are not offered for sale, may constitute commercial use.",7' Here,
60. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 1029.
63. See id. at 1013.
64. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2001) (explaining that infringement equals the
violation of rights listed in § 106).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
66. id. at § 106(3).
67. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
68. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
69. See id.
70. See id at 1015 (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
71. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015 (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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the court focused on the fact that uploading music to share and trade with
others does not evidence personal use.72
After agreeing with the district court that under the second factor the
original work is creative in nature, the court then focused on the third
factor, specifically the portion of the original used. 3 While finding no
error in the district court's conclusion that the fact that Napster users
trade and download entire copyrighted works favors the plaintiffs, the
appellate court made clear that wholesale copying, by itself, is generally
fair use under the holding of Sony."
Finally, regarding the effect on the market, the appellate court re-
jected Napster's claim that permissive uses such as sampling invalidate
plaintiffs' claim of harm to a new, potential market." Specifically, the
appellate court noted that because the effect on the current market does
not mediate a claim that a potential market is harmed, and due to the
commercial nature, sampling here does not lend itself to the defendants.
7 6
Finding no error in the district court's decision that space-shifting is not
fair use in regard to Napster users, the court distinguished the present
facts from those of Sony. In Sony, the video recordings were viewed by
individuals in their home. Here, however, once a work is recorded it is
simultaneously distributed to the general public.77 The court found no
reason to address Napster's argument that other uses, such as permissive
use, are fair uses, since plaintiffs did not challenge that point on appeal].
The appellate court further affirmed the district court's ruling that
"plaintiffs in all likelihood would establish Napster's liability as a con-
tributory infringer," since Napster's very conduct is evidence that it
"knowingly encourages and assists the infringement of plaintiffs' copy-
rights." 79 The Ninth Circuit refused to allow Napster protection under
Sony, pointing out that Sony had constructive knowledge that users could
infringe, as compared to Napster's actual and constructive knowledge
that infringement was taking place.Y The Napster Court added that the
Son), Court found the use of Sony's products substantially non-
infringing, as compared to plaintiffs' present allegations.8'
Nevertheless, the appellate court then departed from the reasoning
of the district court, which "improperly confined the use analysis to cur-
72. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
73. See id. at 1016.
74. See id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
75. SeeNapster, 239F.3dat 1016, 1018.
76. See id at 1018.
77. See id. at 1019.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1020.
80. See id. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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rent uses, ignoring the system's capabilities.,1 2 While the court did not
hold the district court's ruling on this issue clearly erroneous regarding
plaintiffs' probable success, it stressed the holding of Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc.,s which determined that a
computer system operator is not liable for infringing uses of the service
by others absent sufficient knowledge, demonstrated by a copyright
holder providing documentation to the service provider informing it that
infringing activities are taking place on the service.'M By providing "the
site and facilities" by which its users can infringe upon plaintiffs' copy-
righted works, the court found that Napster materially contributes to
copyright infringement, adding to the probable success on the issue of
contributory liability.85
Regarding vicarious liability, the appellate court again affirmed.86
Agreeing that Napster receives a financial benefit, the Ninth Circuit re-
marked that "financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing
material 'acts as a 'draw' for customers.'- 7 Further, the court held that
Napster has failed to employ its policing power, instead turning its back
to allegations of infringement occurring on its site thereby violating the
ruling of Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. , that the ability to block
infringing activity evidences supervision as required for vicarious liabil-
ity.
89
Napster argued that, in any event, a preliminary injunction should
have been denied due to two statutes: 90 the Audio Home Recording Act
(AHRA) of 19929' and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)9
Napster argued specifically that its users are protected by the AHRA
from claims of copyright infringement, and that Napster is alternatively
protected from contributory and vicarious liability under the DMCA.9
The appellate court responded first by interpreting the AHRA as not cov-
ering the "downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives," since the
"primary purpose" of computers is not to record, and computers record in
a different manner than that outlined in the Act.9" However, regarding the
applicability of the DMCA, the appellate court disagreed with the district
82. Id. at 1021.
83. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
84. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
85. Id. at 1022.
86. See id. at 1024.
87. Id. at 1023 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir.
1996)).
88. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-64.
89. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
90. See id. at 1024.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
92. Id. at § 512(a)-(d).
93. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
94. Id.
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court's finding that § 512 of the DMCA is always inapplicable to secon-
dary infringers.95 Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the district
court's ruling that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because
"plaintiffs raise[d] serious questions regarding Napster's ability to obtain
shelter under § 512, and plaintiffs also demonstrate that the balance of
hardships tips in their favor."9
Particularly concerned with the district court's over-sweeping view
of contributory liability, the appellate court ultimately decided that the
preliminary injunction, while warranted, needed modification. 97 "Specifi-
cally, [the appellate court] reiterate[d] that contributory liability may
potentially be imposed only to the extent that Napster: (1) receives rea-
sonable knowledge of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings; (2) knows or should know that such
files are available on the Napster system; and (3) fails to act to prevent
viral distribution of the works."'98 The court held that Napster could still
be vicariously liable, "when it fails . . . to patrol its system and preclude
access to potentially infringing files listed in its search index."99 The
court held, however, that the injunction was overbroad in that it relied
only on Napster to protect plaintiffs works, above and beyond the re-
quirement that Napster "police the system within the limits of the sys-
tem. ' "'o° The appellate court placed the burden on the plaintiffs to provide
notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works
available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable
access to the offending content.'0 ' The Ninth Circuit having stayed the
preliminary injunction pending appeal ruled that the injunction was to
remain stayed until modified in accordance with its decision.'0 2
The District Court for the Northern District of California reissued its
preliminary injunction against Napster in accordance with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's findings on March 5, 2001.103 The district court again enjoined
Napster from "engaging in, or facilitating others in, copying, download-
ing, uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted sound recordings
... ,,104 However this injunction required plaintiffs to provide Napster
with notice of copyrighted material, and specifically stated that both
"parties shall use reasonable measures in identifying variations of the
95. See id. at 1025 (construing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d)).
96. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
97. Id. at 1027
98. Id. (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
99. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1029.
103. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183 MHP, 2001 WL 227083, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
104. A&M. Records, Inc., 2001 WL 227083 at *1.
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filename(s), or of the spelling of the titles or artists' names, of the works
identified by plaintiffs."' ' The district court further reiterated the Ninth
Circuit's ruling that the burden of keeping plaintiff's copyrighted mate-
rial is on both parties.' 6
V. ANALYSIS
A. Congress v. The Courts
These cases illustrate a shift of opinion regarding the role of the judi-
ciary when confronted with copyright issues. Courts, including the ma-
jority in Sony, have long deferred to congressional decisions concerning
the fit of modem technologies with copyright law. 07 As the Sony Court
aptly stated, "[r]epeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this
country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that
new technology made necessary."'O' Overturning the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision that the taping of televised programs on equipment
manufactured by Sony was not fair use, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that "[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
market for copyrighted materials."'O'
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and
Rehnquist, attacking the majority's deferential stance, calling their deci-
sion a way to "evade the hard issues when they arise in the area of copy-
right law." ° It is important to note that the same court that heard Nap-
ster's appeals found Sony secondarily liable for copyright infringement,
declaring that because most of the material recorded by Sony betamax
machines was copyrighted work, "[Sony's machines] (VTRs) were not
suitable for any substantial noninfringing use. . . ."' The Ninth Circuit
also declined to accept a fair use defense by Sony because the "cumula-
tive effect of mass production made possible by VTRs would tend to
diminish the potential market."" 2
The Ninth Circuit's line of reasoning in the present case is strikingly
similar. Much debate exists as to whether the use of Napster currently
harms or supports plaintiff's business."3 However, when applying the fair
use doctrine factor that examines the effect of use on the market," 4 the
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
108. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31.
109. Id. at 431.
110. Id. at 457.
111. Id. at 428.
112. Id. at 427.
113. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2001).
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again relied on the effect on plaintiffs'
potential market (distribution of copyrighted works on the Internet), even
if plaintiffs' current business is not harmed."5 This is a crucial finding, as
copyright holders do not have exclusive rights for those uses that are
determined fair under the factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107. " '
Technology will continue to present innovative businesses with
many new and untested markets. The Sony Court's majority opinion,
refusing to interfere with Congress's constitutional duty in regard to the
expansion or reduction of copyright holders' rights, seems overwhelm-
ingly sensible from this view. Through the use of special committees and
other resources, Congress likely has the means to make more informed
decisions than the judiciary, regardless of how long the decisional proc-
ess takes when compared to the speed of technological changes. This
case, on the other hand, is evidence of the fact that many courts will not
wait for Congress to act when confronted with copyright problems.
B. The Audio Home Recording Act and The Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act
Congress enacted the Audio Home Recording Act"7 in October of
1992, eight years after the Supreme Court decided in Sony to defer to
Congress the power to decide the issue of copyright infringement in re-
lation to the manufacture and use of home audio recording devices.
Therein, Congress exempted the production and implementation of these
devices for noncommercial uses."8 Again, just three years after the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California decided that a web site
host needs specific knowledge of infringing activities as well as time to
correct or somehow stop the infringing activity on its site before it will
be liable for copyright infringement, Congress responded to technologi-
cal advances by passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act." 9 This
legislation provides that a service provider of 'transitory digital network
communications' will not be held liable for copyright infringement based
on the infringing activities of its users, according to certain guidelines.'2°
It is possible that Congress will either amend these acts or draft some-
thing new in order to define when a provider of services similar to those
of Napster is responsible for copyright infringement.
The reasoning of both the district court and the appellate court in
denying Napster's users protection under the Audio Home Recording
Act relied primarily on the fact that "under the plain meaning of the
115. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017.
116. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 433; 17 U.S.C. § 107.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
118. See id. at § 1008.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2001).
120. See id.
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Act's definition of digital audio recording devices, computers (and their
hard drives) are not digital audio recording devices because their 'pri-
mary purpose' is not to make digital audio copied recordings.' 2' A lay
reading of the statute's name, however, implies that uses of home re-
cording devices will not render a user liable of copyright infringement.
Napster's defense to contributory and vicarious liability is not as
clear. The district court insisted that a finding of potential contributory
and vicarious liability required that Napster be precluded from the insu-
lation afforded by §512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 22 The
appellate court refused to decide the issue, ruling that such potential li-
ability did not make the statute invalid per se, and left that question for
the district court on remand.' 23 Only because the plaintiffs "raised serious
questions regarding Napster's ability to obtain shelter under §512," com-
bined with plaintiffs' demonstration "that the balance of hardships tips in
their favor" did the Ninth Circuit affirm the district court's findings.'
Section 512 provides that a "service provider shall not be liable...
for injunctive or other relief' so long as the work is transmitted by some-
one other than the service provider. In other words, the material is trans-
mitted through a process that does not require the "selection of material
by the service provider," recipients of works are not selected by the
service provider, "no copy of the material made by the service provider
in the course of intennediate or transient storage" is accessible to per-
sons other than the intended recipients, and the material passes through
the service provider's site unchanged. 25 On remand, the district court
will be forced to interpret this statute. Of interest is the fact that the copy
of the MP3 file viewed by the other users who are logged on to Napster's
site is a copy that was made by the uploading user.126 Napster does not
copy the material listed on a user's computer, another user does. 27 Nap-
ster merely provides the forum for this to take place.'
28
In Sony, Universal unsuccessfully relied on the holding of Kalem
Co. v. Harper Brothers,'29 which found liable a producer who had made a
film dramatization of a copyrighted work.' 30 The Sony Court distin-
guished the facts of Kalem, in which a product displaying a recorded
performance was sold. 3' "The producer had personally appropriated the
121. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
122. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
126. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-12.
127. Id. at 1012.
128. Id.
129. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
130. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435-36 (1984).
131. Sony, 464 U.S. at 436.
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copyright owner's protected work and, as the owner of the tangible me-
dium of expression upon which the protected work was recorded,
authorized that use."'' The Kalem court disagreed that the producer had
any right to authorize this use of the film, adding that the producer had
also advertised the infringing product.'
3
The Sony court, in contrasting the film involved in Kalem with the
recording machine sold by Sony, stressed that the recorders are only a
means by which to reproduce, and Sony did not advertise infringing ac-
tivities.'T 4 "Sony supplies a piece of equipment that is generally capable
of copying the entire range of programs that may be televised: those that
are uncopyrighted, those that are copyrighted but may be copied without
objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright holder
would prefer not to have copied."'35 The Court certainly seemed to be
impressed by the range of uses by which the VTRs could be used.' 36
It is very possible that the district court will subsequently find Nap-
ster insulated by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The consequence
of that finding would be devastating to the plaintiffs' position. Since it is
Napster that the plaintiffs wish to enjoin, a finding that Napster's users
are liable for direct infringement while Napster is protected by statute
would frustrate the plaintiffs' hardship claims.
If Napster is alternatively found liable for secondary copyright in-
fringement, the line of liability may indeed become a slippery slope. That
finding could possibly mean that an Internet search engine, such as Ya-
hoo, that routes a web user to Napster's site is also vicariously liable. It is
obvious that search engines provide a service to obtain financial benefit,
and they also have the power to supervise what Internet sites are to be
found through the search function of such an engine. Would Yahoo be
forced to block or remove infringing material with notice by a copyright
holder? What about the manufacturer of the equipment that facilitates
these functions? Would Sony control? The answer likely lies with the
decision of Napster's liability by the district court on remand.
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright law in the United States continues to remain flexible,
though fundamentally lacking predictability. While traditionally relying
on the power of Congress to establish laws reflecting changed technol-
ogy, businesses such as Napster must now study judicial trends. As mod-
em technology affords the public faster and more efficient means by
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will likely be unable to keep up with technological advances in regard to
the infringement of copyrighted works.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. suggests that some courts are
willing to assist in the effort to provide public access to copyrighted
works while reserving the rights of the holder. There is no guarantee that
courts will be equipped to apply narrow technological statutes to specific
factual situations. When a statute does not seem to address an unexpected
factual situation made possible by modem technology, such as the use of
MP3s on computers, courts are required to substitute their judgment for
that of Congress. Technological advances will demand that courts apply
facts to ever-changing technological conditions, leaving case precedent
outdated almost immediately upon announcement. It seems, therefore,
that Congress will have the most success in guiding copyright law
through the twenty-first century. However it is anyone's guess as to
whether courts in the future will agree.
In the meantime, decisions such as Sony and the shelter of 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 should lead companies such as Napster to reconsider the structure
of their business. The Ninth Circuit's refusal to find Napster's users "fair
users" relied in part on the fact that the use of Napster was likely com-
mercial, due to the nature of uploading files containing music onto Nap-
ster's site, allowing all others also logged on at that time to view and
download these files. Napster or a competitor might be able to fashion a
similar service whereby it only provides the means by which to record,
similar to the machines used in Sony. The simple copying between users
who have found each other through their own endeavor certainly seems
less commercial than the uploading of files for the general public to
copy.
Not allowing the uploading of files would also serve to weaken the
argument regarding future markets. If record companies and performers
are concerned with not being able to sell their product over the Internet,
simple trading and copying between private individuals probably would
have little economic effect, as those people could record the same onto
tape or compact disk at home with no penalty.
The Ninth Circuit also distinguished the facts of Napster from Sony,
stating that Napster had more than the constructive knowledge found in
Sony. The elimination of the uploading feature might again strengthen
the position of Napster. In any case, a few changes in the functions of
Napster's web site could drastically change the legal situation, moving
the facts of Napster much closer to those of Sony.
A fundamental difference between Internet services like Napster and
other recording mediums, such as dual cassette decks and video record-
ers is the sheer number of people who use the service. Most recording
technology still requires people to find another who most likely bought
an official copy of the copyrighted work. These methods allow people to
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potentially engage in infringing activities, however, the actual method of
making copies assures that there is little effect on a copyright holder's
current and potential markets, as it is usually only the copyright holder
that has the means to mass-produce and mass-market a copyrighted
work. Napster's site, on the other hand, imposes on a copyright holder's
ability to outnumber possibly infringing uses by allowing millions of
people to access one person's uploaded music files. Viewed in this sense,
legal scholars will perhaps never be able to justify the co-existence of
decisions like Sony and Napster. If that is the case, Congress again ap-
pears the best equipped to make technological decisions regarding copy-
right law, since, unlike courts of law, legislation does not have to follow
a consistent, logical path of reasoning.
Jesse Wiens

